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ABSTRACT 
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(CONOPS).  Basic operational Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) were defined.  
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KPPs.  Related research topics included radar parameter sensitivity, cooling, search 
pattern options, Electronic Attack (EA), ship flexure, topside array layout, supportability, 
and cost.  Finally, reaction time modeling was conducted to quantify the increase in 



























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  v
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....................................................................................................1 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................5 
A. MOTIVATION ................................................................................................5 
B. PREVIOUS WORK.........................................................................................6 
C. SCOPE OF PROJECT AND PAPER ORGANIZATION...........................6 
1. Scope and Tasking from NPS .............................................................6 
2. Organization.........................................................................................7 
II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND THREAT DESCRIPTION..........................9 
A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS......................................................................9 
1. BMD Mission........................................................................................9 
2. Threat Summary................................................................................10 
3. Operational View and Scenarios ......................................................12 
III. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OF REQUIREMENTS 
DEVELOPMENT FOR OPPORTUNISTIC ARRAY RADAR ...........................15 
A. DARBC PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS..............................................15 
1. Operational Parameters ....................................................................16 
2. Technical Parameters ........................................................................17 
3. Array Element Density and Integration ..........................................29 
4. Electronic Warfare ............................................................................32 
5. Element Wireless Communications..................................................34 
6. Cooling Requirements .......................................................................34 
7. Search Pattern Recommendations ...................................................40 
8. Logistics Considerations....................................................................44 
9. Ship Flexure Impacts.........................................................................45 
B. PROGRAM CONSIDERATIONS...............................................................54 
1. Cost......................................................................................................54 
2. Strategies for Future Development and Evaluation (SEP) ............58 
3. DOTLMPF..........................................................................................60 
IV. MODELING EFFORTS ...........................................................................................63 
A. RADAR CROSS SECTION (RCS) MODELING ......................................63 
B. RADAR PERFORMANCE MODEL ..........................................................66 
C. REACTION TIME ANALYSIS ONE SHIP TWO SENSOR 
SCENARIO ....................................................................................................67 
D. REACTION TIME ANALYSIS TWO SHIP TWO SENSOR 
SCENARIO ....................................................................................................74 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................79 
A. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................79 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS...............................................................................79 
1. DARBC Modeling ..............................................................................79 
2. DARBC Ship Integration ..................................................................80 
3. DARBC Operational Requirements.................................................81 
  vi
4. Life Cycle Cost Model .......................................................................81 
APPENDIX A.  MATLAB RCS MODEL ...........................................................................83 
APPENDIX B.  MAPLE RADAR TECHNICAL PARAMETERS MODEL..................89 
APPENDIX C.  SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION......................................................95 
END NOTES ........................................................................................................................279 
INITIAL DISTRIUTION LIST..........................................................................................285 
 
  vii
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Ballistic Missile Flight Paths ...........................................................................12 
Figure 2. DARBC Operational View ..............................................................................13 
Figure 3. Illustration of the Doppler Shift Effect ............................................................21 
Figure 4. Calculated Handoff Range to S-Band Radar ...................................................23 
Figure 5. DARBC PD vs. Range Performance Using the UHF Spectrum.......................24 
Figure 6. DARBC PD vs. Range Performance Using the VHF Spectrum.......................25 
Figure 7. VHF Radar PD vs. Power at a Range of 748 km..............................................26 
Figure 8. UHF Radar PD vs. Power at a Range of 748 km..............................................26 
Figure 9. VHF Gain vs. PD at a Range of 748 km...........................................................27 
Figure 10. UHF Gain vs. PD at a Range of 748 km...........................................................28 
Figure 11. VHF PD vs. Number of Elements at a Range of 748 km .................................29 
Figure 12. Coupling Coefficient vs. Separation of Antenna Elements .............................31 
Figure 13. Thermal Resistance for Various Cooling Fluids6 ............................................38 
Figure 14. Thermoelectric Cooling6..................................................................................39 
Figure 15. Fence Search ....................................................................................................42 
Figure 16. Fence Search Transition to Track ....................................................................42 
Figure 17. Conical Scanning .............................................................................................44 
Figure 18. Ship Flexure Impact to Beam Formation and Detection Range ......................49 
Figure 19. Head-On and Crossing Aspect Angles ............................................................50 
Figure 20. RCS for Cylindrical Reflector .........................................................................64 
Figure 21. RCS as a Function of Aspect Angle for S-Band..............................................65 
Figure 22. RCS as a Function of Aspect Angle for VHF..................................................65 
Figure 23. RCS as a Function of Aspect Angle for UHF..................................................66 
Figure 24. SRBM Flight Path and Time-Range Plot (400 km launch range) ...................70 
Figure 25. MRBM Flight Path and Time-Range Plot (600 km launch range)..................70 
Figure 26. IRBM Flight Path and Time-Range Plot (900 km launch range) ....................71 
Figure 27. DARBC Gains Against SRBM........................................................................72 
Figure 28. DARBC Gains Against MRBM.......................................................................72 
Figure 29. DARBC Gains Against IRBM.........................................................................73 
Figure 30. Arena Model 1:  DARBC Designates to Remote S-Band Ship .......................76 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  ix
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Ballistic Missile Flight Path Characteristics ....................................................11 
Table 2. KPPs for the DARBC System..........................................................................16 
Table 3. Parameter Values Used in the Maple Analysis................................................23 
Table 4. Potential T/R Element Substrate Materials and Properties8 ............................35 
Table 5. T/R Module Material Properties8.....................................................................36 
Table 6. Advantages / Disadvantages for Various Cooling Methods7, 8 ........................37 
Table 7. Error Budget for Ship Flexure .........................................................................53 
Table 8. Risk Rating Levels...........................................................................................55 
Table 9. Manpower Risk Metrics...................................................................................56 
Table 10. Design Interface Metrics..................................................................................57 
Table 11. Radar Alignment Risk......................................................................................58 
Table 12 Arena Model Parameters..................................................................................74 
Table 13. Times When Local Sensor Aided by DARBC ................................................77 

























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  xi
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
Acronym Definition 
Ao Operational Availability 
AD Air Defense 
ASCM Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
BMD Ballistic Missile Defense 
CAS Computer Algebra System 
CDD Capability Development Document 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
CONUS Continental United States 
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf 
DARBC Digital Array Radar for BMD and Counter-Stealth 
DDS Direct Digital Synthesizer 
DIRM Design Interface Risk Matrix 
DoD Department of Defense 
DOF Degree Of Freedom 
DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education,
Personnel, and Facilities 
EA Electronic Attack 
ECM Electronic Counter Measure 
EMP Electromagnetic Pulses 
ESM Electronic Surveillance Measures (System) 
ETG Electronic Target Generator 
EW Electronic Warfare 
FDFI Fault Detection Fault Isolation 
FMS Foreign Military Sales 
GaAs Gallium Arsenide 
GPS Global Positioning System 
HEL High Energy Laser 
ICBM Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile 
ICD Initial Capabilities Document 
IO Information Operations 
IR Infra-Red 
IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile 
JBMC2 Joint Battle Management Command and Control 
KEI Kinetic Energy Interceptor 
KPP Key Performance Parameters 
LCC Life Cycle Cost 
LNA Low Noise Amplifier 
LOS Line of Sight 
MDA Missile Defense Agency 
MHz Megahertz 
  xii
MIC Miniature Integrated Chip 
MMIC Micro Miniature Integrated Chip 
MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile 
MSSE Master of Science Systems Engineering 
MTBF Mean Time Before Failure 
MTTR Mean Time To Repair 
NATO North American Treaty Organization 
NAVICP Navy Inventory Control Point  
NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command 
NNEMP Non-Nuclear Electro-Magnetic Pulse 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
NSWC PHD Naval Surface Warfare Center Port Hueneme Division 
NTSP Navy Training System Plan 
OA Opportunistic Array 
OASR Opportunistic Array Surveillance Radar 
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer 
OV Operational View 
PD Probability of Detection 
PFA Probability of False Alarm 
QRS Quartz Rate Sensor 
RCS Radar Cross Section 
RM&A Reliability, Maintainability, Availability 
RV Re-entry Vehicle 
SATCOM Satellite Communication 
SE Support Equipment 
SEP Systems Engineering Plan 
SESEF Shipboard Electronic Systems Evaluation Facility 
SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile 
SM-3 Standard Missile - 3 
S/N Signal to Noise Ratio 
SNR Signal to Noise Ratio 
SRBM Short Range Ballistic Missile 
TBM  Theater Ballistic Missile  
TEL  Transportable Erectable Launchers  
TEMP  Test and Evaluation Master Plan  
T/R  Transmit-Receive  
UNREP Underway Replenishment 
USAF United States Air Force 
UHF Ultra High Frequency 
URMTT Universal Radar Moving Target Transponder 
USN United States Navy 
VHF Very High Frequency 
WCS Weapon Control Sensor 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
  xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
We would like to acknowledge our project advisor, Professor Mike Green, for his 
guidance throughout the project; Professors William Solitario, David Jenn, Michael 
Melich, and Rodney Johnson for their insight into the problem; Andy Summers from 
NAVSEA-05 for his thoughts concerning the integration of the Aperstructure; Ross 
Howard from NSWC PHD for his insight on ship flexure and error budget impacts; and 



























The purpose of this Capstone project was to perform a detailed system analysis for 
a Very High Frequency (VHF) / Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Digital Array Radar for 
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and Counter-Stealth (DARBC).   Results of this 
analysis have been recorded in an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD)1 and Capabilities 
Design Document (CDD)2. 
United States Navy (USN) sources indicate a need for long-range (order of 
thousands of kilometers) shipboard radar for BMD to augment and expand current 
capabilities to defend against the increasing ballistic missile threat. The Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) is conducting radar architecture research based on an 
Opportunistic Array (OA) and is assessing the needed critical technologies to be 
incorporated into a ship-wide digital phased array radar.3  An OA radar is an integrated, 
ship-wide, digital, phased-array radar, in which antenna elements are placed at available 
open areas over the entire ship’s length.  The DARBC has the potential to fulfill the U.S. 
Navy’s BMD sensor missions, including long-range search, detection, track and 
preliminary discrimination of exo-atmospheric ballistic missiles.  The increase in 
maximum detection range over existing ground-based and shipboard sensors would 
provide a mobile early warning capability that can improve engagement by extending the 
time available for engagement decision making and providing earlier track information 
for designation to other engagement sensors.  This increases opportunities to engage and 
re-engage targets, increasing the overall Probability of kill (Pk).  This long-range search 
capability would decrease the workload of existing BMD capable Aegis platforms so that 
those systems could focus on the closer range Air Defense (AD) mission. 
This research first investigated the expected threats and Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) for employment of an OA radar configured ship.  Threat Radar Cross Section 
(RCS) assumptions were developed providing a common basis for Probability of 
Detection (PD) calculations for a notional S-band radar and the DARBC radar.  
Determination of the Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) of the OA radar was 
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developed based on the CONOPS and PD capabilities in order to develop an ICD1 and 
CDD2.  Additional research included analysis of other radar performance parameters 
including antenna gain, Transmit/Receive (T/R) element and total array power, number 
of pulses integrated, antenna integration efficiency, receiver noise bandwidth, receiver 
noise figure, probability of false alarm, and radar transmit frequency.  Sensitivity analysis 
was conducted on all of the radar technical parameters but primarily focused on 
improving performance of the DARBC.  This sensitivity analysis further characterized 
the impacts of total power, antenna gain, and number of T/R elements as they relate to 
PD.  Analysis of the radar was based on achieving a KPP for a 0.90 PD at a maximum 
range that will support cue to the S-band radar.  This “Handoff Range” for cue to track a 
ballistic missile target was calculated to be a range of 748 km.  This is the range where 
the S-band radar has a PD of 0.5 for a notional ballistic missile RCS.  A Waterloo 
Maple 7 ® software model based on the radar range equation was used to evaluate radar 
parameters and perform sensitivity analysis.  Microsoft Excel ® and MATLAB ® models 
were developed to examine RCS as a function of aspect angle and radar frequency.  
These models were used to refine assumptions for PD in order to determine handoff range 
for KPP finalization. 
Current S-band radars used by the US Navy to search for ballistic missiles 
consume many resources performing long-range search functions, reducing their 
performance level in the closer-range Air Defense (AD) mission.  Also, the S-band radars 
are actually capable of tracking targets at ranges greater than their maximum 
instrumented search range.  The DARBC will provide a benefit to current S-band radar 
systems.  It will provide a longer-range search capability allowing the S-band radar to 
acquire the target at a range that would have been outside the acquisition range for the 
S-band radar if operating alone.   A timeline analysis was conducted to estimate the 
additional reaction time provided to the S-band ship and subsequent ability to engage and 
re-engage a ballistic missile threat.  The DARBC concept has not defined the complete 
mission, associated capabilities, or systems the ship would support.  The ship could 
additionally support engagement of ballistic missiles with Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) or 
other future weapons such as a sea-launched version of the Kinetic Energy Interceptor 
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(KEI) missile or High Energy Laser (HEL).  Scenarios were developed as part of the 
CONOPS for cases where the DARBC ship would cue a fire control sensor (such as the 
S-band radar system described above) on the DARBC ship or other platform.  Models 
built using Microsoft Excel ®, and Arena ®, were used to perform timeline analysis 
determining the time advantage provided. 
Radar design parameters and other considerations were examined for a few areas 
that were considered key to the planned capabilities of the radar.  These were used for the 
development of an ICD1 and CDD2 including operational requirements and performance 
requirements.  These areas included cooling requirements of T/R elements, search pattern 
capabilities, and array density and topside integration concepts.  As the radar has 
considerable transmitting power, capability to support Electronic Attack (EA) was 
studied for missions of jamming, deception, and destruction of threat key electronic 
components. Supportability of the radar was examined to consider maintenance 
requirements for such a new radar design concept.  Supportability and design risk items 
were documented and assessed for relative risk levels for an eventual DARBC acquisition 
program.  Radar errors due to ship flexure were researched to estimate error budget 
contributions of flexure and other key errors such as time latency and geolocation to a 
sensor located away from the DARBC ship.  Previous ship development program test 
results were used as a basis of ship flexure assumptions and development of the error 
budget.  BMD mission considerations for the evolving threat, including increased ranges 
for engagement, have the potential to require increased accuracies on radar systems.  
Dynamic compensation methods of ship flexure were examined for application in the 
DARBC. 
This document was prepared by the Radar group (Team “R”) of the Naval 
Postgraduate School Masters of Science in Systems Engineering (MSSE) program, Naval 
Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Port Hueneme Division Cohort #4.  It focuses only on 
the radar as a sensor and a weapon, not addressing potential communication capabilities.   
This research concluded that the OA concept as defined by the DARBC operational and 
technical requirements has the potential of providing a very real and significant benefit to 
the USN and BMD program.  Further research is recommended in a of areas of modeling 
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of the radar, ship integration, operational requirements identification, and Life Cycle Cost 




The successful missile test was part of a regular military exercise 
conducted by our military to boost our self-defense," a North Korean 
foreign ministry spokesman was quoted as saying. "As a sovereign 
country, this is our legal right and we are not bound by any international 
law or bilateral or multilateral agreements ... if anyone tries to discuss the 
rights and wrongs about [future tests] and apply pressure, we will be 
forced to take physical actions of a different nature. Justin McCurry, in 
Tokyo and agencies in Washington, July 7, 2006, The Guardian 
The threat we face from proliferating and evolving ballistic missile 
systems and associated technologies and expertise continues unabated. 
There were nearly 100 foreign ballistic missile launches around the world 
in 2004. This is nearly double the number conducted in 2003 and slightly 
greater than the number of launches in 2002. More than 60 launches last 
year involved short-range ballistic missiles, over ten involved medium 
range missiles, and nearly twenty involved land- and sea-based long-
range ballistic missiles.  Lieutenant General Henry A. Obering III, USAF 
Director, Missile Defense Agency Missile Defense Program and Fiscal 
Year 2006 Budget Spring 2005 
The threat from ballistic missiles to the U.S. and its allies is ever increasing in 
quantity and capability.  The recent war in Lebanon has seen hundreds of small rockets 
launched into Israel.  Had Hezbollah gained access to longer range missiles, much greater 
damage to property and loss of life throughout Israel could have occurred.  North Korea 
flexed its military muscle on 6 July, 2006 with the test firing of seven ballistic missiles in 
one day, including a Taepo Dong II.  While the failure of the dual stage Taepo Dong II, 
capable of reaching over 5000 kilometers into U.S. soil, captured all the attention, the 
success of the other 6 missiles shows an increasing capability of this rogue nation.  BMD 
will be a common theme of military for years if not decades to come.  “The Missile 
Defense Agency (MDA) mission remains one of developing and incrementally fielding a 
joint, integrated, and multilayered BMD system to defend the United States, our deployed 
forces, and our allies and friends against ballistic missiles of all ranges by engaging them 
in the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases of flight.”4 
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This paper explores a VHF / UHF ship-based OA radar, called the DARBC, and 
describes the operational and technical requirements for this notional system.  The 
combination of a large effective radar aperture created by the OA and relatively low VHF 
/ UHF transmit frequencies are expected to allow the DARBC system to achieve the long 
detection ranges needed by the MDA.  These attributes may also provide the added 
advantage of being able to detect and track targets with low RCSs such as stealth aircraft 
and missiles. 
B. PREVIOUS WORK 
This document is a continuation of design and development of a three-
dimensional UHF/VHF digital phased array radar against ballistic missiles using new 
aperstructure opportunistic array radar concept generated by Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) students Lance Esswein5, Cher Eng6, Chin Ong7, and Matthew Tong8.  Esswein 
studied and demonstrated use of the AD8346 and AD8347 T/R modulator and 
demodulator chips as phase shifters and variable attenuators.  Eng researched the 
capability of using Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) modulation boards from the 3-D 
2.4 GHz phase array antenna.  Ong researched different options in the use of Direct 
Digital Synthesizer (DDS) in pulse radar and continuous wave radar.  Tong’s studied the 
opportunistic array concept for ballistic missile defense and on designing a low-profile, 
broad-band U-slot microstrip patch antenna.  This work provided guidelines for the 
current DARBC study and the concept was used to demonstrate that DARBC radar can 
first detect ballistic missiles at 2000 km and designate to S-band fire control radar for 
engagement. 
C. SCOPE OF PROJECT AND PAPER ORGANIZATION 
1. Scope and Tasking from NPS 
This project was based on tasking from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in a 
proposal made to the MDA9 to provide a detailed radar systems analysis and parameter 
tradeoff study for a long-range VHF / UHF OA Surveillance Radar (OASR).  The tasking 
further requested operational and technical requirements along with the resultant impact 
to ship.  Discussions with faculty advisors provided initial assumptions which included 
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limiting research on ship integration impacts.  The project assumes that an aperstructure 
concept, or combination of radar aperture with ship’s structure would be utilized and the 
DARBC radar would be implemented in a new ship design10, 11.  Detailed integration and 
back-fit considerations were eliminated from the scope. 
2. Organization 
Chapter II provides the CONOPS which describes the ballistic missile defense 
mission and the benefits that a long range mobile sensor could provide.  The CONOPS 
also provides a detailed threat description including RCS analysis which is required for 
some of the modeling efforts provided in Chapter IV.  Chapter II presents the Operational 
View (OV-1) for the radar and basic scenarios for its use which will apply for modeling 
efforts described in Chapter IV. 
Chapter III provides the operational and technical parameters of the DARBC 
system as requested under the NPS tasking9.  These requirements are further detailed in 
the ICD1 and CDD2.  Radar parameters of interest including array density, capability to 
support EA, recommendations for search patterns, and cooling requirements of T/R 
modules are also provided.   Ship flexure contributions to system error budgets for the 
large scale radar are discussed along with potential dynamic compensation methods.  
Program considerations for supportability and risk areas for program costs are also 
included in this chapter. 
Chapter IV provides a description of modeling efforts and presents the basic 
results from analysis performed on RCSs of threat, radar performance parameters, and 
system reaction time improvements with DARBC. 
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II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND THREAT DESCRIPTION 
A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
The DARBC radar will provide long-range search, detection and track of the 
various types of ballistic missiles for cueing to other organic sensors or systems in an 
overall Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2) network.  The radar 
will provide early detection of ballistic missile launches over large areas of land or sea 
space not currently or adequately covered by existing sensors.  Ships configured with 
DARBC will be forward deployed to positions where they have the greatest potential for 
detection of launches.  Early detection and tracking increases overall engagement 
timeline, providing more time for decision making, weapon assignment, and weapon 
engagement from the overall BMD family of systems.  Early detection using forward 
based sensors permits engagement of ballistic missile threats during boost and ascent 
phase when the threats are slower, larger and easier to engage.   The early detection, track 
and cueing will also improve engagement by other BMD systems that engage the threat 
in midcourse or terminal phases of flight.  Deployment of the ship to provide midcourse 
and terminal search, detection, and tracking of ballistic missiles is possible as well.  
Secondary benefits include search, detection and track of all stealth air threats.  Detection 
of these threats will be at ranges where they pose a secondary threat to the ship or units in 
the immediate operational area either by launch of weapons or as weapons themselves.  
The radar also could provide tertiary benefits to support VHF / UHF communications 
either in Line Of Sight (LOS) or by SATCOM link. 
1. BMD Mission 
BMD is best accomplished using a layered defense/combined arms approach. 12  
There are too many threats in existence to rely on hard kill defenses only.12  Many 
countries can launch multiple salvo threats and from many locations.  The best overall 
strategy will entail systems to attrite enemy capability using Information Operations (IO) 
/ Electronic Attack (EA) / Strike in addition to hard kill of threats in flight.   Current 
Navy BMD capability is based on the STANDARD Missile 3 (SM-3) launched from 
Aegis ships.  Depth of fire with SM-3 is limited during an engagement from one 
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platform– generally one, max of two.  Maximum effectiveness of Aegis and SM-3 can be 
achieved when reaction time is improved by cueing and positioning the Aegis platform 
for an engagement and allowing other sensors to be positioned for early detection and 
cueing.  Detection of ballistic missiles can be enhanced from prior knowledge of launch 
location, time and target type.  When intelligence can provide some of this information, 
especially location, specific search patterns can be generated to increase probability of 
detection.  Space based assets can monitor large areas and cue sensors when launches 
have been detected.  As a forward deployed combatant, the ship will potentially be 
exposed to direct attack by the state posing the ballistic missile threat.  The ship and radar 
will be able to counter threats of anti-ship cruise missiles through hard kill methods.  The 
radar design and ship integration shall not increase the RCS signature.  The ship/radar 
will be available on station for long periods of time, regardless of weather and sea 
conditions.   When the ship is positioned to defend a terminal position, the radar must be 
capable of detecting the threat at ranges suitable for terminal engagements.  These threats 
can include single or multiple re-entry vehicles (RV) which may be obscured by 
associated debris and decoys. 
2. Threat Summary 
The Radar will be deployed to support one of two basic missions.  The first is to 
be forward deployed near a projected threat country or area positioned to search for 
ballistic missile launches.  The second is a homeland defense position where the ship will 
be positioned to detect sea based launches from submarines or undisclosed threat surface 
ships.  The forward deployed scenario could put the ship in a position where it is in harms 
way.  Because the time line between detection and engagement is very short, shooters 
armed with very fast interceptors or lasers must be stationed close to the launch location.  
The proximity of this position to the threat means the ship is subject to attack.  The ship 
will be subject to the same threats posed to current and future surface combatants such as 
Anti Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) and other air, surface, and subsurface threats.  The 
ship can be expected to be deployed and positioned for long periods of time while on 
station providing surveillance. 
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The ship/radar would normally be operated in conjunction with other BMD units.  
These units could be Patriot or Aegis platforms providing terminal phase defense.  When 
long-range ballistic missiles are launched, BMD fixed assets in Alaska or Continental 
United States (CONUS) will be cued to support midcourse tracking in support of ground-
based interceptors or other engagement means. 
Ballistic missiles have proliferated over the last four decades and are now 
prevalent across the globe with over 24 countries capable of launching some form of this 
threat.  As an example, over 100 foreign ballistic missile test launches occurred around 
the world in 2004.  Many countries also have the capability to configure these missiles 
with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) including nuclear, chemical and biological 
payloads.  Additionally, submarines can launch ballistic missiles, dramatically increasing 
threat launch areas, escalating the need for sea-based sensors with enhanced capabilities 
in search volume4.  Ballistic Missiles are classified in the following 5 main categories as 
described by Table 1. 
Ballistic Missile Category Maximum Range Apogee 
Short-range ballistic missile 
(SRBM) 
<1,000 km(621 mi) 160 km 
Medium-range ballistic missile 
(MRBM) 
1,000-3,000 km (621-1,864 mi) 500 km 
Intermediate-range ballistic 
missile (IRBM) 
3,000-5,500 km (1,864 – 3,418 
mi) 
900 km 
Intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM) 
>5,500 km (3,418 mi) 2500 km 
Submarine-launched ballistic 
missile (SLBM) 
Any ballistic missile launched 
from a submarine, regardless of 
maximum range 
Varies 
Table 1. Ballistic Missile Flight Path Characteristics13 
The range and apogees reported are estimated maximum capabilities.  These 
weapons can support shorter ranges with lower or depressed apogees.  Some may fly a 
trajectory that has a lower apogee to achieve maximum range.  A ballistic missile is a 
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projectile that has been given some level of initial power, operates at or below the 
exo-atmosphere, and after boost, follows a path governed mainly by the laws of gravity.  































Figure 1. Ballistic Missile Flight Paths 
 
Tactics for deploying these threats will involve surprise.  Submarine launched 
threats are based on a stealthy launch platform that can hide its position and intent until 
after weapons release.  Many BMD threats are launched from Transportable Erectable 
Launchers (TELs) that can hide their positions, then erect and launch in just a few 
minutes.  TELs can virtually be hidden within the boundaries of an entire country.  
ICBMs are typically housed in silos that have known positions.  While the known 
location of these launchers may help in destruction when rules of engagement permit, 
initial launches in an unprovoked attack may provide with little to no warning. 
3. Operational View and Scenarios 
The DARBC OV-1, Figure 2, depicts the ship providing forward deployed 
support sensor coverage for ballistic missile defense. 
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Figure 2. DARBC Operational View 
 
The following scenarios are possible: 
• DARBC ship forward deployed close to launch point and cueing S-Band 
or other sensors for mid-course or terminal engagement. 
• DARBC ship forward deployed close to launch point for engagement by 
own weapons.  Cue to Weapon Control Sensor (WCS). 
• DARBC ship deployed in linebacker position with forward deployed 
S-Band sensors and engagement receiving cue from DARBC. 
• DARBC ship deployed in homeland defense mission to detect submarine 
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III. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OF REQUIREMENTS 
DEVELOPMENT FOR OPPORTUNISTIC ARRAY RADAR 
A. DARBC PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS 
This section identifies the operational and technical requirements for the DARBC 
and defines thresholds and objectives for these parameters.  Further details on the radar 
requirements can be found in the ICD1 and CDD2 for the DARBC system.  A summary of 
the KPPs for the DARBC is shown in Table 2. 
 
(U)   Key Performance Parameters 
Key System 





Detection     
Detection Range 748 km 1000 km   
Probability of Detection 0.90 0.95 
Acquisition    
  Probability of Track 0.90 0.95 
Track Accuracy     
Azimuth ± 0.5° ± 0.2° 
Elevation ± 0.5° ± 0.2° 
Range ± 0.5 km ± 0.2 km 
  
Velocity ± 100 m/sec ± 80 m/sec 
Reliability     




(U) 130.0 Hrs (U) 130.0 Hrs   




(U) 25.0 Hrs (U) 25.0 Hrs 
Maintainability     
  Mean Corrective 




(U) 2.0 Hrs (U) 2.0 Hrs 
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(U)   Key Performance Parameters 
Key System 










(U) 18 sec (U) 18 sec 
Scheduled Maintenance 
Time Per 24 Hours 
(U) 2.0 Hrs (U) 2.0 Hrs 
Restoration Time (Max 
Time) (From Scheduled 
Maintenance) 
(U) 10.0 Min (U) 10.0 Min 
Restoration Time (Max 
Time) (From System 
Test) 
(U) 3.0 Min (U) 3.0Min 
Availability     
  Ao (Ballistic Missile 
Defense Mission 
Profile) 
(U) 0.9 (U) 0.9 
Table 2. KPPs for the DARBC System 
 
1. Operational Parameters 
The Radar antenna performance shall satisfy the following DARBC operational 
requirements: Detection Range, Probability of Detection, Probability of Acquisition, 
Track Accuracy, Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability (RM&A). 
a) Detection Range 
The DARBC system shall have the capability to detect the signal returned 
from a notional ballistic missile target characterized by a 10 m2 RCS14 at the handoff 
range of 748 km15 where the DARBC would likely cue the S-band radar in order to 
engage the threat with a signal to noise ratio sufficient to exceed the receiver’s sensitivity 
threshold.  The notional ballistic missile target described in this project is defined as 
having a 77m2 RCS in the UHF band and a 146 m2 RCS in the VHF band14.  It shall 
provide consistent, timely, and accurate target information in any environmental 
conditions. 
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b) Probability of Detection 
The DARBC system shall have 0.90 PD on a notional ballistic missile 
target described in the section 6.1 at a range of 748 km. 
c) Probability of Track 
The DARBC system shall have 0.90 probability of track on a notional 
ballistic missile target described in the section 6.1 at a range of 748 km. 
d) Track Accuracy 
At the conclusion of the acquisition cycle, the DARBC shall be capable of 
providing position and velocity information on the target.  Azimuth and elevation shall be 
accurate within ± 0.5°.  Range shall be accurate within ± 0.5 km.  Velocity shall be 
accurate within ± 100 m/s. 
e) Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability 
The DARBC system shall be capable of meeting the reliability, 
maintainability, and availability thresholds of Mean Time Between Operational Mission 
Failures (Hardware) (MTBOMFhw) of 130 Hrs, Mean Time Between Operational 
Mission Faults (Software) (MTBOMFsw) of 25 Hrs, Mean Corrective Maintenance Time 
for Operational Mission Failure (Hardware) (MCMTOMFhw) of 2 Hrs, Mean Corrective 
Maintenance Time for Operational Mission Failure (Software) (MCMTOMFsw) of 18 sec, 
Scheduled Maintenance Time Per 24 Hours of 2 hrs, Restoration Time (Max Time) 
(From Scheduled Maintenance) of 10 min, Restoration Time (Max Time) (From System 
Test) of 3 min, and Ao (Ballistic Missile Defense Mission Profile) of 0.90. 
2. Technical Parameters 
a) Value Calculations 
Radar systems like the DARBC can be technically described by the radar 
equation.  The radar equation is made up of parameters which represent characteristics of 
the radar, the target, and the operational environment.  The parameters can be optimized 
for maximum operational performance using the equation.  The optimized values for 
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these parameters will be the technical requirements for the system so that it will be 
capable of achieving the KPPs specified in the CDD2. 
Equation 3.1 is the radar equation solved for Signal to Noise Ratio (S/N).  

















Equation 3.2 is the relationship between S/N and the PD and False Alarm 














Equations 3.1 & 3.2 can be combined to form Equation 3. 3.  This 
equation is the base of the radar parameters analysis, allowing for the radar parameters to 



























 3. 3 
 
The overall approach for the analysis was to first look at the way in which 
the DARBC would be used in operation.  Current S-band radars used by the U.S. Navy to 
search for ballistic missiles use up a lot of resources in search mode and are actually 
capable of tracking targets at ranges greater than their maximum search range.  The 
DARBC will provide a benefit to current S-band radar systems by extending the search 
capability to detect ballistic missiles and cueing the S-band systems to track the target at 
a range that would have been outside the search range for the S-band radar alone. 
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Analysis using Equation 3. 3 was first conducted for a notional S-band 
radar to form a baseline needed to determine at what maximum range the current radar 
will be able to accurately track a ballistic missile if cued by the DARBC.  A PD vs. Range 
plot was generated for the S-Band radar with parametric curves on the graph for different 
RCSs.  Since the predicted RCS for a notional ballistic missile is 10m2 in the S-band 
frequency (assuming an aspect angle of 88.46°) equaling to 77m2 in the UHF band and 
146m2 in the VHF band at the same aspect angle16, the generated plot can be analyzed to 
see at what range the S-band radar would have a PD of 0.5 for this RCS.  This range will 
be the desired track handoff range from the DARBC to the S-Band radar. 
Following the analysis on the S-Band radar, the same analysis was 
generated to analyze the capabilities of the DARBC.  The approach said that the DARBC 
should be capable of tracking the notional ballistic missile with a PD of 0.90 at the 
handoff range to the S-Band radar.  The Range / PD combination will drive one of the 
KPPs for the DARBC system.  The radar parameters for the DARBC were tuned so that 
this goal can be met and that the parameters used are feasible. 
The values for the parameters listed in Equation 3. 3 for the DARBC were 
derived using this equation and other equations to be described in this section.   Analysis 
and calculations described in this section were conducted using Waterloo Maple® 7 
Computer Algebra System (CAS).  Initially, notional values were used as the radar 
equations were set up in the Maple code.  After the completion of the Maple code, the 
values of the various parameters were researched, manipulated and analyzed for their 
affect on the overall PD as well as their feasibility. 
Equation 3.4  calculates the wavelength (λ) for a given frequency.  
Calculations were done using one VHF (216 MHz) and one UHF (420 MHz) frequency 
for the DARBC.  For the notional S-band radar, a frequency of 3 GHz was used.  In this 




c=λ  3.4 
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Equation 3.5 is the equation used to calculate the Antenna Effective 
Aperture (Ae).  A typical value of 0.7 was used for Effective Aperture Efficiency η.17  
Analysis on the array element density shows that there are can be up to 2 elements / m2 
on the DARBC aperstructure.18  With this specified density, Ae can be calculated based 
on the number of elements within the aperstructure which contribute to a single beam (n) 
multiplied by the efficiency η.  Based on a notional hull for a new construction ship, it 
was found that 3411 elements can be placed one side of the ship.  For this research, 3411 
was used for n but sensitivity analysis was conducted which relates PD to n. 
 
 η×= nAe  3.5 
 









Doppler Shift (fD) occurs when the target being tracked is non-stationary.  
The echo returning to the radar receiver will be higher or lower in frequency than the 
transmission wave depending on if the target is closing or moving away from the radar 
(See Figure 3).  Using the maximum predicted velocity for a ballistic missile, fD was 
calculated.  Based on this fD value, receiver noise bandwidth (BN) was calculated to be 
double the value of fD so that the DARBC would be able to track targets coming towards 
or going away from the radar.  Calculations for BN for the UHF and VHF frequencies are 




Figure 3. Illustration of the Doppler Shift Effect 
 
Doppler Shift and Bn19 
 
Rules of Thumb for two-way signal travel  
(divide in half for one-way ESM signal measurements) 
 At 10 GHz, fD = 35 Hz per Knot 
  = 19 Hz per km/Hr 
  = 67 Hz per m/sec 
  = 61 Hz per yd/sec 
  = 20 Hz per ft/sec 
To estimate fD at other frequencies, multiply these by: 
 
Ballistic Missile travels at 7.5 km/s (max) = 27000 km/hr 
D (VHF)
19 Hz 27000 km hr 0.216 GHzf  =  ×  ×  = 11.08 kHz
km hr 1 10
 
Bn(VHF) ×≥ 2  fD(UHF) = 23kHz 
D (UHF)
19 Hz 27000 km hr 0.420 GHzf  =  ×  ×  = 21.55 kHz
km hr 1 10
 
Bn(UHF) ×≥ 2  fD(VHF) = 44kHz 
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Based on the Maple calculations and parameter sensitivity analysis, the 
following parameters were used for the DARBC and S-band radar calculations (Table 3).  
The values listed for the DARBC in this table are the recommended values for the 
DARBC technical parameters. 
 
Parameter Description Value Used Maple Name 
Pmax20 Transmitted power [W] 500 kW (VHF, UHF), 
4 MW (S-band) 
P (VHF & 
UHF), P2 (S-
band) 
σ21 Radar cross section of target 
[m2] 
146 (VHF), 100, 77 
(UHF), 10, 1, 0.1 [m2] 
H1V (146), H1 
(100), H1U 
(77), H2 (10), 
H3 (1), H4 
(0.1) 
n Number of pulses integrated 1 N 
Ei(n) Integration efficiency 1 E 
kB Boltzmann’s constant 
[J/degree K] 
 
1.3806503E-23 J/ K K 
T0 Standard temperature [degrees 
K] 
290 degrees K T 
Bn Receiver noise bandwidth 
[Hz] 
23 kHz (VHF), 44 kHz 
(UHF), 4 MHz (S-band) 
B1 (VHF), B2 
(UHF), B3 (S-
band) 
Fn22 Receiver noise figure 1×103/5 = 6 dB F 
PFA Probability of False Alarm 0.01 fa 
f23 Radar Transmit Frequency 216 MHz (VHF), 420 
MHz (UHF), 3 GHz (S-
band) 
f1 (VHF), f2 
(UHF), f3 (S-
band) 
η24 Effective Aperture Efficiency 0.7 Ef 
n25 Number of Array Elements 
contributing to 1 beam 
3411 n 
λ Wavelength [m] 1.3879 (VHF), 0.7138 




Ae Antenna effective aperture 
[m2] 
This is a function of n 
and η; 1193.85 (VHF & 
UHF), 17.5 (S-band) 




Parameter Description Value Used Maple Name 
G Antenna gain This is a function of Ae 
and λ; 38.9 dB (VHF), 
44.7 dB (UHF), 43.4 dB 
(S-band) 
G1 (VHF), G2 
(UHF), G3 (S-
band) 
S/N Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) 
required for detection based 
on a single pulse 
Not directly calculated.  
This is a function of 
Rmax. 
S1 (VHF), S2 
(UHF), S3 (S-
band) 
Rmax Maximum radar range or 
detection range [m] 
Variable (see plot) R 
PD Probability of Detection Variable (see plot) D 
Table 3. Parameter Values Used in the Maple Analysis 
 
Based on these values above, the “Handoff Range” where the DARBC 
will cue the S-band radar to track a ballistic missile target will be 748 km.  This is the 
range where the S-band radar has a PD of 0.5 for an RCS of 10 m2 (See Figure 4).  Ignore 
the vertical lines on these plots as they are an artifact of Maple where the values go to 
zero. 
 
Figure 4. Calculated Handoff Range to S-Band Radar 
Handoff Range of 748 km for a 
PD of 0.5 for an RCS of 10 m2 
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The DARBC should have a 0.90 PD at this range of 748 km vs. a similar 
ballistic missile target (RCS of 146m2 for VHF and 77m2 for UHF).  Using parameters 
from Table 3, the Maple model shows that the DARBC is able to obtain 0.906 ≈ 0.91 PD 
using both VHF and UHF spectrums.  Shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 below is the 
anticipated performance level, PD vs. Range for VHF and UHF, of the DARBC system, 
using the parameters from Table 3. 
 
> VHFPsubD:=evalf(eval(P4VHF,R1=748000),5);#VHF Pd at handoff range vs. Ballistic 
Missile (146m^2 RCS) 
:= VHFPsubD .90616  
> UHFPsubD:=evalf(eval(P4UHF,R2=748000),5);#UHF Pd at handoff range vs. Ballistic 
Missile (77m^2 RCS) 
:= UHFPsubD .90651  
 
 




Figure 6. DARBC PD vs. Range Performance Using the VHF Spectrum 
 
The current model (using parameters defined in Table 3) of the DARBC 
shows that the radar system will be capable of meeting its KPP of a 90% PD at the 
handoff range (748 km) against a notional ballistic missile target however, sensitivity 
analysis was performed on various parameters to see how easily PD could be raised for 
the DARBC.  Power, Gain, and number of elements were analyzed against PD at the 
handoff range to see if minor adjustments could increase the predicted performance. 
b) Sensitivity Analysis 
(1) Power Sensitivity   
Power sensitivity analysis shows that major increases in PT would 
not bring the performance of the DARBC up significantly.  As shown in Figure 7 and 
Figure 8, increased levels in power beyond several tens of kW have a mild affect on PD.  
Power levels for the DARBC would have to be raised to an unfeasible level in order to 
have an increase of 1 – 2 % in PD.  The power parameter is a conservative estimate of 500 
kW.  For that number of elements, the system may be capable of radiating at a much 
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higher power level.  Increasing the power would only increase the PD values for the radar 
and the power was left at its current level in the Maple ® model. 
 
 










(2) Gain Sensitivity 
Gain sensitivity analysis shows that increases in G of about 10dB 
or so have the ability to increase the performance of the DARBC with some level of 
significance depending on the RCS of the target.  The smaller RCSs will benefit more 
from this type of adjustment to the radar parameters.  See Figure 9 and Figure 10 for the 








Figure 10. UHF Gain vs. PD at a Range of 748 km 
 
 
(3) Aperstructure Size Sensitivity (number of elements) 
Since G is a function of λ and Ae, further analysis was needed to 
look into Ae since λ is fixed at the VHF and UHF bands.  Ae is dependent on the number 
of elements in the array as they are fixed in size.  Figure 11 shows the sensitivity curves 
for number of elements as a function of PD for the DARBC using the VHF spectrum.  
There is some level of performance to gain by boosting the number of active elements for 




Figure 11. VHF PD vs. Number of Elements at a Range of 748 km 
 
Results show that an increase in the number of active elements, from the 
value specified in Table 3, will have a minor but still significant affect on PD against 
targets with lower RCS values.  However, this sensitivity analysis also shows the impact 
of having fewer elements than the number specified in Table 3. 
3. Array Element Density and Integration 
“Phased array radars are most commonly designed as periodic arrays. In 
developing the aperstructure concept, however, it is important investigate if aperiodic 
arrays are able to achieve comparable performance. This is because the ship’s 
superstructure makes it physically unfeasible to implement a uniform, periodic array over 
the entire ship’s structure.  In addition, integrating an array of closely spaced antenna 
elements across the entire ship’s structure is impractical and likely to be extremely costly.  
Density requirements for T/R elements of the DARBC system is needed in order 
to define radar parameters including total power, peak power, shape of the radar beam 
and antenna efficiency.  The array density requirements will help determine how the 
radar system would be implemented and operated. 
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Periodic array designs typically maximize the spacing between individual antenna 
elements yet keep it small enough to eliminate grating lobes.  Equation 3.7 shows the 




One of the inherent disadvantages to using this spacing between OA elements is the 
effect known as mutual coupling. 
Mutual coupling occurs between closely spaced antenna elements.  Coupling may 
occur by radiation, from surface paths, from paths within the feed structure, or from 
reflections at the antenna terminal due to impedance mismatches.  The effects of mutual 
coupling include distortions in the radiation pattern and variations in the element gains.  
Mutual coupling may be characterized by a coupling coefficient mnc  that relates the 
current flowing into the nth element due to the current from the mth element. Equation 3.8 








mnd  = distance between nth and mth elements 
The figure below graphs the relationship between the mutual coupling coefficient 
and the separation between antenna elements.  Observe that the equation for mnc  is 
simply a sinc function. Hence, the effects of mutual coupling are undulatory with the 





Figure 12. Coupling Coefficient vs. Separation of Antenna Elements8 
 
Theoretically, the effects of mutual coupling can be calculated and hence 
compensated. In reality, the coupling coefficient is not easily measured, is not stable with 
scan angle and is not conveniently controlled – especially for large ship-sized arrays 
which are too big to be tested in a controlled environment.  The best way to reduce the 
effects of mutual coupling is to increase the distance between individual antenna 
elements beyond the requisite 
2
λ  criteria presented in the Equation 3.8.  This process is 
commonly known as “thinning”. This approach, however, can result in higher sidelobes 
and increased grating lobe levels unless an aperiodic array is designed.8 
In order to have minimal interference between OASR elements the minimum 
physical spacing between the elements on the hull of the ship should be greater than ½ of 
the wavelength of the beam in use.  The DARBC system will operate in the VHF (216-
225 MHz) and UHF (420-450 MHz) frequency bands.  Equations 3.9, 3.10, 3.11, and 



































6min =××=λ  3.12 
 
The desired minimum spacing between elements (the spacing which will cause 
minimal interference at any frequency of operation) will have to be greater than ½ VHF λ 
(max) which is 0.694m.  Our goal is to have this minimum separation between array 
elements in all directions of the aperstructure.  This spacing will minimize phase 
interference between elements which plays a part in optimizing the DARBC’s ability to 
have the narrowest beam possible.  A one degree beam-width will translate to a 35 km 
beam-width at a range of 2000 km, so it is necessary to consider everything within the 
design of the radar which can influence the beam-width. A narrower wavelength 
separation may cause the beam to have a large scatter point when it illuminates the target 
thereby causing the convergent point of the beam to be off. 
4. Electronic Warfare 
EA is defined as the division of Electronic Warfare (EW) involving the use of 
electromagnetic or directed energy to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the 
intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability26.  EA includes 
actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic 
spectrum, such as Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) (jamming and deception) and 
employment of weapons that use electromagnetic, optical or directed energy as their 
primary destructive mechanism as in Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) (lasers, RF weapons, 
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particle beams).26  This section will discuss jamming and deception ECMs and 
destructive mechanisms that could be incorporated in the design of the DARBC. 
The two types of EA which are used against enemy communications are jamming 
and deception.  Jamming is also thought of as “Concealment or Masking”, which 
broadcasts high levels of radiation within the frequencies used by the enemy for 
communication.  The objective is to overpower the communication systems such as UHF 
SATCOM systems by inhibiting the reception of the enemy messages.  Deception or 
“Forgery” mimics signals to the enemy radar in an effort to confuse the enemy’s systems.  
To do this, the DARBC would have to be able to monitor (receive) enemy radar 
transmissions and imitate those signals and broadcast them back to the enemy receivers27. 
The main threats against the DARBC platform would be ASCMs.  ASCMs can 
have various modes of guidance such as differential Global Positioning System (GPS), 
active homing, semi-active homing, heat seeking, TV or infrared (IR).  If any of theses 
guidance modes can be interrupted or deceived then there is a greater potential of the 
ASCM missing the target. 
Since the DARBC is a VHF/UHF radar and does not have the capability to 
transmit and receive on other frequencies, it is not likely that the DARBC would be very 
good as a deception ECM platform.  ASCMs such as the Exocet use X-band active 
homing which is outside the range of the DARBC’s spectrum28.  Since the DARBC 
spectrum does not coincide with the typical ASCMs radar guidance frequencies, it would 
not be effective for deception. 
Based on the radar technical parameters research, the DARBC will be capable of 
producing in excess of 500 kW peak output signal.  If all this power can be directed at an 
incoming ASCM at a relatively close range (compared to the DARBC’s typical search 
ranges), the DARBC can generate a Non-Nuclear Electro-Magnetic Pulse (NNEMP)29.  
In order to achieve the frequency characteristics of the pulse needed for optimal coupling 
into the ASCM, the addition of wave-shaping circuits and/or microwave generators need 
to be added between the DARBC radiating element and the antenna. 
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When NNEMPs are coupled with existing electronic systems such as ASCMs, 
damaging current and voltage surges can be induced on those systems causing failure30.  
The signals’ power and the pulse of the signal are what drive the effectiveness of an 
NNEMP signal.  Higher frequency signals such as microwave signals are more effective 
than lower frequencies31, such as VHF or UHF.  Due to the low operational frequencies, 
even with the high power output, the DARBC could not effectively deliver NNEMPs, 
even on close range targets. 
Even with the ability to direct high amounts of energy, the DARBC would 
probably not be capable of emitting NNEMPs effectively as part of a platform self 
defense effort or short range offensive effort.  The DARBC would not be a good 
candidate for an ECM platform which could produce jamming or deception forms of EA 
due to the limited bandwidth of the radar.  However, if enemy communications were 
known to be operating in the VHF or UHF spectrums, the DARBC could be effective as 
an ECM generating platform. 
5. Element Wireless Communications 
Research indicated that there are many viable options for the implementation of 
the wireless communication architecture for the DARBC system.  The scope of this paper 
originally considered investigation of wireless architecture options.  However, the 
investigation was cancelled due to the change in guidance relating to ship integration 
work.  A future study is still necessary to assess wireless communications architecture for 
shipboard integration and should be conducted as part of a more detailed ship integration 
research project.  
6. Cooling Requirements 
This section describes different methods of cooling.  Tradeoffs are considered in 
order to satisfy a range of requirements.  Tong8 provided the thresholds for different 
types of substrate options that the T/R module may utilize.  The substrate consists of a 
dielectric material that affects the electrical performance of the antenna, circuits and 
transmission line for the OASR.  Information on the best methods to cool the T/R 
modules was examined32, 33. 
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No initial attempt was made to define measures, thresholds or objectives for 
cooling.    Cooling requirements to increase survivability and operational availability 
were identified by Tong8.  Table 4 compares the relevant properties of various different 
substrate options.  Substrate properties listed in the table include constant dielectric, loss 
tangent, dimensional stability, chemical resistance, and temperature range.  In addition, 
the relative cost is also considered as part of this tradeoff study. 
 








Range (F degree) 
Relative  
Cost 
Ceramic Substrates       
Alumina 9.8 0.0004 Excellent Excellent to +1600 Medium to high 
Sapphire 9.4, 1.6 0.0001 Excellent Excellent -24 to +370 Very high 
Semiconductor 
Substrates       
Gallium arsenide 
(GaAs) 13 0.0006 Excellent Excellent -55 to +260 Very High 
Silicon 11.9 0.0004 Excellent Excellent -55 to +260 High 
Ferromagnetic 
Substrates       
Ferrite 9.0 to 16 0.001 Excellent Excellent -24 to +370 Medium 
Synthetic 
Substrates       
PTFE (Teflon) 2.1 0.0004 Poor Excellent -27 to +260 Medium 










0.0022 Excellent Excellent -27 to +260 Medium 
Table 4. Potential T/R Element Substrate Materials and Properties8 
a) T/R Module Component Analysis 
Table 5 shows a list of components that can be used to build the T/R 
module and also the substrates that can be used for the components based on the new 




T/R Module Component Breakdown 
 
Component Substrate Function Area 
Bipolar Transistor Silicon based Transmit 
Pin Diode Silicon based Receive 
Low noise amplifier (LNA) GaAs MMICs Transmit 
Digital Attenuator GaAs MMICs Receive 
Phase Shifter GaAs MMICs Receive 
T/R switches GaAs MMICs Transmit/Receive 
Microstrip circuitry Ceramic microwave laminates Transmit/Receive 
Table 5. T/R Module Material Properties8 
Analysis of Table 4 and Table 5 indicated that temperatures range from -
55 F degrees to +260 F degrees for the semiconductor substrates and up to 1600 F 
degrees for ceramic substrates.  These substrate materials provide excellent dimensional 
stability and chemical resistance. 
b) Cooling Methods 
There are many different methods for transferring heat from the T/R 
module.  The optimal method depends upon the temperatures and tolerances of the 
application, and impact to overall system performance and supportability.  Table 6 is an 
overview of the different cooling techniques with their advantages and disadvantages.  
 
 
Cooling Method Advantages Disadvantages 
Thermoelectric 
coolers 
• Can be used in any orientation  
• Small size  
• No moving parts 
• Cooling below ambient  
• Temperature control  
• Heating capability  
• Compatible with heat sinks, cold 
plates, and heat pipes 
• DC power source required 
• Not practical for large electronic 
system 
• Cooling density of less than 10 
W/cm2 
Fans and blowers • Low cost  
• Installation flexibility 
• Air exchange is required; potential 
 for dust and moisture  
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Cooling Method Advantages Disadvantages 
• Ineffective for high-power devices  
• Object cannot be cooled at or below 
ambient 
Heat sinks • Low cost  • Installation flexibility 
• No cooling at or below ambient  
• No temperature control 
Liquid cold plates 
(passive) 
• Size (at point of attachment)  
• Heat dissipation effectiveness 
• Cannot cool below ambient (liquid) 
 temperature  
• No temperature control  
• Potential for leaks  
• Liquid source availability 
Heat pipes • Reliability  • Size 
• Cannot cool below ambient  
• No temperature control 
Compressor-based 
cooling 
• Cooling large amounts of heat  
• Cooling below ambient  
• Temperature control 
• Maintenance/ reliability (moving 
parts)  
• Size (units tend to be bulky)  
• Noise  
• Limited installation flexibility 
Table 6. Advantages / Disadvantages for Various Cooling Methods7, 8 
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Figure 13 displays the thermal resistance per 10 cm2 from different types 
of cooling fluids.  Natural air convection provides the highest range of thermal resistance 
and boiling water provides the lowest range of resistance. 
 
Figure 13. Thermal Resistance for Various Cooling Fluids6 
c) Thermoelectric Cooling System 
Based on analysis of the data presented, the most practical method for 
cooling the T/R module is the combinations of heat sinks, fans, and thermoelectric 
device.  This combination is called a “thermoelectric cooling system.”  Figure 14 details 
the design of the thermoelectric cooling system. 
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Figure 14. Thermoelectric Cooling6 
Thermoelectrics themselves are solid-state heat pumps made from 
semiconductor materials32 and have no moving parts.  Thermoelectrics are manufactured 
in modular form, where a series of p-type and n-type semiconductor element junctions 
are layered between ceramic plates.  At the cold junction, heat is absorbed by electrons as 
they pass from a low-energy level in the p-type element to a higher energy level in the n-
type element.  A Direct Current (DC) power supply provides the energy to move the 
electrons through the system.  At the hot junction, energy is expelled to a heat sink as the 
electrons move from a high-energy element (n-type) to a lower level element (p-type).  A 
typical thermoelectric cooling module contains as many as 127 junctions and could pump 
up to 120 W of heat out of the T/R module.  The amount of heat pumped is proportional 
to the amount of current flowing through the thermoelectric enabling the possibility of 
tight temperature control (<0.01°C).  Also, by reversing the current, a thermoelectric can 
be used to heat the device instead of cooling it.  This is valuable when it is necessary to 
precisely control an object’s temperature in changing ambient environments.  The size of 
these cooling devices range from 2 to 62 mm and multiple devices can be used for greater 
cooling.  Due to the relatively large amount of heat pumping over a small area, 
thermoelectrics require the addition of a heat sink and fan to dissipate the heat into the 
ambient environment. 
For the DARBC T/R module, a thermoelectric cooling system is the most 
practical method for maintaining a stable operating temperature.  The forced air 
convection in a thermoelectric system has a thermal resistance range between 8 K/W and 
100 K/W per 10 cm2 area.  As shown in Figure 14, the thermoelectric device is located 
between two heat sinks.  One heat sink is placed inside the T/R module enclosure while 
the other remains outside in the ambient air.  As current flows through the thermoelectric, 
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the internal heat sink cools, allowing it to absorb heat from the enclosed air.  The addition 
of an internal fan is recommended to circulate the air to reduce temperature gradients 
within the enclosure, increasing the efficiency of the thermoelectric device.  The hot-side 
heat sink increases in temperature as the heat is absorbed from the enclosure.  The 
ambient air absorbs the heat from the hot-side heat sink.  As with the cold side, a fan on 
the hot side will greatly increase the performance and efficiency of the thermoelectric 
device.  The temperature of the enclosure can be controlled through simple on-off 
thermostats or more precise controllers that adjust the input power to the thermoelectric 
depending upon T/R module temperature.  In addition, condensation removal can be 
accomplished by using drainage ports or incorporating absorptive materials and wick 
structures.  The small size of the thermoelectric cooler reduces the overall weight and 
size of the DARBC system, increasing overall system modularity likely reducing costs. 
7. Search Pattern Recommendations 
In order to describe where a target is located, its range (distance) and angle 
(direction) are required.  The radar range to target is a function of the speed of light and 
the round trip propagation time.  The angle is broken down into a horizontal component 
(azimuth) and a vertical component (elevation).  They are measured by observing the 
antenna’s pointing angles at the time signal detection is made, on the presumption that 
signals detected always originate from the direction of the antenna’s beam at the time of 
detection.34  Radars can differentiate between targets in various directions as well as 
detect targets at greater ranges.  The radar’s antenna concentrates the radiated energy into 
a narrow beam.35 
When performing a search, the radar beam is systematically swept through a 
region in which targets are expected to appear.  The beam’s path is known as the search 
scan pattern.  The region covered by the scan is called the scan volume or frame and the 
length of time the beam takes to scan the complete frame is called the frame time. 
Radar systems are often identified by the type of scanning used.  Scanning is the 
systematic movement of a radar beam in a definite pattern while searching for or tracking 
a target.  The type and method of scanning used depends on the radar.  In some cases, the 
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type of scan will change with the particular system mode of operation.  For example the 
search mode scan may be quite different from that of the track mode scan.36 
The two basic methods of beam steering are mechanical and electronic.  Since the 
DARBC is a phased array radar, it will be electronically steered.  In electronic steering, 
the beam is effectively moved by such means as (1) switching between a set of feeder  
sources, (2) varying the phasing between elements in a multi-element array, or (3) 
comparing the amplitude and phase differences between signals received by a multi-
element array. 
Since the DARBC will have the majority of its elements on the port and starboard 
sides of the ship, it may be necessary to orient the ship so that one side of the array is 
facing the desired area to scan.  This will allow the maximum swing of the beam to be 
used, covering the largest amount of area.  Positioning the ship in this way allows the 
maximum number of elements to contribute to the beam which minimizes the beam 
width increasing track accuracy. 
Since the primary mission of the DARBC is to search, detect, and track ballistic 
missiles such as ICBMs and SLBMs, an optimal combination of search and track patterns 
was investigated.  While searching for ICBMs and SLBMs that can “pop-up” from over 
the horizon or surface, a typical search radar devotes approximately one-half of its time 
generating what is called a “surveillance fence.”  The surveillance fence is normally at 3 
degrees in elevation.  Figure 15 and Figure 16 demonstrate the Fence Search Scan/Pattern 








Figure 16. Fence Search Transition to Track 
 
Fence searches work well for detecting “pop-up” targets however other search 
patterns are necessary for the DARBC to monitor areas above the horizon.  A volume 
search is a 360° search pattern that covers all area around the sensor out to a defined 
range.  This volume search is best used in the AD role where all areas of the sky should 
be monitored.  This type of search is effective against multiple kinds of threats as long as 
the threat is within the volume being covered and is detectable by the radar (i.e. has a 
large enough RCS and is not too fast for the sensor).  The downside of the volume search 
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is the requirement for a large amount of the radar’s resources to cover the full volume, 
taking a relatively large amount of time to complete the search pattern compared to the 
fence search.  Also, in order to reduce the time required to complete the search, the radar 
detection range is reduced in order to decrease the volume.  This has an impact on long 
range performance which is needed for the BMD mission. 
A sector search is similar to a volume search except range, bearing, and elevation 
windows are defined, effectively creating a volume search on a limited and defined area.  
The sector search can be defined in the area where hostile threats are expected to 
originate reducing the resources required as compared to using a volume search.  With 
the extra available resources, it would be possible to perform one or several sector 
searches while also performing a fence search. 
When transitioning to track, as depicted in Figure 16, conical monopulse scanning 
is typically initiated for this type of threat.  If the target is on the scan axis while 
performing a conical monopulse scan, the strength of the reflected signals remains 
constant or changes gradually as the range changes.  However, if the target is slightly off 
the axis, the amplitude of the reflected signals will change at the scan rate.  Based on the 
amplitude of the reflected signal, the radar can adjust its beam direction to keep the target 
in the center of the scan, holding it in track.  Figure 17 is a graphical representation of 




Figure 17. Conical Scanning36 
 
Successful detection is a precondition for setting the entire BMD system in 
motion.  The problem with detection is that a huge volume of space has to be covered to 
ensure a reliable surveillance is conducted, and this entails the implementation of special 
search techniques.37  The final search pattern recommendations for the DARBC include 
the combination of a fence search and a sector or volume search depending on the 
operational scenario.  Once a target is detected, transition to conical scanning is 
recommended to maintain track. 
8. Logistics Considerations 
The DARBC radar system is a significant departure from current radar design 
concepts and requires an evaluation of supportability concepts to avoid incurring 
avoidable Life Cycle Costs (LCCs) and risk areas.  The DARBC system must incorporate 
the essential logistics support elements in order to maintain the readiness and operational 
capabilities that are defined in the DARBC ICD1 and CDD2.  Logistics supportability 
factors are integral elements that must be considered while developing a support strategy 
that optimizes those functional operational requirements that must be achieved.  In order 
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to ensure that a viable, cost-effective support infrastructure is planned and put into place, 
the RM&A of the DARBC radar system will have to be evaluated. 
The logistics support element maintenance planning will be utilized to establish 
DARBC radar system maintenance concepts and requirements for the life of the system. 
The ultimate goal of maintenance planning is to determine the actions and support 
resource requirements necessary to maintain the design system requirements that are 
noted in the ICD1 and CDD2.  Supportability risks assessment drivers must be defined in 
the system analysis phase to assist in determining the maintenance concept for the 
DARBC system.  The risk assessment should be assessed under both peacetime and 
wartime environments.  Prototype systems and modeling will be utilized to mitigate the 
risks while defining the DARBC radar system maintenance concept. Logistics risk 
metrics for prototyping has been identified to aid in establishing a maintenance concept 
in the Design Interface Risk Metric (DIRM) section of the DARBC Logistics Support 
and Budget Requirements research study. 
Acquisition logistics principle objectives have been applied to the DARBC 
system to ensure that support considerations are an integral part to the system’s design 
requirements.  Logistics risk metrics were performed for the DARBC system based on 
the key cost driver risk areas that were identified in the DARBC CDD.2  The DARBC 
Logistics Support and Budget Requirements research study identifies logistics support 
elements that are required to ensure support considerations have been identified and are 
an essential part of the system’s operational and supportability requirements. 
9. Ship Flexure Impacts 
Ships are subject to flexure due to a variety of construction, environmental and 
operational parameters.  The DARBC has radar T/R elements dispersed throughout the 
ship hull and superstructure.  Ship flexure can impact system performance by introducing 
alignment errors between elements.  Traditionally these errors occur between various 
elements such as a fire control radar and a gun system.  For the DARBC, errors 
introduced by ship flexure will be across T/R elements which will affect beam forming 
and antenna alignment.  This can impact radar system performance for detection of 
threats and in providing accurate track information for handover to other sensors in the 
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BMD system network.  Current weapon systems performance has not suffered as error 
budgets absorb ship flexure errors.  Increasing ranges and capabilities of ballistic missile 
threats and resulting system capability requirements may not allow this in future systems 
like DARBC.38  This section identifies errors and classifies them in a system error 
budget.  It will also describe potential methods for compensation. 
Ships need to flex to prevent intolerable buildup of stresses in the ship structure 
when subjected to operational conditions of the sea.39  Ship flexure shows up as relative 
rotational motion between two points and can result in unfavorable misalignment 
between elements located between these two points.  In traditional (current) combat 
system configurations this results in static or bias errors and dynamic errors between 
various combat system elements.  These errors have been calculated and handled through 
system error budgets as opposed to providing a compensation to eliminate or reduce these 
errors.  Despite being the largest error contributor, ship flexure is deemed acceptable as 
its impact is reduced by systems with closed loop tracking, large beam-widths of 
illuminators, and close-in engagements (relative to ballistic missile engagements).  As 
engagements ranges increase from ownship, these errors can become intolerable to 
support functions such as handover to sensors (organic and off platform) and 
engagements with missile or other weapon systems.  DARBC is a non-traditional sensor.  
As the array elements are distributed across the ship hull and superstructure, ship flexure 
will have a significant impact on element to element positional spacing and alignment 
resulting in phase differences of T/R element impacting overall system performance. 
Ship flexure is generally defined as the uncompensated relative angular difference 
between two combat system elements from the compensated aligned state.40  Combat 
system alignment is accomplished on every ship to baseline the system.  This is 
accomplished as part of new construction and after major overall maintenance periods.  
Additionally alignments can be done throughout the life cycle of a ship when it is 
believed an error exists.  Alignment is a very time consuming and labor intensive process 
which can be interpreted as costly and therefore undesirable to perform.  Combat system 
alignments are performed pier side during the night or morning hours before solar heating 
can impact measurements.  Flexure is broken down into static bias errors which occur 
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over a long periods (minutes to permanent) and dynamic which is constantly changing 
during an engagement. 
a) Static Flexure Examples 
1. Solar loading.  The sun can dramatically impact ship flexure.  If 
the sun is exposed to only one side of the ship as in morning or evening hours it will heat 
the ship and cause expansion relative to the unexposed side.  Solar loading can create 
changes of several arc minutes between elements.  The amount of solar loading and 
shade, material of the ship, its expansion under heating, and duration of loading all 
contribute to some amount of change. 
2. Load-out.  Ships require a great deal of material for operation 
including weapons, fuel, food stores, spares, personnel and associated materials.  This 
distributed weight varies as the ship operates (consumes fuel and other material).  
Alignment is generally conducted when ships are loaded to 90% total weight.  This 
requirement can be difficult to achieve as the ship may not be fully equipped at the time 
of alignment.  Loading arrangement during alignment tests may also not reflect 
operational lead-out as weapons and material may need to be simulated. 
3. Temperature.  Similar to solar loading, air and sea temperature can 
have dramatic effects on ship alignment by expansion of hull materials. 
4. Impact.  Impact can be categorized as a permanent flex or bend to 
a ship caused by a load such as a large swell, impact with another ship or pier, or near 
explosion.  When detected by an alignment test this can be measured and compensated 
for. 
5. Steady winds. 
6. Improper measurements during alignment test.  Human error, test 
equipment error and poor procedures can contribute to a static error problem by not 
properly measuring baseline alignment of a ship. 
b) Dynamic Flexure Examples 
1. Waves.  Sea state is the most common parameter describing the 
load that forces ship flexure.  Sea state is a standard measure of wind speed, swell size 
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and swell period that can cause hogging and twisting moments on the ship.  The length 
and beam of the ship, its speed and direction relative to the seas as well as its height and 
construction material and structure will ultimately determine susceptibility to flexure 
under load.   A large swell of a period that introduces the most significant hogging effects 
is considered the worst condition. 
2. Vibration.  Vibration on a ship can be caused by a number of 
sources such as operating equipment and operational environment induced by sea state. 
3. Maneuvers.  Speed and rate of turns will cause torsional loads on a 
ship’s hull. 
c) Flexure Impact to Alignment and Radar Performance 
Susceptibility to flexure can vary across ship class designs due to a variety 
of impacts.  Ship design aspects such as material (Steel, aluminum, composite), 
construction (material thickness, support structure, open space), length, beam, weight, 
height, and hull type (mono-hull, catamaran, trimaran other) all contribute to the stiffness 
or flexibility of the ship overall or in certain locations.  The further away from midships 
on the hull a superstructure element is located, the greater the susceptibility to flexure.  
Also the farther up the mast an element is located the greater the impact of flexure.  The 
use of aperstructures needs to be considered due to the use of composites which may 
have different response to flexure than traditional metal hulls.  No analysis is provided at 
this time as to whether this would have a positive or negative effect.  The large dispersal 
of elements along the hull can exacerbate the effects of misalignment.  Alignment errors 
will have the following two primary impacts which are depicted in Figure 18: 
• T/R elements will be out of relative position resulting in phase 
shift errors, decreasing antenna gain and reducing performance for 
detection and tracking. 
• Antenna alignment to ships reference will be effected causing bias 
errors resulting in mismatch between antenna and other sensors 
and possibly across sections of the antenna.  This could result in 
lost tracks and poor handover between elements or array faces. 
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Dynamic flexure is usually a cyclic event and can be minimized by 
mathematical filters in the radar.  Static flexure is an unknown bias and cannot be undone 
with filtering.41  Loke discusses criteria for sensor synchronization in detail42 and 
provides overall azimuth and elevation pointing error as ship does not act as a point 
source (gun, single phased array face, dish radar).  This can be on the order of several 
milliradians.  At 1000km, 1 milliradian error equates to a distance of approximately 300 
meters.  When different portions of the ship array elements provide the radiating portion 
of the radar, misalignment can occur as the track is handed over to other portions of the 





Figure 18. Ship Flexure Impact to Beam Formation and Detection Range 
d) Ballistic Missile Defense Problem 
The operating ranges for detection, tracking and engagement of ballistic 
missiles coupled with the small RCS of threats, high velocity of both threat and 
interceptor and need to hit-to-kill engagements allow for little error.  Crossing targets 
make the intercept volume for a kinetic kill weapon smaller.  The intercept volume is the 
space that the target and weapon will fill at the same time.  A nose on engagement can 
provide a longer volume as intercept timing will be dependant on the angle of attack.  
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Figure 19 shows this aspect angle effect for straight on and crossing target cases.  
Handover between sensors on the same platform is difficult due to time synchronization 
errors of the two systems in addition to alignment errors.  On a single platform the 
sensors are generally aligned to the same reference point and use the same geodesic 
reference.  They can also be keyed to the same clock reference.  Handover to a second 
sensor separated from the ship will increase potential for time synchronization errors and 
positional reference problems.  Sensors can be cued and depending on the particular 
sensor beam-width capability, can also be directed into a search pattern to acquire the 
target if errors are to significant where direct cueing alone will not generate a track. 
If the sensor handover is sent to an interceptor, the error budget will be 
determined by the onboard sensor range and resultant phase of flight.  This is generally 
late in flight and results in a very small error budget contribution.  If the handover for 
DARBC is to a fire control level quality/accuracy sensor, the error budget can be larger 
but will depend on the characteristics/performance of that sensor (or multiple sensors in 
the case of a network of BMD sensors). 
Ballistic Missile Error Budget
• Intercept volume is small  
• Dependant on aspect angle
• High seed reduces volume 
 
Figure 19. Head-On and Crossing Aspect Angles 
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e) Antenna Alignment of DARBC array 
Large antenna arrays such as DARBC will naturally flex over time and 
require a cohering or calibration method to determine antenna element locations and 
provide accurate digital beam-forming.  Nelson Dorney provides a description of a 
broadcast reference technique43 that could be applied for the DARBC.  The method 
measures phase of each element with respect to a number of reference beacons.  Dorney 
also describes a self-cohering technique where one element (or possibly more) transmits 
conducting a self survey of the array which also applies the use of reference beacons.  
The uses of beacons in both the far field and near field are implied in the article43. 
Cost and time to perform a physical measurement and mechanical battery 
alignment of thousands of elements of an OA would be time and cost prohibitive.  The 
capability to dynamically calibrate, while in port or on a fixed site will be required for 
this radar system.  The use of reference beacons of known locations with respect to the 
DARBC ship would potentially require the development of special facilities.  The entire 
radar would need to be visible to the beacons which may not be practical in most navy 
ports.  The ship would need to have the ability to transmit at this facility which can also 
be a problem especially considering the high power levels of the system.  A fixed or 
portable calibration system nearby naval stations is an option but would require the ship 
to be underway and subject to flexure effects from the sea during alignment.  Also, the 
calibration system itself would be subject to errors that can occur in alignment tests of 
today.  Ship flexure due to solar loading, wind loading, and temperature variations could 
have the similar impacts on the alignment system as on the ship.  Alignment of DARBC 
to other sensors would also need to be considered.  The beacon array would most likely 
operate in the VHF/UHF band.  Co-locating other frequency systems and optical 
reference objects could allow alignment to other primary sensors.  The Shipboard 
Electronic Systems Evaluation Facility (SESEF) utilizes the Universal Radar Moving 
Target Transponder (URMTT) as a supplement to aircraft services.  Other Electronic 
Target Generators (ETG) also exist which could be used as a repeatable test tool to train 
ships and to help with alignment.  Since SESEF facilities are land based, they are limited 
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in assessing elevation.  Placement of ETGs such as URMTT in an aircraft would allow 
elevation to be assessed. 
f) Dynamic Compensation 
Once aligned, dynamic compensation could be provided by a number of 
different means.  Automatic laser tracking tools exist that can measure positions of 
targets in 3-dimensional coordinates with high accuracy.  Ships that flex can use a 
number of laser elements and reflectors on the hull (the targets) to measure flexure 
dynamically.  The system would need sufficient laser systems in certain portions of the 
hull. Algorithms and processing are required to extrapolate flexure over large sections of 
the hull. 
The use of differential GPS has been speculated and eliminated as an 
option for measuring positions of sensors.42  Miniature ring laser gyros could be located 
throughout the ship to measure 3-dimensional rotation.  Data from the gyro could be 
compared to a reference plane to determine areas of flexure.  Currently ships have two 
gyros for redundancy to measure ships roll, pitch, and yaw.  The two gyros will show 
different responses while ship is underway.  This difference is due to ship flexure, 
differences in hardware alignment, or drift of electronics internal to the gyros.  This fact 
could permit multiple gyros to be placed around key positions on the ship that represent 
portions of array elements. 
Loke identified the potential use of a Quartz Rate Sensor (QRS) to detect 
angular rate motions.42  By integrating three gyros for three axis and coupling with a 
clock, angular displacement can be determined similar to the gyro concept described 
above.  They have the advantage of being small and low cost but their design was 
deemed not mature enough to be a viable alternative at this time. 
For all these options, integration of these sensors for measuring flexure 
would require development of both hardware and computer software.  Installation of 
small, low cost sensor cages at key combat system elements including DARBC array 
elements would be required.  The software would need to collect, correlate and interpret 
the data from the sensors and translate into dynamic compensation adjustments. 
  53
Gyros are likely to experience gyro drift over time.  One possible way to 
minimize drift would be to develop a hybrid system consisting of both gyros and lasers.  
The lasers could be used to quantify and periodically remove any bias. 
Error Budget Elements 




RSS= root sum 
squared 




Flexure Static RSS 39 
Temperature/sun .5 m displacement 30 
Wind loading .3 m displacement 20 
Load-out .2 m displacement 10 
Alignment test errors n/a 5 
Post alignment impact .2 m displacement 10 
Flexure Dynamic RSS 32 
Waves/maneuvers .5 m displacement 30 
Vibration .2 m displacement 10 
Time latency between sensors RSS 45 
DARBC to own ship sensor negligible 0 
DARBC to off ship Fire Control sensor > .01 sec 45 
DARBC as FC to interceptor missile  n/a 
Geo Position error RSS 50 
DARBC ship to off board sensor > 1 m displacement 50 
Total Errors  98 
Table 7. Error Budget for Ship Flexure 
 
The operational requirements for DARBC will provide determination of 
overall mission requirements and capabilities.  The DARBC ship, its outfitted systems, 
and interfaced systems to DARBC, will determine the error budget and define the 
capabilities the radar will be designed to.  If ship flexure is determined to be too large of 
an error contributor, dynamic compensation will be looked at to reduce errors.  Ship 
flexure errors may be exceeded by time latencies between platforms and position 
determination but will still be a significant contributor to overall error.  The increased 
ranges and strenuous mission profiles to support BMD scenarios will likely cause tighter 
error budgets than today’s systems.  The length and distribution of DARBC array 
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elements will make this radar susceptible to flexure problems.  Reduced detection ranges, 
difficulty in maintaining track, and handing over to other sensors are the likely problems 
caused by this flexure.  No methods exist today to measure and compensate for flexure.  
Several technologies have potential to provide dynamic compensation but none appear to 
be a clear leader.  Further investigation of mitigating methods is recommended.  
Calibrating the DARBC array will likely need to be done both pier side and underway to 
verify alignment and determine compensation to remove biases.   
B. PROGRAM CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Cost 
As noted in the DARBC CDD2 program costs and projections of LCCs are 
outside the scope of this capstone project.  However specific system attributes have been 
identified by capstone team members to be key cost driver risk areas that must be 
addressed at the earliest stages of the acquisition cycle in order to determine if tradeoffs 
in performance requirements may be necessary in order to meet the criticality of the 
mission that the DARBC system must perform.  The key anticipated cost driver risk areas 
that have been identified for the DARBC system are manning, reliability, maintainability, 
dynamic radar-ship alignment and static radar-ship alignment or calibration.  The 
DARBC system logistics risk metric assessments analysis process considered the support 
resources necessary to achieve specified levels of readiness (Ao) regarding system 
reliability and maintainability uniqueness plus mission operating requirements.  The 
logistics risk metrics will be utilized to determine risk handling priorities, execute risk 
handling plans, observe the status of risk handling actions, determine and acquire the 
resources necessary to execute risk management strategies.  To analyze the cost driver 
risk areas, logistics risk metric tables were created to measure and rate program activities 
associated with specific critical logistics elements noted in Table 8 through Table 11.  
These tables identify specific logistics risk metric assessment requirements to ensure that 
the operational and the support characteristics for the radar will be achieved to perform 
its assigned mission effectively and efficiently over the life-cycle period.  The Rating vs. 
Risk Conversion Table provides metrics for measuring and rating program activities 
associated with each critical logistics risk element that has been identified by capstone 
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team members.  Each critical logistics risk element includes key program activities that 
identify output/performance metrics collectively to determine success or failure for a 
given element.  The logistics risk element rating system was developed by the capstone 
team members based on practical knowledge and experience in the technology areas 
being assessed.  Rating values are ranked by the following criteria: 
 
• High (Red):  Numeric rating 1.0 to 2.2.  Indicates very high risk to 
program success due to immaturity of technology or little or no program 
compliance with metric identified.  Risk to achieve program costs and 
schedule goals is high.  Risk to meet threshold KPPs is high.  
• Moderate (Yellow): Numeric rating 2.3 to 3.7.  Indicates moderate risk to 
program success due to low level of maturity of technology or minimal 
program compliance with metric identified.  Risk to achieve program costs 
and schedule goals is moderate.  Risk to meet objective KPPs is high and 
threshold KPPs is moderate.  
• Low (Green):  Numeric rating 3.8 to 5.0.  Indicates low risk to program 
success.  Technology exists today.  Risk to meet threshold KPPs is low 
and to meet objective KPPs is moderate to low.   
• Blank (White):  Numeric rating that is noted as N/A which represents that 
the metric is not applicable at the time of the assessment. 
 
Rating vs. Risk Conversion  
Rating Values Risk Assessment 
1.0 to 2.2 
 
2.3 to 3.7 
 
















Manpower and Personnel  
Program Activity Metrics Rating 
1.1 Identifies requirements for: 
− Special skills. 
− Maintenance and operator labor hours by 
rate by year. 
− Number of personnel by rate by 
maintenance level by year. 
1.2 Identifies requirements for manpower 
factors that impact system design utilization 
rates, pilot-to-seat ratios and maintenance 
ratios. 
1.3 Maintenance task times, maintenance 
skill levels and number of maintenance 
personnel required have been derived from 
the following: 
− Reliability (e.g., MTBF). 
− Maintainability (e.g., MTTR, maintenance 
task times). 
− Availability (e.g., task time limits). 
− Reliability and maintainability tests. 
− Performance monitoring/fault 
detection/fault isolation and diagnostics. 












1. Maintenance Concept/Plan – 
includes identification of the frequency of 
failures for maintenance, maintenance task 
times, maintenance skill levels and number 
of maintenance personnel required. These 
factors are critical during the design phase to 







Activity (8.2/3) 2.7 
 
 
Table 9. Manpower Risk Metrics 
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Design Interface (Reliability, Maintainability, Quality and Availability) 
Program Activity Metrics Rating 
2.1 The following measures of effectiveness 
or equivalent are identified in measurable 
quantifiable terms based on similar systems 
and available detail design information: 
− Availability. 
− Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF). 
− Mean Time To Repair (MTTR). 
− Frequency and duration of preventive or 
scheduled maintenance. 
− Battle damage repair capability. 
− Readiness thresholds for all system 
downtime, including scheduled maintenance. 
2.2 Reliability, maintainability and 
availability of the system are continually 
assessed through analyses and testing to 
ensure life cycle objectives will be met. 
2.3 Design and layout minimizes 
unnecessary removal of items to gain access 
for maintenance and minimizes design of 
special tools. 
2.4 Maintainability predictions and task time 
analyses are completed for organizational 
level or shipboard maintenance as a 
minimum. 
2.5 Mock-ups, prototypes and/or simulations 
to assess accessibility are completed as part 
of design. 
2.6 Accessibility and maintainability are 
validated through tests. 
2.7 A quality program is established to 
assure implementation of design 


























2.0 Reliability, Maintainability, Quality 
and Availability – are requirements imposed 
or analyses performed to insure that the 
system is operationally ready for use when 
needed, will successfully perform assigned 
functions, and can be operated and  
maintained within the scope of the logistics 










Table 10. Design Interface Metrics 
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Dynamic/Static Radar-Ship Alignment or Calibration 
Program Activity Metrics Rating 
3.1 Establishes the diagnostics concept to test 
the antenna elements. 
3.2 Identifies test and fault isolation 
capabilities desired of automatic, semi-
automatic and manual test equipment at all 
maintenance levels, expressed in terms of 
realistic and affordable probabilities and 
confidence levels to repair or calibrate 
antenna elements. 
3.3 Identifies the SE associated with the most 
economical level of repair (usually 
determined in the level of repair analysis) 
unless over-ridden because of non-economic 
factors. 
3.4 Identifies manpower, training and 
maintenance task requirements. 
3.5 Identifies required technical 
documentation to support the SE. 
3.6 Identifies the level of maintenance at 
which the various SE is required to repair or 
calibrate antenna elements (e.g., 
organizational, intermediate and depot level 
maintenance). 
3.7 Types and quantity of SE for each 
location has been established. 
3.8 Calibration requirements are specified. 
3.9 Support Equipment Requirements 
Document is submitted by the contractor to 
justify SE requirements and initiate follow-






















3.0 Maintenance Plan to repair or 
calibrate antenna elements – includes 
documentation of the Support Equipment 
(SE) concept as a result of the level of repair 
analysis, organic repair/contractor (OEM) 









Table 11. Radar Alignment Risk 
 
2. Strategies for Future Development and Evaluation (SEP) 
Once the Full Rate Production (FRP) of the DARBC system is authorized, a long 
term buy of the system components (especially, T/R modules) should be funded by the 
program office and managed by Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP).  This helps 
reduce price creep due to part obsolescence and lack of qualified vendors bidding on 




program initiation by the program office for intermediate and depot level work, rather 
than relying solely on the OEM for non-organizational level work.  This competition will 
keep operation costs in check. 
The DARBC system is intended for operation in forward deployed areas.  There is 
a very good possibility that the DARBC will operate in an EW intensive environment.  
Future DARBC design considerations should be given to this possibility. 
When possible, open-architecture shall be used in the DARBC system design.  
Utilizing digital architecture lends itself to advanced signal processing.  The use of open 
architecture allows DARBC system signal processing to change as advances in state of 
the art technologies evolve.  Design considerations that should be emphasized are 
frequency agility, jitter and stagger.  Another DARBC system design consideration is 
single site control of multiple DARBC systems or system components (e.g. OA antenna, 
transmitters) for bistatic or multi-static operation. 
A design feature for DARBC system development consideration is integration 
into FORCENet.  Although this integration goes without saying for any future major 
weapons procurement, its importance is emphasized by stating it.  Also, integration with 
USN Link 16 and 11 should be a requirement for additional design considerations, as 
well as similar US Army and Air Force systems.  Integration with future space based 
radars should be considered as a DARBC system design requirement also. 
Design considerations should be given to a variant of the DARBC system that is 
less expensive.  This variant could be used by Military Sealift Command, Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) or North American Treaty Organization (NATO) ships to cue USN 
DARBC systems or link to a joint data network. 
Development of a Systems Engineering Plan (SEP) should be considered to help 
identify program risk areas.  This SEP could also identify development strategies 
including a detailed prototype, a Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP), procurement 
strategy, supportability concepts and detailed ship integration concepts including 




The policy considerations for the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, 
Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) associated with 
fielding the DARBC are addressed at a high level in this document.  The doctrine for the 
DARBC includes publications, tactics, techniques, and procedures on how the radar will 
function on its own and in a System-of-Systems (SoS) environment.  This doctrine will 
guide the way the military utilizes the DARBC system.  Doctrine will be heavily 
influenced by the overall mission of the DARBC ship and associated weapons systems.  
A forward deployed DARBC tasked to engage ballistic missiles over a threat nation will 
apply a different set of rules of engagement than a homeland defense positioned ship. 
The organizational reporting structure for the DARBC platform will be influenced 
by other platforms that may be operating in conjunction.  A DARBC ship positioned for 
early detection of launch supporting engagement from other platforms will need an 
organization structure that supports ship positioning and launch considerations in addition 
to a system that can pass track information.  DARBC search areas can be optimized if 
threat sectors and types are known.  Timely reporting of this intelligence information 
through the organizational elements is required to ensure effective use by DARBC to 
accomplish its mission. 
DARBC training will be documented by a Navy Training System Plan (NTSP) 
and will cover all elements of instructor requirements, shipboard operator and maintainer 
courses, remote maintenance support personnel, and all hands on training including 
embedded training capabilities. 
DARBC will apply COTS equipment, military developed equipment, and Non-
Developmental Items (NDIs) to minimize development and procurement costs.  
Application of these items needs to consider LCC and ability to meet key system 
capabilities such as reliability. Significant materiel costs and timing will be associated 
with the development and procurement of the DARBC ship platform. 
The requirement for minimal manning will depend largely on availability of 
qualified personnel.  The competencies, skills, and abilities of personnel must be 
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established and known and be considered as a driver for design decisions.  DARBC 
personnel requirements will consider all levels of operations and maintenance including 
shipboard, remote maintenance, Fault Detection Fault Isolation (FDFI) and depot.   
Facilities for DARBC need to ensure infrastructure capabilities to meet unique 
design aspects of DARBC.  The integrated hull structure of DARBC may impact ability 
of tug or Underway Replenishment (UNREP) platforms to approach and interface with 
the ship in order to not damage array elements.  Calibration and alignment of the array 
elements may require unique design features at piers to allow direct visibility to antenna 
elements during radiation.  Remote maintenance facilities will require bandwidth, trained 
personnel, and representative systems to assist in troubleshooting and repair 
recommendations so ships force is seamlessly supported at all times.  Pier facilities will 
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IV. MODELING EFFORTS 
A. RADAR CROSS SECTION (RCS) MODELING 
Initially, it was assumed that a normal (90° aspect angle) RCS should be used for 
a notional ballistic missile target because the DARBC will most likely detect a ballistic 
missile shortly after launch during boost and ascent phases of flight, leaving the 
orientation of the target to be nearly perpendicular to the radar beam.  An initial RCS 
model was generated using Microsoft ® Excel which calculated a normal RCS for a 
simple cylindrical object.  As threat representative inputs were entered into the model, the 
output was observed to be several orders of magnitude higher than expected.   
A ballistic missile RCS was initially assumed to be 10m2 for all frequency bands.  
Upon further research, this value was confirmed by reviewing a table relating different 
objects from birds to planes to their respective RCSs.  This table also brought to attention 
that the RCS will vary with frequency44.  The values on the table generally used S-band 
or X-band frequencies.  The assumption was refined that the RCS of 10m2 would be for 
S-band only and RCS values in the VHF and UHF bands would be calculated. 
Following the initial RCS calculations in Excel®, a MATLAB® model analysis 
tool was used to generate mathematical algorithms to calculate the RCS for a cylinder to 
more accurately simulate the ballistic missile target.  The normal and non-normal 
incidence backscattered RCSs for a finite length, finite radius cylinder (see Figure 20 and 
Equations 4.1 and 4.2) are given by the following equations: 
  64
 








θλσ r= , for different aspect angle backscatter 4.2 
 
Typically there is relative motion between the radar and observed target.  This 
implies that the observed RCS measured by the radar fluctuates over time as a function of 
frequency and target aspect angle.  This observed RCS is referred to as the dynamic cross 
section or dynamic RCS45. 
Normalized target dimensions of two meters for the radius and 18 meters for the 
height were used to simulate a ballistic missile target.  In order to get a RCS value in 
square meters, apply the radius and height values for the normal (90° aspect angle) RCS 
calculation to the non-normal aspect angle backscatter calculation.  The calculated RCS 
value is then converted to dbsm and plotted against the aspect angle for VHF, UHF, and 
S-band frequencies.  This analysis was done to determine at which aspect angle, the 
notional ballistic missile target would have a 10m2 RCS in the S-band.  Also, similar 
plots were generated which identified the aspect angles that would let the same size target 
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have a 10m2 RCS in the VHF and UHF bands.  This was done as a sanity check on our 
analysis.  Figure 21, Figure 22, and Figure 23 contain the simulation graphical results 






Figure 21. RCS as a Function of Aspect Angle for S-Band 
 





Figure 23. RCS as a Function of Aspect Angle for UHF 
 
The figures show that in order to maintain a RCS 10m2 in the S-band, an aspect 
angle of 88.46 or 91.54 degrees is required.  This is a near normal aspect angle which 
satisfies all initial assumptions.  Using the same aspect angle of 88.46 degrees in the VHF 
and UHF spectrums, new RCS values were calculated using the dimensions of a notional 
ballistic missile.  Using these values, RCSs of 77m2 and 146m2, for the UHF and VHF 
frequencies, respectively, were obtained.  In conclusion, the analysis output was that the 
RCSs of 77m2 for UHF and 146m2 for VHF using a fixed, near normal aspect angle of 
88.46 degrees were used for a notional ballistic missile.  These values were used in the 
radar technical parameters research. 
B. RADAR PERFORMANCE MODEL 
Waterloo Maple ® 7 was used to derive the technical requirements for the 
DARBC.  With this software, the radar equation and other equations were used as 
described in section III.A.2.  All the parameters in of section III.A.2 have their 
corresponding Maple variable names which can be traced to the Maple Radar 
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Performance Model Source Code located in Appendix B.  To use this model, the 
variables were assigned values which were input by the user based on assumptions, 
references, research, or calculations.  After all the variables had values assigned, all 
commands in the Maple file are executed in order (from top to bottom).  Near the bottom 
of the Maple worksheet, several plot commands generate the output plots which are seen 
in section III.A.2.  The radar parameter values were ultimately obtained by using this 
model in a trial and error fashion.  Radar parameters were checked to ensure all inputs to 
the model would be feasible in the real system.  Inputs were manually varied in an 
attempt to characterize how each input affected the results.  DARBC system KPPs were 
met using the parameter values in Table 1 of section III.A.2, but further sensitivity 
studies were conducted to show how modifications to inputs, such as the number of 
elements, power, and gain affect the output.  These sensitivity plots were done on variant 
worksheets of the original Maple model and their source code is included in Appendix B. 
C. REACTION TIME ANALYSIS ONE SHIP TWO SENSOR SCENARIO 
In this Microsoft Excel ® model the subject ship is, in all cases, equipped with a 
weapon system.  The weapon’s range exceeds the tracking range of the WCS.  The WCS 
has two track range parameters.  The first, Un-aided RD, is the range at which the unaided 
WCS can detect, acquire, and track a TBM.  The second range, Aided RD, is achieved 
when the WCS receives a cue or designation from another source, the DARBC in this 
case.  For this investigation the ranges of our notional WCS are Un-aided RD = 300 km, 
and Aided RD = 748 km.  The DARBC detection range is assumed to be 2000 km. 
The calculations are based on some assumptions supported by a Congressional 
Budget Office study46.  According to the study a typical TBM burnout velocity ranges 
from 6 to 7 km/sec.  Because the study is two years old and the DARBC is a future 
system, 7.5 km/sec is used.  As shown in the CDD, the ranges of TBMs are up to 1000 
km for a SRBM, between 1000 and 3000 km for a MRBM, between 3000 and 5500 km 
for an IRBM.  Again high range values of 1000, 3000, and 5500 and apogee values of 
160, 500, and 900 km are used to compensate for future advances in TBM design. 
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Flight path calculations can be complex.  They can be based on a rotating, oblate 
earth with a four-thirds aspect ratio.  However, this model is based on a flat, non-rotating 










−= + −  4.3 
 
VALUES 
x is the horizontal (range) axis. 
y is the vertical (altitude) axis. 
Yc is the vertical center of the flight path ellipse in kilometers from the 
ship due to the curvature of the earth (assigned 0 in this analysis). 
Ship is always at x = 0, y = 0. 
ADJUSTABLE VARIABLES 
Xc is the horizontal center of the flight path ellipse in kilometers from the 
ship. 
a is the semi-major (horizontal) axis of the ellipse in km. 
b is the semi-minor (vertical) axis of the ellipse in km. 
R is the radius of the earth in km. 
The horizontal range of each TBM is divided into 1000 segments.  The length of 
the chord across each segment’s flight path is calculated and assumed to be a good 
estimate of the length of the flight path arc.  Next the chord length is divided by the TBM 
velocity to determine the time taken to travel that segment of the flight path, and to 
maintain a running total flight time.  The range is then calculated using the x and y 
coordinates of the end of the segment, which is then used to calculate the change in range 
for that segment.  Total time for each of the three range-spaces was calculated as a sum of 
the segment times for applicable flight path segments. 
The following criteria were used to determine if a segment’s flight path was 
applicable to a range-space. 
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• Range-Space #1:  0 km out to the Unaided RD 
o The segment ends within the range-space, or, 
o Both 
 The segment ends in range-space #2 on the outbound leg, and, 
 The range-space #1 time is greater than 0 
• Range-Space #2:  Unaided RD out to the Aided RD 
o The segment ends within the range-space, and 
o Either 
 The segment ends in range-space #2 on the inbound leg, or, 
 The range-space #1 time is equal to 0 
• Range-Space #3:  Aided RD out to the DARBC RD 
o The segment ends in range-space #3 on the inbound leg 
 
If a target has been in range-space #1, the WCS is already tracking it and is capable 
of maintaining that track out to Aided RD.  The unaided WCS is not capable of acquiring 
a target in range-space #2.  So, if the target has not yet entered range-space #1, acquiring 
it with the WCS is only possible if the WCS is aided by the DARBC.  An outbound target 
in range-space #3 is un-engagable. 
This model does not account for the acceleration of the TBM.  It is assumed to be at 
full speed immediately after launch.  This assumption makes the analysis much simpler 
and the errors it induces are of smaller magnitude than those that result, or would result 
from uncertainty about velocity and acceleration values and launch angle.  This 
assumption also leads the results of this analysis to be more conservative, i.e., if the target 
initial velocity was zero and it accelerated to full speed at some later time, the time-
benefit from the DARBC would be greater. 
Because the objective of this analysis was to identify engagability gains attributable 
to the DARBC, the analysis only considered TBMs that could be engaged, i.e., those with 
launch ranges for which the flight path at least entered the Aided RD.  The Excel analysis 
tool allows the boost phase duration to be set as a percentage of the total flight time.  For 
this analysis, boost phase duration was set at 25% and flight paths are only analyzed from 
launch to the end of boost phase because the DARBC’s main goal is to support boost 
phase intercepts.  Figure 24 through Figure 26 are representative of the three important 
types of results from this model:  extended engagement time, the ability to engage a 
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Figure 26. IRBM Flight Path and Time-Range Plot (900 km launch range) 
 
Figure 27 through Figure 29 are based on further analysis of the model’s time-
range plots.  Each plot shows the times in each range-space, stacked, i.e., showing the 
additional time afforded by each range-space.  The area under the Unaided-t line shows 
launch ranges that would be engagable by an isolated WCS and how long a target would 
be engagable.  The area between the Unaided-t and the Aided-t lines shows the launch 
ranges that would be engagable by a WCS when cued by the DARBC and duration of 
that engagability.  The area between the Aided-t and DARBC-t lines shows how much 
extra time would be available to evaluate a target with a given launch range.  They also 
show improvement in the launch range coverage as the horizontal distance between the 
point before reaching zero on the Unaided-t line and the Aided-t line.  The span of launch 
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Figure 29. DARBC Gains Against IRBM 
 
DARBC would provide the generic benefits of having an additional sensor 
available, increasing the overall probability of detection.  That would allow the time 
resources of the WCS to be re-prioritized.  Using only a handoff to an organic weapon 
system, the DARBC also shows the following benefits. 
• Against the SRBM, the DARBC provides: 
o up to 22 seconds of additional engagement time at a launch range of 400 
km, 
o up to 28 seconds of additional evaluation time at a launch range of 900 
km, 
o increased coverage from 400 km to 900 km launch range. 
• Against the MRBM, the DARBC provides: 
o up to 96 seconds of additional evaluation time at a launch range of 1200 
km, 
o increased coverage from 300 km to 1200 km launch range. 
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o  
• Against the IRBM, the DARBC provides: 
o up to 182 seconds of additional evaluation time at a launch range of 1300 
km, 
o increased coverage from 300 km to 1300 km launch range. 
 
D. REACTION TIME ANALYSIS TWO SHIP TWO SENSOR SCENARIO 
A stochastic reaction time model using the Arena ® 10 process simulation 
software was used to model system reaction time for the case of DARBC operating in 
conjunction with another S-band configured ship in a detect through engage sequence.  
The model was built with two baselines.  The first one with the DARBC cueing to an S-
band radar.  The second was the S-band radar operating unaided.  Both baselines had 
targets with uniformly distributed ranges, RCSs, and velocities as seen in Table 12. 
Parameter Minimum Maximum 
RCS 1m2 300m2 
Target Speed 1 km/s 10 km/s 
Range from Ownship 
(DARBC aided) 
500 km 5000km 
Range from Ownship 
(local sensor only) 
50 km 300km 
Table 12 Arena Model Parameters 
 
Also assumed in these baselines is that the target velocity is the closing velocity 
with respect to the ship.  Initial detection time was collected based on a process 
simulation.  For the baseline with the DARBC, if the target was generated at a position 
outside the maximum range of the DARBC (assumed to be 2000 km) then the target 
would not be detected until it closed to within that range limit and the detection time 
process was complete.  If the target was generated inside the detection range, the 
detection time was assumed to be time of completion of the detection time process.  If the 
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target RCS was less than that of the notional ballistic missile, then the target was not 
detected.  As the target closed on the handoff range, an engagement process simulation 
occurred which considered target acquisition, time to establish a fire control track, 
identify the target, compute the firing solution, grant permission to launch a missile, 
process launch sequence, and launch the missile.  Missile flight time was not included in 
this sequence.  The total time from initial detection to the time of missile launch was 
measured during each run and over an average of 10 runs.  This was done for both 
baselines.   
This model included a very simplistic 1 degree of freedom target flight path of a 
radially inbound ballistic missile.  Reaction times were 16.2 seconds for the model with 
DARBC and 10.5 seconds without.  The results showed that on average, the system with 
the DARBC had approximately 53.5% more time to engage the target than the system 
without the DARBC. 
The reaction time model baseline representing the scenario with DARBC 
operating with an S-band ship is described by Figure 30.  In the second scenario, 
described by Figure 31. the S-band ship operates independently without the benefit of 
designations from DARBC.  
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Figure 30. Arena Model 1:  DARBC Designates to Remote S-Band Ship 
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Figure 31. Arena Model 2:  S-Band Ship Operates Independently 
 
The following attributes were used to model the reaction time in Arena: 
Frequency: VHF (216–225 MHz), UHF (420–450 MHz), S-band (3.3 GHz) 
Arrival Time: TNOW 
RCS: Uniformly Distributed, 1 to 300 m2 
Target Speed: Uniformly Distributed, 1 to 10 km/sec 
Target Range: Uniformly Distributed, 500 to 5000 km (DARBC aided) 
Target Range: Uniformly Distributed, 50 to 300 km (Local Sensor only) 
 
Table 13 and Table 14 show the analysis results from the models: 
DARBC Radar Aiding Local Sensor Average (sec) Minimum Value (sec) Maximum Value (sec) 
Record Time to Detect 1.4573664 1.0087536 1.983207 
Record Handover Time 5.652 0.629757 9.99 
Local System Engagement Time 9.0906336 8.7594894 9.008793 
Record Total Time 16.2 10.398 20.982 
Table 13. Times When Local Sensor Aided by DARBC 
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Local Sensor Only Average (sec) Minimum Value (sec) Maximum Value (sec) 
Record Time to Detect 1.5131976 1.006176 1.9865094 
Record Total Time 10.884 8.256 13.488 
Table 14. Times for Unaided Local Sensor 
 
Table 13 indicates that DARBC system on average takes 1.46 seconds to detect a 
high velocity target in the range between 500 km to 2000 km.  Total time from first 
detection by DARBC to interceptor launch is 16.2 seconds. 
Table 14 indicates that local sensor without aid of the DARBC radar takes an 
average of 1.51 seconds to detect high velocity target in the range between 50 km to 300 
km.  Total time from first detection to interceptor launch is 10.88 seconds. The 
comparison indicates that with the aid of DARBC radar the average local system 
engagement time improves from 10.88 seconds to 9.09 seconds. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis concludes that implementation of the DARBC would fill a vital gap 
as a mobile, extended range sensor as part of the BMD program, providing the 
capabilities needed to defend our country and its allies from the Ballistic Missile threat as 
no other system can.  If it is shown in future research that the Aperstructure concept can 
be physically realized and implemented to meet the technical requirements identified in 
this project, then the DARBC can be a very real asset to the USN and DoD. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
This research project concluded that the OA concept as defined by the DARBC 
operational and technical requirements has the potential of providing a very real and 
significant benefit to the USN and BMD program.  More analysis and research is 
recommended in a number of areas.  Some of these may be good candidates for future 
COHORTs or NPS graduate students to pursue.   Recommendations are provided in four 
primary topics; DARBC modeling, DARBC ship integration, DARBC operational 
requirements, and DARBC Life Cycle Cost. 
1. DARBC Modeling  
Future modeling efforts could be improved by combining the features of the 
individual modeling efforts used during this project and expanding for features not 
assessed.  The expanded model would incorporate the benefits of the both system 
performance models such as stochastic processing along with more realistic 
representation of radar parameters and target characteristics.  The model should have the 
following features: 
• Threat representative 6 Degree Of Freedom (6 DOF) threat flight profile for 
various ballistic missiles.  Targets would vary stochastically in flight path, 
target speed, and flight profile relative to the radar position.   
• Earth’s curvature & rotation considerations. 
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• Target RCS considering more realistic Swerling Case results, varying aspect 
angles, and influences of rocket motor plume enhancements during boost 
phase. 
• Radar propagation analysis including environmental factors such as ducting, 
rain, fog and various operational conditions such as chaff.  (This may be a 
special case model applicable to ASCM scenarios as opposed to BMD.) 
• Stealth target RCS analysis to determine the effectiveness of the DARBC in 
the counter-stealth role. 
• Weapon system engagement capabilities including complete detection, control 
and engagement sequence.  An ability to select weapon capabilities and 
employment consideration (e.g. shoot-look-shoot vs. shoot-shoot-look) should 
be included.  A variety of weapons including SM-3, marineized THAAD, 
marineized KEI weapon, and HEL, should all be included as engagement 
options. 
 
The STK® family of modeling products generated by Analytical Graphics Inc. 
(AGI) was identified by the team as a viable COTS analysis tool that would provide some 
of the functionality described above.  This tool should be a starting point for future 
modeling efforts by NPS or other activities investigating DARBC potential capabilities. 
2. DARBC Ship Integration 
This report touched lightly on a number of very critical technical risk areas 
impacting the eventual success of the DARBC concept.  While work has been 
accomplished in aperstructures for superstructures, array T/R element integration into 
ship hull features remains critical to the success of a large scale array.   A study solely 
focused on ship hull integration of T/R elements should be considered.  This study could 
investigate hull strength impacts, antenna element features for transmissibility in a hull 
form, and anticipated ship flexure results.  The study could also examine how element 
alignment and calibration would be accomplished during fabrication and then throughout 
the life cycle. 
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A study on ship flexure impacts and error budgets could examine and potentially 
calculate total error contributions across an entire system.  This study would not 
necessarily need to be linked to DARBC as it could concentrate on developing 
compensation for dynamic flexure.  This compensation concept could potentially support 
any sensors or systems impacted by ship flexure. 
3. DARBC Operational Requirements 
The DARBC system is currently a radar without a ship.  The overall missions and 
weaponization of this platform need to be considered for the completion of DARBC 
operational capabilities definition.  The Team was challenged to define radar capabilities 
when ship capabilities had to be assumed and availability of other potential sensors were 
unknown.  Search pattern requirements is an area where sensor loading, capabilities of 
other ship sensors (on DARBC ship and integrated through ForceNet) and deployment 
environment need to be considered.   The size and capability of DARBC could be 
considerably different if called to complete large scale fence search for ballistic missiles 
launch and volume search for stealth ASCMs simultaneously.  
4. Life Cycle Cost Model 
Supportability costs have the largest potential LCC impacts to DARBC.  Ship 
integration of an opportunistic array has reliability and maintainability considerations that 
have never been considered to the scale of the DARBC system.  Immediate access to 
radar components may be impossible to major sections of hull areas compared to today’s 
“radar rooms”.   To address manning considerations, studies are required that will drive 
preventative maintenance to absolute minimal requirements.  Corrective maintenance 
must not be critical to system performance.  How to accomplish this affordably must be 
examined during early stages of DARBC development. 
Strategies for future development and evaluation of DARBC should be 
investigated to bring concepts from paper study phase into systems that can be used to 
validate capabilities only shown by models.   A SEP preparation could have been more 




Articulation of a path forward including identification of risk areas and possible options 
for mitigation is recommended.  This SEP could help define additional study areas not 
recognized or considered by this team.  
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APPENDIX A.  MATLAB RCS MODEL 
Model RCS in VHF, UHF, and S-band Radar 
 
function [rcs] = rcs_cylinder(r, h, freq, phi, CylinderType) 
% rcs_cylinder_225MHz.m 
% This program compute monostatic RCS for a finite length 
% cylinder of circular cross-section. 
% Plot of RCS versus aspect angle theta is generated at a specified 
% input angle phi 
% Last modified on August 27, 2006 
 r = 2;           % radius of the circular cylinder 
 h = 18;           % height of the circular cylinder 
eps =0.00001;      % error in degree per specular 
dtr = pi/180;      % one degree 
freq = 225000000;  % frequency used 
freqMH = num2str(freq*1.e-6); % frequency in MHz 
lambda = 3.0e+8 /freq;      % wavelength 




    % Compute RCS from 0 to (90-.5)  degrees 
    index = 0; 
    for theta = 0.0:.1:90-.5 
        index = index +1; 
        thetar = theta * dtr; 
        rcs(index) = (lambda * r * sin(thetar) / ... 
            (8. * pi * (cos(thetar))^2)) + eps; 
    end 
    % Compute RCS for broadside specular at 90 degree 
    thetar = pi/2; 
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    index = index +1; 
    rcs(index) = (2. * pi * h^2 * r / lambda )+ eps; 
 
    % Compute RCS from (90+.5) to 180 degrees 
    for theta = 90+.5:.1:180. 
        index = index + 1; 
        thetar = theta * dtr; 
        rcs(index) = ( lambda * r * sin(thetar) / ... 
            (8. * pi * (cos(thetar))^2)) + eps; 
    end 
end 
 
% Plot the results 
figure(1) 
delta= 180/(index-1); 
angle = 0:delta:180; 
plot(angle,10*log10(rcs),'k','linewidth',1.5); 
grid; 
xlabel ('Aspect angle, Theta [Degrees]');; 
ylabel ('RCS - dBsm'); 
title  ([[CylinderType],'  Cylinder','  at Frequency = ',[freqMH],'  MHz']); 
 
 
function [rcs] = rcs_cylinder(r, h, freq, phi, CylinderType) 
% rcs_cylinder_425 MHz.m 
% This program compute monostatic RCS for a finite length 
% cylinder of circular cross-section. 
% Plot of RCS versus aspect angle theta is generated at a specified 
% input angle phi 
% Last modified on August 27, 2006 
 r = 2;           % radius of the circular cylinder 
 h = 18;           % height of the circular cylinder 
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eps =0.00001;      % error in degree per specular 
dtr = pi/180;      % one degree 
freq = 425000000   % freqebcy in MHz 
freqMH = num2str(freq*1.e-6); % frequency in MHz abbreviated 
lambda = 3.0e+8 /freq;      % wavelength 




    % Compute RCS from 0 to (90-.5)  degrees 
    index = 0; 
    for theta = 0.0:.1:90-.5 
        index = index +1; 
        thetar = theta * dtr; 
        rcs(index) = (lambda * r * sin(thetar) / ... 
            (8. * pi * (cos(thetar))^2)) + eps; 
    end 
    % Compute RCS for broadside specular at 90 degree 
    thetar = pi/2; 
    index = index +1; 
    rcs(index) = (2. * pi * h^2 * r / lambda )+ eps; 
    % Compute RCS from (90+.5) to 180 degrees 
    for theta = 90+.5:.1:180. 
        index = index + 1; 
        thetar = theta * dtr; 
        rcs(index) = ( lambda * r * sin(thetar) / ... 
            (8. * pi * (cos(thetar))^2)) + eps; 
    end 
end 
% Plot the results 
delta= 180/(index-1); 




xlabel ('Aspect angle, Theta [Degrees]');; 
ylabel ('RCS - dBsm'); 
title  ([[CylinderType],'  Cylinder','  at Frequency = ',[freqMH],'  MHz']); 
 
 
function [rcs] = rcs_cylinder(r, h, freq, phi, CylinderType) 
% rcs_cylinder_3300MHz.m 
% This program compute monstatic RCS for a finite length 
% cylinder of circular cross-section. 
% Plot of RCS versus aspect angle theta is generated at a specified 
% input angle phi 
% Last modified on August 27, 2006 
r = 2;           % radius of the circular cylinder 
h = 18;           % height of the circular cylinder 
eps =0.00001;     % error in degree per specular 
dtr = pi/180;     % one degree 
freq = 3300000000 % frequency in MHz 
freqMH = num2str(freq*1.e-6); % abbreviate the Frequency 
lambda = 3.0e+8 /freq;      % wavelength 




    % Compute RCS from 0 to (90-.5)  degrees 
    index = 0; 
    for theta = 0.0:.1:90-.5 
        index = index +1; 
        thetar = theta * dtr; 
        rcs(index) = (lambda * r * sin(thetar) / ... 
            (8. * pi * (cos(thetar))^2)) + eps; 
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    end 
    % Compute RCS for broadside specular at 90 degree 
    thetar = pi/2; 
    index = index +1; 
    rcs(index) = (2. * pi * h^2 * r / lambda )+ eps; 
    % Compute RCS from (90+.5) to 180 degrees 
    for theta = 90+.5:.1:180. 
        index = index + 1; 
        thetar = theta * dtr; 
        rcs(index) = ( lambda * r * sin(thetar) / ... 
            (8. * pi * (cos(thetar))^2)) + eps; 
    end 
end 
 
% Plot the results 
delta= 180/(index-1); 
angle = 0:delta:180; 
plot(angle,10*log10(rcs),'k','linewidth',1.5); 
grid; 
xlabel ('Aspect angle, Theta [Degrees]');; 
ylabel ('RCS - dBsm'); 
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> #Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
> #Masters of Science in Systems Engineering (MSSE) 
> #Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Port Hueneme Division (PHD) 
> #Team "R" Capstone Project, Radar Technical Parameters Research 
> #23 August, 2006, PRD 
>  
> restart;  #Reset of Maple's Memory 




:= P 500000  
 := p .3 107  
:= H1 100  
:= H1V 146  
:= H1U 77  
:= H2 10  
:= H3 1  
:= H4 .1  
:= N 1  
:= E 1  
 := K .138065 10-22  
:= T 290  
:= B1 23000  
:= B2 44000  
 := B3 .4 107  
 := F 10
( )/3 5
 
:= fa .01  
 := f1 .216 109  
 := f2 .420 109  
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 := f3 .3 1010  
:= L1 100  
:= L2 5  
:= W1 40  
:= W2 5  
:= Ef .7  
:= n 3411  
> WL1:=299792458/f1; 
:= WL1 1.387928046  
> WL2:=299792458/f2; 
:= WL2 .7137915667  
> WL3:=299792458/f3; 
:= WL3 .09993081932  
> A1:=Ef*(n/2); 
:= A1 1193.850000  
> A2:=Ef*(n/2); 
:= A2 1193.850000  
> A3:=Ef*L2*W2; 
:= A3 17.5  
> G1:=(A1*4*Pi)/(WL1^2): 
> G1db:=evalf(10*log10(G1),5); 
:= G1db 38.914  
> G2:=(A2*4*Pi)/(WL2^2): 
> G2db:=evalf(10*log10(G2),5); 
:= G2db 44.689  
> G3:=(A3*4*Pi)/(WL3^2): 
> G3db:=evalf(10*log10(G3),5); 
:= G3db 43.428  
> RE1VHF:=(R1)^4=(P*G1*A1*H1V*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B1*F*S1):# VHF Radar Equation using RCS 
of 146m^2 
> RE1:=(R1)^4=(P*G1*A1*H1*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B1*F*S1):# VHF Radar Equation using RCS of 
100m^2 
> REA1:=(R1)^4=(P*G1*A1*H2*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B1*F*S1):# VHF Radar Equation using RCS of 
10m^2 
> REB1:=(R1)^4=(P*G1*A1*H3*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B1*F*S1):# VHF Radar Equation using RCS of 
1m^2 
> REC1:=(R1)^4=(P*G1*A1*H4*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B1*F*S1):# VHF Radar Equation using RCS of 
0.1m^2 
>  
> RE1U:=(R2)^4=(P*G2*A2*H1*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B2*F*S2):# UHF Radar Equation using RCS of 
100m^2 
> RE1UHF:=(R2)^4=(P*G2*A2*H1U*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B2*F*S2):# UHF Radar Equation using RCS 
of 77m^2 
> REA1U:=(R2)^4=(P*G2*A2*H2*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B2*F*S2):# UHF Radar Equation using RCS 
of 10m^2 
> REB1U:=(R2)^4=(P*G2*A2*H3*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B2*F*S2):# UHF Radar Equation using RCS 
of 1m^2 




> RE1S:=(R3)^4=(p*G3*A3*H1*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B3*S3):# S-Band Radar Equation using RCS 
of 100m^2 
> REA1S:=(R3)^4=(p*G3*A3*H2*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B3*F*S3):# S-Band Radar Equation using 
RCS of 10m^2 
> REB1S:=(R3)^4=(p*G3*A3*H3*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B3*F*S3):# S-Band Radar Equation using 
RCS of 1m^2 
> REC1S:=(R3)^4=(p*G3*A3*H4*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B3*F*S3):# S-Band Radar Equation using 

























































































Detection"],labeldirections=[HORIZONTAL,VERTICAL],legend=["RCS=146","RCS = 100","RCS = 
10","RCS = 1","RCS = 
0.1"],view=[0..3E6,0..1],color=[black,red,magenta,blue,navy],thickness=2,font=[HELVETICA,
BOLD,12],title="VHF Radar Pd vs. R"); 
 
> plot([P4U,P4UHF,PA4U,PB4U,PC4U],R2=0..8000000,D2=0..1,xtickmarks=3,labels=["Range 
(m)","Probability of Detection"],labeldirections=[HORIZONTAL,VERTICAL],legend=["RCS = 
100","RCS = 77","RCS = 10","RCS = 1","RCS = 
0.1"],view=[0..3E6,0..1],color=[red,black,magenta,blue,navy],thickness=2,font=[HELVETICA,
BOLD,12],title="UHF Radar Pd vs. R"); 
 
> plot([P4S,PA4S,PB4S,PC4S],R3=0..8000000,D3=0..1,xtickmarks=3,labels=["Range 
(m)","Probability of Detection"],labeldirections=[HORIZONTAL,VERTICAL],legend=["RCS = 
100","RCS = 10","RCS = 1","RCS = 
0.1"],view=[0..3E6,0..1],color=[red,magenta,blue,navy],thickness=2,font=[HELVETICA,BOLD,1




> eval(PB4S,R3=425000);#S-Band Radar's "Range" using 1m^2 RCS. (Range is R (450km)) 
(Result should be 0.5)  
.4904985725  
> eval(PA4S,R3=748000);#S-Band Radar's max Range for Handoff (Handoff Range is R (748km)) 
(Result should be 0.5) 
.5000286862  
> VHFPsubD:=evalf(eval(P4VHF,R1=748000),5);#VHF Pd at handoff range vs. Ballistic Missile 
(146m^2 RCS) 
:= VHFPsubD .90616  
> UHFPsubD:=evalf(eval(P4UHF,R2=748000),5);#UHF Pd at handoff range vs. Ballistic Missile 
(77m^2 RCS) 
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APPENDIX C.  SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION 
The following documents were generated during the course of the research 
project.  These documents and engineering notes supported the production of the Joint 
Applied Project (JAP) paper and are being listed in this appendix for reference use only.  
These documents were used internally by “Team R” to document and record the progress 
of the different studies and satisfy the requirements of the course.  Differences between 
content in these attachments and the content in the body of the JAP paper reflect 
evolution of the project and should be disregarded.  Information in the body of this paper 
is the latest information available from this study.  References in this appendix were 
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CHANGE HISTORY 
 
The table below identifies all changes incorporated into the updated version of this document 
after initial approval.  A change in twenty percent (20%) of the document constitutes a new 
version, which will also be identified in this table.  The Change Request Number (CR #) 
provides a link to the history of the change request. 
 
CR # Date Version # Change Description 
1 1 May 1.04 Initial draft for delivery to NPS 
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INTRODUCTION 
United States Navy (USN) sources indicate a need for long range (order of thousands of 
kilometers) shipboard radar for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) to augment and expand current 
capabilities to defend against the increasing ballistic missile threat. The Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) is conducting radar architecture research based on an Opportunistic Array (OA) 
and is assessing the needed critical technologies to be incorporated into a ship-wide digital 
phased array radar. 
The Digital Array Radar for BMD and Counter-Stealth (DARBC) radar will be a ship based 
sensor to provide long range search, detection and track of ballistic missiles.  The increased in 
maximum detection range over existing shipboard sensors would provide a mobile early warning 
capability that can improve engagability by extending the time available for engagement decision 
making and providing improved track information for designation to other engagement sensors.  
This long range search capability would decrease the workload of existing BMD capable Aegis 
platforms so that those systems can focus on the closer range Air Defense (AD) mission. 
The radar will have sufficient power, aperture and system characteristics necessary to 
perform the mission described and will be operating over the Very High Frequency (VHF) and 
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) frequency bands (216-225 MHz and 420-450 MHz respectively).  
A benefit of operating in the anticipated frequency ranges is enhanced counter-stealth AD 
capability. 
The radar platform may be equipped with weapons of sufficient range and capability to 
provide boost, mid-course, and terminal phase engagements of Short Range Ballistic Missiles 
(SRBMs), Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs), Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles 
(IRBMs), Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missiles (ICBMs).  The radar will provide large area surveillance necessary to detect the launch 
of ballistic missiles, both land and sea based, and track the missiles.  The radar data will then be 
used to cue other sensors for purpose of engagement with defensive systems.  The other sensors 
may be from the same ship or as part of the overall BMD architecture.  The early detection, track 
and cueing will improve engagement by other BMD systems that currently are only capable of 
engaging the threat in midcourse or terminal phases of flight. 
JOINT FUNCTIONAL AREAS AND CONCEPTS 
The development of the DARBC system will apply BMD capabilities-based planning across 
the range of defined military operational requirements that pertains to the Universal Joint Task 
List (UJTL) CJCSM 3500.04D dated August 1, 2005, in order to meet mission requirements to 
defend the United States, its deployed forces and allies from ballistic missile threats. The 
DARBC system is being designed to counter a full spectrum of ballistic missile threats. The U.S. 
military leaders will be able to use the DARBC system to effectively apply a missile shield for 
an area defense ballistic missile threat. Should stealth air threats be present in the scanning area, 
the DARBC system will also be capable of detecting and tracking those threats. 
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RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 
The concept of a forward deployed BMD force enables the USN to provide battlespace 
awareness enhancing the joint relationship between the U.S. military services which enhances 
the defense of our homeland as well as deployed U.S. and allied forces.  By operating in a 
forward deployed region, ballistic missile launches can be detected earlier even when tracked 
above an adversary’s homeland.  A BMD umbrella can be formed for expeditionary land and sea 
forces as they move into the theater.  The fight can be taken to the enemy’s shores for 
asymmetric threats, such as theater ballistic missiles armed with nuclear, biological, or chemical 
warheads.  The BMD concept assures enduring and emerging allied troops they are protected. 
Battle management Command and Control (C2) covering forward deployed military 
operations can use the DARBC for independent search and detection, and tracking of ballistic 
missile launches in the early stages of flight. The current BMD concept that is only capable of 
supporting military operations against ballistic missile threats in midcourse and terminal flight 
phases.  Also, the BMD concept can support military operations or homeland defense against 
ballistic missile threats launched from a surface ship or submarine threat.  The BMD concept 
with the DARBC system can also support military operations covering counter stealth search, 
detection and tracking of airborne threats. 
TIMEFRAME UNDER CONSIDERATION 
The technology required to integrate the DARBC system into a new and advanced ship 
design will require several years of Research and Development (R&D) prior to achieving Initial 
Operational Capability (IOC) of the system.  IOC is likely to depend largely on integration of the 
DARBC into either an existing development spiral of a ship construction program or into a new 





This section will discuss the requirements needed for DARBC to meet the BMD, counter 
stealth, and other mission goals. The primary function of DARBC is shipboard exo-atmospheric 
surveillance, and tracking and preliminary discrimination of ballistic missiles.  DARBC can be 
deployed on surface combatants or auxiliary class ships.  The possible secondary uses of the 
DARBC include communications and electronic attack. 
The radar architecture will utilize wireless networked Opportunistic Array (OA) and 
aperstructure concepts.  The OA concept can be described as locating array elements at available 
open areas over the entire ship and integrated into the ship’s superstructure and hull form above 
the waterline.  The array is integrated throughout the ship and utilizes transmit-receive (T/R) 
modules.  The T/R modules are self-standing with no hard wire connections, except for primary 
power, and also utilize wireless networking. 
The DARBC architecture allows for flexibility and growth while incorporating 
redundancy for hardware errors.  Hardware and software shall be easily incorporated.  The radar 
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will be reconfigurable with selectable weights and elements used in beam forming for beam 
pattern control.  Table 0-1 provides Battlespace Awareness goals that will be supported by the 
DARBC as a sensor element.  
 
Table 0-1.  Battlespace Awareness (BA) JFC Goals 
Battlespace Awareness (BA) JFC Goals  
Superior Information Position (Fight First for Information Superiority) – generate 
and exploit high quality shared awareness through better timeliness, accuracy and relevance of 
information. 
• Assure our own information access through a well-networked and interoperable force. 
High Quality Shared Awareness – move to a capability to translate information and 
knowledge routinely into the requisite level of common understanding and situational 
awareness across the spectrum of participants. 
• Requires a collaborative network of networks, populated and refreshed with quality 
intelligence and non-intelligence data, both raw and processed to enable forces to build a 
shared awareness relevant to their needs. 
• Requires information users to become information suppliers, responsible for posting 
information before use. 
Dynamic Self-Coordination – increase freedom of low-level forces to operate near 
autonomously and re-task themselves through exploitation of shared awareness and 
commander’s intent. 
• Produce a meaningful increase in operational tempo and responsiveness. 
• Rapidly adapt when important developments occur in the battlespace and eliminate the 
step function character of military operations. 
Dispersed Forces – move combat power from a fixed or constant position to 
noncontiguous operations. 
• Retain control of the battlespace and generate effective combat power at the proper time 
and place. 
• Increase close coupling of intelligence, operations and logistics to achieve precise 
effects and gain temporal advantage with dispersed forces. 
Deep Sensor Reach 
• Leverage increasingly persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) to use 
sensors as a maneuver element as well as a deterrent when used as an overt display of intent or 
defensive reach capability. 
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Battlespace Awareness (BA) JFC Goals  
Rapid Speed of Command – reduce the time required to recognize and understand a 
situation, and through battlefield innovation and adaptation compress sensor-to decision 
maker-to-shooter timelines to turn information advantage into decision superiority and 
decisive effects. This should include locking out an adversary’s options and achieving option 
dominance. 
Alter Initial Conditions at Increased Rates of Change – exploit the principles of high 
quality shared awareness, dynamic self-coordination, dispersed and de-massed forces, deep 
sensor reach, compressed operations and levels of war, and rapid speed of command to enable 
the joint force, across the cognitive, information and physical domains of warfare, to swiftly 
identify, adapt to and change an opponent’s operating context to our advantage. 
LOGISTICS SUPPORT CONCEPT 
The DARBC system will employ a maintenance support concept based on minimal 
manning and a high usage rates.  The system will have minimum maintenance requirements, 
utilizing distance support, automation, and fault tolerance to provide a highly available system 
capable of supporting a high demand mission profile.   
JOINT FORCE CAPABILITIES (JFC)  
The joint force capabilities of the DARBC are listed in Table 0-2. 
Table 0-2.  JFC Capabilities 
JFC Capabilities 
DARBC will provide search functions and set up based on sensor or intelligence source 
and data latency.  User defined search capability will also exist.  Search types will include 
cued from ship organic sensor, cued from BMD sensor in Joint Battle Management Command 
and Control (JBMC2) architecture, horizon, and fence.  
DARBC will provide sensor data to the Global Information Grid (GIG) to extend the level 
of data interoperability; expand collaborative communications connectivity; shared awareness; 
and integration and acceleration of kill chain execution with other sensors against ballistic 
threats. 
DARBC will provide long range tracking of ballistic missile threats through ascent and 
mid-course phases of flight.  Track can be maintained while DARBC continues to provide 
search.  
DARBC will provide all weather performance.  The system will operate in sea state 5.  
DARBC will provide Line of Sight (LOS) and satellite UHF communication. 
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JFC Capabilities 
Provide situational awareness to joint forces and civilian population about imminent 
threats from incoming ballistic missile or stealth targets. 
DARBC will calculate predicted launch origin and time and impact location and time for 
any ballistic missiles tracked. 
DARBC will require limited onboard maintenance.  Availability of the system will be 
above 95% under a heavy duty cycle and mission profile. 
 
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS SUMMARY 
The DARBC radar will provide long range search, detection and track of the various 
types of ballistic missiles for cueing to other organic sensors or sensors and systems in the 
overall Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2) network.  The radar will 
provide early detection of ballistic missile launches over large areas of land or sea space not 
currently or adequately covered by existing sensors.  The ship configured with DARBC will be 
forward deployed to a position where it has greatest potential for detection of launches.  Early 
detection and tracking increases overall engagement timeline, providing more time for decision 
making, weapon assignment, and weapon engagement from the overall BMD family of systems.  
Early detection using forward based sensors permits engagement of ballistic missile threats 
during boost and ascent phase when the threats are slower, larger and easier to engage.xlvii  The 
early detection, track and cueing will improve engagement by other BMD systems that engage 
the threat in midcourse or terminal phases of flight.  Deployment of the ship to provide 
midcourse and terminal search, detection, and tracking of ballistic missiles is possible as well.  
Secondary threats that the radar will support search, detection and track of are stealth air threats.  
Detection of these threats will be at ranges where they pose a direct threat to the ship or units in 
the immediate operation area either by launch of weapons or as weapons themselves.  The radar 
also provides capabilities to support UHF communications either in line of sight or by SATCOM 
link. 
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE MISSION 
BMD is best accomplished using a layered defense/combined arms approach.  There are 
too many threats in existence to rely on hard kill defenses only requiring need to attrite enemy 
capability using Information Operations (IO) / Electronic Attack (EA) / Strike.  Depth of fire 
with SM-3 is limited – generally one, max of two.xlviii  Detection of Ballistic missiles can be 
enhanced from prior knowledge of launch location, time and target type.  When intelligence can 
provide some of this information, especially location, specific search patterns can be generated to 
increase probability of detection.  Space based assets can monitor large areas and cue sensors 
when launches have been detected.  As a forward deployed combatant, the ship will potentially 
be exposed to direct attack by the state posing the ballistic missile threat.  The ship and radar will 
need to be able to counter threats of anti-ship cruise missiles through soft and hard kill methods.  
The radar design should enhance signature reduction of radar cross section (RCS) and Infra Red 
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(IR).  The ship/radar will need to be available on station for long periods of time regardless of 
weather and sea conditions.  When ship is positioned to defend a terminal position, the radar 
must be capable of detecting the threat at ranges suitable for terminal engagements.  These 
threats include re-entry vehicle (RV) as well as the associated debris and decoys of the threat.  
CAPABILITY GAP 
Search and detection of ballistic missiles is a difficult task exacerbated by the large 
quantities of ballistic missiles available in the world today, by their increased capabilities of 
range, speed, and reduced signatures, and by the increased flexibility to launch these weapons 
from submarines, and asymmetric platforms such as surface ships.  Current Navy systems lack 
the quantity and range to provide sufficient coverage.xlix  Current platforms must manage their 
radar resources across BMD search and detection as well as general AD coverage missions.  
Upgrades and additional deployment of sensors such as Cobra Dane and Sea based terminal do 
not provide sufficient early warning and track history of launches do to their limited quantity and 
fixed locations.  Forward presence by Aegis Cruisers and Destroyers provide some search 
capability but these platforms are limited in range and share the same sensor for AD and BMD 
search.   Future missile and high energy weapons such as the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) 
and High Energy Laser (HEL) will provide greater capability for engagements in boost and 
ascent phase, increasing need for long range sensor to support their capabilities.l  Destroying a 
ballistic missile during boost or ascent phase would dramatically increase the defended area and 
has the advantage that the weapon will fall back into shooter’s territory, eliminating the need and 
concerns of destroying the warhead.  Current ship based sensors lack range capability for 
detection and track to support future ship based KEI missiles.  Potential for sea based launches of 
ballistic missiles increases need for ocean based surveillance.  Long range surveillance capability 
reduces quantity of assets required to cover sea based launches.  Aegis capability is currently 
limited to short and medium range ballistic missiles during their midcourse flight.  SRBMs with 
depressed trajectories may also not allow engagement by exo-atmospheric systems such as SM-
3.lilii 
The MDA’s strategy is to evolve the current capability to improve defenses against all 
threats in all phases of flight with emphasis on longer range missiles and engagement during 
boost and ascent phase.  To fill the gap, the strategy will feature greater sensor and interceptor 
mobility.liii  The Sea Based Terminal X-band radar enters service in 2006 providing a sea-based 
mobile midcourse radar that can be based in the Pacific Ocean.  This system will share test bed 
asset functions in addition to operational requirements and lacks mobility of speed to transit to 
optimum locations.  While multiple Sea Based Terminals are possible they will lack the numbers 
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characteristics Description Parameters 
Minimum 
Value 
  Search volume   
  Area coverage fence search km2  TBD 
  Detection   
  Detection range km  1500 km 
MAX 
  Detection  km 100 km 
MIN 
  Probability of detecting target launch, includes search time. P of detection for nominal 
target size 
 
  Of enemy aircraft detected in time to allow second engagement. percent TBD 
  Of enemy aircraft passing through coverage area detected. percent TBD 
  Of targets lost after detection. percent TBD 
  Beyond engagement range aircraft detected. km TBD 
  From sensor enemy air raid detected. km TBD 
  From sensor single enemy aircraft detected. km TBD 
  Reaction Time   
  After launch of ballistic missile attack on US, attack assessment issued. minutes TBD 
  After launch of ballistic missile attack on US forces, attack assessment issued 
to theater ballistic missile (TBM) forces. 
minutes TBD 
  Of threat warnings to TBM forces are false. percent TBD 
  After launch, geographic combatant commander provided assured warning of 
theater ballistic missile launch. 
minutes TBD 
  For ballistic missile to be detected (after launch). minutes TBD 
  Detect to Engage   





characteristics Description Parameters 
Minimum 
Value 
     Of attacking missiles successfully penetrated friendly defenses culminating 
in warhead delivery or function on 
target. 
percent TBD 
  Of detected ballistic missile launches, provide cueing for counterforce 
operations. 
percent TBD 
  Of launched ballistic missiles, destroyed before impact. percent TBD 
  Of launched cruise missiles (of all types) destroyed before impact. percent TBD 
  Of combatant commander specified areas of interest covered for ballistic 
missile warning. 
percent TBD 
  Of commander's area has required reconnaissance and surveillance 
coverage. 
percent TBD 
  Of enemy aircraft detected in time to 
allow weapons employment. 
percent TBD 
  Of electronic attacks achieve desired effects on enemy. percent TBD 
 
Table 4-2:  Specific Capability Gaps 





SN 3.4.2 Provide 
Integrated Tactical Warning 




Existing sensors lack forward presence 
and mobility to provide early warning. 
Existing sensors lack sufficient 
situational awareness to conduct attack 
operations against re-locatable, time critical 
(RTC) theater missile threats; e.g. , TELs. 
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SN 3.4.3 Coordinate 





Existing sensors lack range and search 
capability to provide launch detection of 
threats for engagement during boost or 
ascent phase. 
Existing sensors lack ability to 
recognize and react to all theater air and 
missile threats. 
ST 6.1 Provide Theater 




Existing sensors lack capability 
(operating independently or as part of a 
Joint/Combined Force) to detect and 
maintain a single and continuous track on 
each air and space vehicle within the 
assigned battlespace. 
ST 6.1.6 Support Tactical 
Warning and Attack 
Assessment in Theater 
Joint Air 
Operations 
Existing sensors lack forward presence 
and mobility to provide early warning.  
Existing sensors lack sufficient 
situational awareness to conduct attack 
operations against Sea based, re-locatable, 
time critical (RTC) theater missile threats; 
e.g. , Submarines, asymmetric attack by 
surface vessel  
OP 6.1.5 Conduct Joint 
Operations Area Missile 
Defense (Includes Homeland 






Existing sensors lack forward presence 
and mobility to provide early warning.  
Existing sensors lack sufficient 
situational awareness to conduct attack 
operations against re-locatable, time critical 
(RTC) theater missile threats; e.g. , TELs. 
Existing sensors lack capability 
(operating independently or as part of a 
Joint/Combined Force) to detect and 
maintain a single and continuous track on 
each air and space vehicle within the 
assigned battlespace. 
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THREAT/OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
The Radar will be deployed in one of two basic scenarios.  The first is to be forward 
deployed near a projected threat country or area positioned to search for ballistic missile 
launches.  The second is a homeland defense position where the ship will be positioned to detect 
sea based launches from submarines or undisclosed threat surface ships.  The forward deployed 
scenario could put the ship in a position where it is in harms way. Because the time line between 
detection and engagement is very short, shooters, armed with very fast interceptors or lasers, 
must be stationed close to the launch location.  The sheer closeness of this position means that 
the shooters are subject to interception and attacks themselves.  The ship will be subject to the 
same threats posed to current and future surface combatants such as Anti Ship Cruise Missiles 
(ASCMs) and other air, surface, and subsurface threats.  The ship can be expected to be deployed 
and positioned for long periods of time while on station providing surveillance. 
The ship/radar would normally be operated in conjunction with other BMD units.  These 
units could be Patriot or Aegis platforms providing terminal phase defense.  Where long range 
ballistic missiles are launched, BMD fixed assets in Alaska or CONUS will be cued to support 
mid course tracking in support of Ground Based interceptors or other engagement means. 
Ballistic missiles have proliferated over the last four decades and are now prevalent across 
the globe with over 24 countries capable of launching some form of this threat.  As an example, 
over 100 foreign ballistic missile launches occurred around the world in 2004.lv Many countries 
also have capability to configure these missiles with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) 
including nuclear, chemical and biological payloads.  Additionally submarines can launch 
Ballistic Missiles dramatically increasing threat launch areas increasing surprise and need for 
sensors with increased capabilities and search volume.  Ballistic Missiles are classified in the 
following 5 main categories as described by the following table. 
Table 0-1.  Ballistic Missile Flight Path Characteristics 
Ballistic Missile Category Maximum Range Apogee 
Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) <1,000 km (621 mi) 160 km 
Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) 1,000-3,000 km (621-1,864 mi) 500 km 
Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) 3,000-5,500 km (1,864 - 3,418 mi) 900 km 
Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) >5,500 km (3,418 mi) 2500 km 
Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) Any ballistic missile launched from a submarine, regardless of maximum range 
Varies 
The range and apogees reported are examples of maximum capabilities.  Trajectories can 
support shorter ranges with lower or depressed apogees. Some may fly a trajectory that has a 
lower apogee to achieve maximum range.  A ballistic missile is a projectile that has been given 
some level of initial power, operates within the earth’s atmosphere or the immediate space above 
the atmosphere, and follows a path governed mainly by the laws of gravity.  Notional trajectories 
for the above categories are depicted in the following figure. 































Ballistic Missile Flight Paths 
 
FUNCTIONAL SOLUTION ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
Non-materiel approaches which could enhance the military’s detection of BMD threats 
would be to reorganize the deployment of Aegis platforms so that the AN/SPY-1 Radar Systems 
are forward deployed close enough to the anticipated threats to detect launches of ballistic 
missiles and/or to take a sea-based platform which hosts an existing BMD search radar and move 
it to a forward deployed position.  These approaches would make use of our existing capabilities 
to enhance our picture of the battlefield.  These approaches would require movement/adjustment 
of existing deployment schedules for battle groups. 
One materiel approach necessary to address the capability gaps described includes 
developing the DARBC system to be implemented on new construction surface combatants.  The 
DARBC system will be capable of mitigating the capability gaps described in Section 4 of this 
document.  This system will be installed on future surface combatants.  Additional platforms 
such as auxiliary class ships could provide additional flexibility and reliability through 
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redundancy.  Another materiel approach would be to develop a similar system, which would be 
installed on existing surface combatants that would have the same capabilities as the DARBC.  
Back-fitting existing platforms with a system with ship integration needs of the DARBC would 
likely have significant impact to existing ship design.  These combatants would also require a 
change in mission and deployment as their use in providing air defense for Carrier Strike Groups 
(CSGs) and Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs) would be modified in order for these platforms 
to be forward deployed. 
The non-materiel approaches would provide a benefit of better detection of ballistic missiles 
but would require CSGs and ESGs be deployed with reduced AD coverage or require additional 
Aegis platforms to be procured.  Whether Aegis ships or other sea-deployed radar platforms are 
used, escort services would be required to defend these assets which would have a large impact 
on the Navy’s deployment schedule.  Also, these non-materiel solutions would only address the 
BMD threats and would not address the capability gaps related to the Counter-Stealth mission. 
The non-materiel approaches would definitely be cheaper than the materiel ones so there is a 
tradeoff present between cost and capability. 
In order to address all the current capability gaps listed in Section 4, a new system needs to 
be developed which meets requirements that mitigate the gaps in our current capability.  Two 
materiel solutions exist which could meet these requirements.  The differences between them are 
which platforms the systems will be installed on.  The DARBC system will be a new system to 
be installed on future surface combatants, which are not yet developed.  This provides both 
benefits and challenges.  Benefits include have a “blank canvas” for development purposes 
which allows the design to not be hindered by existing physical features of current platforms. 
One major feature of the DARBC system is the Aperstructure, which integrates the radar 
array with the hull of the ship.  Development of this Aperstructure would benefit from the “blank 
canvas” of future surface combatants.  Challenges for the DARBC include coming up with the 
new technology of integrating radar array elements into the hull of the ship.  New technology 
will have to be developed for this to be implemented.  Developing another system that would go 
on current surface combatants would be a benefit in that the platforms would be eventually 
modernizes with a new capability, extending their service life and possibly delaying the need to 
development of future combatants.  The downside of this approach is that current platforms 
would have to be taken out of service for research, development, testing, and installation of this 
system.  Also, integration of a new system into all the existing systems of current platforms 
would be more difficult than starting with a “blank canvas”. 
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FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommended materiel solution is to develop new shipboard DARBC System on future ships 
to conduct the Ballistic Missile Defense mission.  New DARBC system will mitigate the capability 
gaps addressed in section 4.  This materiel approach is considered the most effective for improving 
long-range coverage, providing adequate target discrimination data for handover to another sensor or 
interceptor, and eliminating the requirements to conduct AD search.  The following outlines the 
advantages of this materiel solution. 
Improve long-range coverage:  The radar provides autonomous search at ranges greater than 
1,000 km. When a target is detected, a precision search function is used to discriminate booster from 
the warhead and transition to target tracking. 
Adequate target discrimination data for handover:  The radar provides adequate target track 
resolution precise enough to cue existing BMD sensors so they can detect and track the target. 
Reduce the existing Aegis requirements to support ballistic missile search functions:  DARBC 
will take over the responsibility for this requirement, permitting the Aegis system to concentrate on 
the AD mission and surface search.  Aegis platforms can optimize location to support engagement 
rather than search requirements. 
ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES (AOA) 
Each of the presented materiel solution approaches has its strengths and weaknesses.  In 
Table 0-1, the materiel approaches that have been presented are discussed. 
Table 0-1:  Materiel Solution Analysis 
APPROACH PURPOSE STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES 
Install DARBC system 
on existing ship 
platform 
Early detection of 
threats 
Long range detection and 
tracking capability, 
mobility 
Cost, lack of existing ships for full 
area coverage, lost of escort 
capability 
Install DARBC system 
on new class of ships 
tailored to address 
Ballistic Missile 
mission 
Early detection of 
the threats 
Long range detection and 
tracking capability, large 
field of view, and rapid 
response time 
BMD mission capability, new 
technology, integration, and cost 
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Appendix A:  ACRONYMS 
ACRONYM DEFINITION 
AD Air Defense 
AOA Analysis of Alternatives 
ASCM Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
BA Battlespace Awareness 
BMD Ballistic Missile Defense 
C2 Command and Control 
CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 
CONUS Continental United States 
CR # Change Request Number 
CSG Carrier Strike Group 
DARBC Digital Array Radar for BMD and Counter-Stealth 
DoD Department of Defense 
EA Electronic Attack 
EMCON Emission Control 
ESG Expeditionary Strike Group 
FP Force Protection 
HEL High Energy Laser 
ICBM Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile 
ICD Initial Capabilities Document 
IO Information Operations 
IOC Initial Operational Capability 
IR Infra-Red 
IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile 
ISR Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance  
JBMC2 Joint Battle Management Command and Control 
JFC Joint Functional Concept 
KEI Kinetic Energy Interceptor 
LORA Level of Repair Analysis 
LOS Line of Sight 
MHz Megahertz 
MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile 
NCOW Network-Centric Operations and Warfare 
OA Opportunistic Array 
OV Operational View 
RADHAZ Radiation Hazard 
RCS Radar Cross Section 
RV Re-entry Vehicle 
SATCOM Satellite Communication 
SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile 
SM-3 Standard Missile - 3 
SPY-1 AN/SPY-1 Radar 
SRBM Short Range Ballistic Missile 
T/R Transmit-Receive 
TBD To Be Determined 
TBM Theater Ballistic Missile 
  113   
ACRONYM DEFINITION 
U.S. United States 
UHF Ultra High Frequency 
UJTL Universal Joint Task List 
USN United States Navy 
VHF Very High Frequency 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 
Appendix B:  OV-1 
OV-1 High-Level Operational Concept 





Long range ICBM, IRBM MRBM 
launch detection and track
SRBM, MRBM launch detect/track/
engage on ascent
Area defense
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Appendix C:  OV-2 





Midcourse Engagement Terminal Engagement
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The purpose of this CDD is to define the operational attributes of the Digital Array Radar 
for Ballistic Missile Defense and Counter-Stealth (DARBC) radar necessary to design a 
proposed system.  
United States Navy (USN) sources indicate a need for long-range (order of thousands of 
kilometers) shipboard radar for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) to augment and expand current 
capabilities to defend against the increasing ballistic missile threat. The Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) is conducting radar architecture research based on an Opportunistic Array (OA) 
and is assessing the needed critical technologies to be incorporated into a ship-wide digital 
phased array radar. 
The DARBC radar will be a ship-based sensor to provide long-range search, detection 
and track of ballistic missiles.  The increase in maximum detection range over existing ground-
based and shipboard sensors would provide a mobile early warning capability that can improve 
engagement, by extending the time available for engagement decision making and providing 
earlier track information for designation to other engagement sensors.  This increases 
opportunities to engage and re-engaging targets increasing overall probability of kill.  This long-
range search capability would decrease the workload of existing BMD capable Aegis platforms 
so that those systems can focus on the closer range Air Defense (AD) mission. 
The radar platform, or other platforms receiving data from the DARBC, may be equipped 
with weapons of sufficient range and capability to provide boost, mid-course, and terminal phase 
engagements of Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs), Medium Range Ballistic Missiles 
(MRBMs), Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs), Submarine Launched Ballistic 
Missiles (SLBMs), and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).  The radar will provide large 
area surveillance necessary to detect the launch of ballistic missiles; both land and sea based, and 
track the missiles.  The radar data will then be used to cue other sensors for the purpose of 
engagement with weapon systems.  The other sensors may be from the same ship or as part of 
the overall BMD architecture.  The early detection, track and cueing will improve engagement 
by other BMD systems that currently are only capable of engaging the threat in midcourse or 
terminal phases of flight. 
This document summarizes the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and describes the 
projected threat the Radar is intended to counter.  Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) are 
defined and used to address the radar system capabilities and supportability requirements.  This 
CDD also identifies key program risk areas that can impact cost and schedule. 
This document was prepared by the Radar group of the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Master of Science System Engineering (MSSE) program. This CDD focuses only on the radar as 
a sensor despite potential functionality in shipboard communications due to the scope and time 
limits of the project.  The CDD also excluded capabilities of the DARBC ship and associated 
weapon systems to support missions including BMD We concluded that it is necessary to 
develop the DARBC on future ships in order to conduct BMD missions. 
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CHANGE HISTORY 
 
The table below identifies all changes incorporated into the updated version of this 
document after initial approval.  A change in twenty percent (20%) of the document constitutes a 
new version, which will also be identified in this table.  The Change Request Number (CR #) 
provides a link to the history of the change request. 
 
CR # Date Version # Change Description 
1 3 August 1.0 Revision 1 of CDD 
2 1 September 2.0 Revision 2 of CDD 
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CAPABILITY DISCUSSION 
Search and detection of ballistic missiles is a difficult task exacerbated by the large 
quantities of ballistic missiles available in the world today, by their increased capabilities of 
range, speed, and reduced signatures, and by the increased flexibility to launch these weapons 
from submarines, and asymmetric platforms such as surface ships.  Current Navy systems lack 
the quantity and range to provide sufficient coverage.lvi  Current platforms must manage their 
radar resources across Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) search and detection as well as general 
Air Defense (AD) coverage missions.  Upgrades and additional deployment of sensors such as 
Cobra Dane and Sea based terminal do not provide sufficient early warning and track history of 
launches due to their limited quantity and fixed locations.  Forward presence by Aegis Cruisers 
and Destroyers provide some search capability but these platforms are limited in range and share 
the same sensor for AD and BMD search. 
Future missile and high-energy weapons such as the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) 
and High Energy Laser (HEL) will provide greater capability for engagements in boost and 
ascent phase, increasing need for long-range sensor to support their capabilities.lvii  Destroying a 
ballistic missile during boost or ascent phase dramatically increases the defended area and has 
the advantage that the weapon will fall back into shooter’s territory, eliminating the need to and 
concerns of destroying the warhead.  Current ship based sensors lack the detection and track 
range capability to support future ship-based KEI systems.  The potential for sea-based launches 
of ballistic missiles increases the need for sea-based surveillance.  Long range surveillance 
capability reduces the quantity of assets required to cover sea-based launches.  Aegis capabilities 
are currently limited to engagements during midcourse phases for short- and medium-range 
ballistic missiles.  Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) with depressed trajectories may not 
be able to be engaged by exo-atmospheric systems such as SM-3.lviii,lix 
The Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA’s) strategy is to evolve the current capability to 
improve defenses against all threats in all phases of flight with emphasis on longer-range 
missiles and engagement during boost and ascent phase.  To fill the gap, the strategy will feature 
greater sensor and interceptor mobility.lx 
The Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) for the Digital Array Radar for BMD and 
Counter-stealth (DARBC) describes a ship-based sensor capable of providing long range search, 
detection and track of ballistic missiles.  The increase in maximum detection range over existing 
shipboard sensors would provide a mobile early-warning capability that can improve 
engagement capability by extending the time available for engagement decision-making and 
providing improved track information for designation to other engagement sensors.  This long-
range search capability would decrease the workload of existing BMD capable Aegis radar 
systems so that those systems can focus on the closer range AD mission. 
The DARBC will have sufficient power, aperture, and system characteristics necessary to 
perform the mission described and will be operating over the Very High Frequency (VHF) and 
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) frequency bands (216-225 MHz and 420-450 MHz respectively).  
A benefit of operating in the anticipated frequency ranges is enhanced counter-stealth AD 
capability.  The DARCB will employ new aperstructure technology in which the radar array is 
integrated within the skin of the ship.  The radar system will explore the Opportunistic Array 
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(OA) concept in which the Transmit/Receive (T/R) elements of the radar can be 
opportunistically place where space is available on the hull or superstructure of the host 
platform. 
The development of the DARBC system will apply BMD capabilities-based planning 
across the range of defined military operational requirements that pertains to the Universal Joint 
Task List (UJTL) CJCSM 3500.04D dated August 1, 2005, in order to meet mission 
requirements to defend the United States, its deployed forces and allies from ballistic missile 
threats. The DARBC system is being designed to counter a full spectrum of ballistic missile 
threats. The U.S. military leaders will be able to use the DARBC system to effectively apply a 
missile shield for an area defense ballistic missile threat. Should stealth air threats be present in 
the scanning area, the DARBC system will also be capable of detecting and tracking those 
threats. lxi  This current increment of the DARCB moves the USN closer to obtaining the 
operational capabilities required to adequately defend the US against the ballistic missile threat. 
The DARBC will operate at sea onboard a future USN surface combatant due to the 
Research & Development (R&D) required to achieve the OA and Aperstructure concepts.  The 
DARBC will meet standard USN requirements for radar systems operating in a sea environment.  
It will be forward deployed, designed to operate off the coasts of hostile countries that threaten 
the US with ballistic missiles.  This forward deployed concept will increase the probability of an 
early detection of a ballistic missile launch, providing more time to make decisions and react to 
the threat. 
The DARBC will be a stand-alone system with an external communications interface for 
passing target designation information.  Data from the DARBC could then be passed to other 
combat systems, radar systems, and weapons systems via a joint communications system such as 
FORCEnet.  These interfacing systems will be required to maximize the benefit of the DARBC.  
The development of the DARBC should coincide with the development or fielding of these 
interfacing systems.  The DARBC will be able to provide situational awareness that no other 
system can provide to the joint US armed forces. 
ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
In order to adequately define both the need for and the requirements for the DARBC 
system, research was required in many areas.  Initially an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) was 
conducted between the capabilities presented by current USN systems that can support the BMD 
mission and a new set of systems made up of current technology, and new technology including 
the DARBC.  The AoA showed that the DARBC was a system that could fill a void in the 
current capability to counter the ballistic missile threat and the results were documented in the 
ICD for the DARBC, May 2006. 
In the quest to define the operational and technical requirements of the DARBC system, 
key research was conducted in the many areas.  Whitepapers (technotes) were written detailing 
the research done on these topics and their results.  Full versions of these technotes including 
results of the analysis will be included in a later revision of this document.  A brief description of 
each of the research areas is described below. 
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CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) 
The CONOPS for the DARBC was written to detail the threats, associated capability 
gaps, and how the DARBC would operate.  In this research, initial concepts for the system were 
discussed including the concept of the OA and the Aperstructure.  The development of the 1st 
Operational View (OV-1) was a key point in the concept of the system.  The modes of operation 
for the system were defined including searching, cueing (or being cued), and tracking.  
Anticipated operational capabilities were discussed as well as the operational scenarios for the 
system.  The initial concepts of the system included using the VHF and UHF bands for their 
ability to detect targets at great ranges as well as their ability to detect stealth air threats. 
THREAT RADAR CROSS SECTION (RCS) 
The threat, defined in the CONOPS technotes, was analyzed and a RCS modeling tool 
was developed to generate the radar profile of the threat that could be seen by the DARBC 
including both the ballistic missile and stealth air threats.  
ARRAY DENSITY REQUIREMENTS 
Based on the frequencies in use and the OA concept, minimum distance spacing of the 
array elements on the exterior of the platform was calculated.  This minimum spacing value was 
the closest distance that the array elements could be place together without causing interference 
to one another.  This data was required by other related research in order to determine the overall 
size of the OA as well as to quantify the “Opportunistic” term with the OA concept. 
RADAR PARAMETERS 
The radar parameters research focused on the characteristics of the DARBC and their 
relationship to the operational requirements for the system.  The requirements defined by the 
ICD for the DARBC, such as Probability of Detection (Pd) could only be achieved if the 
physical characteristics of the radar were calculated and defined properly.  Parameters such as 
antenna gain, noise values, and power were calculated and modeled in order to determine a range 
of values for each parameter which if implemented would result in a radar system capable of 
meeting the operational requirements.   Supporting data was taken from related theses and other 
studies done on the OA concept. 
SEARCH PATTERN OPTIONS 
Research was done to determine the best methods of employing the radar in a tactical 
scenario.  Based on the capabilities of the radar, the optimal search patters were defined in an 
effort to minimize reaction time should a threat be present.  Data from this research would drive 
the tactical program(s) for the DARCB and will have a large affect on the operational 
effectiveness of the system. 
OBSERVE ORIENT DECIDE ACT (OODA) LOOP MODELING 
Modeling was done on to show the BMD functional loop with and without the DARBC.  
Reaction time to a hostile ballistic missile threat was modeled in an attempt to show the benefit 
of having the DARBC as part of the overall BMD system.  This effort is the first attempt to 
quantify the time saved by employing the DARBC. 
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APERSTRUCTURE HULL INTEGRATION 
Limited research was conducted regarding the conceptual layout of the OA elements on a 
generic ship platform in an attempt to visualize how the Aperstructure concept would come 
together.  Considerations for the environment were taken into account.  Also, the minimum size 
of the platform required to field the OA was determined using data from the Array Density 
Requirements research. 
SHIP FLEXURE 
The topic of ship flexure was addressed to quantify how much the aperstructure could 
flex due to the environment and to come up with an error budget for flexure as related to radar 
beam-forming performance.  Based on the error budget as compared to the actual values of 
possible flexure, a recommendation for an auto-alignment requirement for the elements is 
discussed. 
WIRELESS COMMUNICATION 
Data from the T/R elements needs to be passed to a central computer for processing.  
With the concepts of the OA and Aperstructure, a great deal of cable would be required between 
the thousands of elements and the central computer.  In an effort to reduce weight, and overall 
system complexity, wireless communication within the host platform was investigated. 
COOLING 
Based on the element power of the DARBC, cooling would be required to keep the 
system operational.  Investigations into the methods used for cooling along with a look into 
different materials and their characteristics were conducted. 
ELECTRONIC ATTACK (EA) 
A side thought to the DARBC concept was to determine if the system, as designed to 
meet the BMD and counter stealth requirements, would be capable of being used as an EA 
weapon.  The ideas ranged from using the DARBC for jamming or deception of enemy 
communications to firing Electromagnetic Pulses (EMPs) at enemy electronic equipment. 
BUDGET & LOGISTICS 
A combination all requirements led to the research of how the system could be supported 
so that system availability could remain at an acceptable level.  Also, tradeoffs between 
requirements and cost were discussed.  An overall acquisition strategy for the DARBC was 
developed as part of this study. 
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS SUMMARY 
The DARBC radar will provide long-range search, detection and track of the various 
types of ballistic missiles for cueing to other organic sensors or sensors and systems in the 
overall Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2) network.  The radar will 
provide early detection of ballistic missile launches over large areas of land or sea space not 
currently or adequately covered by existing sensors.  Ships configured with DARBC will be 
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forward deployed to positions where they have greatest potential for detection of launches.  Early 
detection and tracking increases overall engagement timeline, providing more time for decision 
making, weapon assignment, and weapon engagement from the overall BMD family of systems.  
Early detection using forward based sensors permits engagement of ballistic missile threats 
during boost and ascent phase when the threats are slower, larger and easier to engage.lxii  The 
early detection, track and cueing will improve engagement by other BMD systems that engage 
the threat in midcourse or terminal phases of flight.  Deployment of the ship to provide 
midcourse and terminal search, detection, and tracking of ballistic missiles is possible as well.  
Secondary threats that the radar will support search, detection and track of are stealth air threats.  
Detection of these threats will be at ranges where they pose a direct threat to the ship or units in 
the immediate operation area either by launch of weapons or as weapons themselves.  The radar 
also provides capabilities to support UHF communications either in line of sight or by SATCOM 
link. 
BMD MISSION 
BMD is best accomplished using a layered defense/combined arms approach.  There are 
too many threats in existence to rely on hard kill defenses only.  Many countries can launch 
multiple salvo threats and from many locations. The best overall strategy will entail systems to 
attrite enemy capability using Information Operations (IO) / Electronic Attack (EA) / Strike in 
addition to hard kill of threats in flight.  Current Navy BMD capability is based on the 
STANDARD Missile 3 (SM-3) launched from AEGIS ships.  Depth of fire with SM-3 is limited 
during an engagement from one platform– generally one, max of twolxiii.  Maximum 
effectiveness of AEGIS and SM-3 can be achieved when reaction time is improved by cueing 
SPY-1 and positioning the AEGIS platform for an engagement and allowing other sensors to be 
positioned for early detection and cueing.  Detection of ballistic missiles can be enhanced from 
prior knowledge of launch location, time and target type.  When intelligence can provide some of 
this information, especially location, specific search patterns can be generated to increase 
probability of detection.  Space based assets can monitor large areas and cue sensors when 
launches have been detected.  As a forward deployed combatant, the ship will potentially be 
exposed to direct attack by the state posing the ballistic missile threat.  The ship and radar will be 
able to counter threats of anti-ship cruise missiles through hard kill methods.  The radar design 
and ship integration shall enhance signature reduction of radar cross section (RCS) and Infra Red 
(IR).  The ship/radar will be available on station for long periods of time regardless of weather 
and sea conditions.  When ship is positioned to defend a terminal position, the radar must be 
capable of detecting the threat at ranges suitable for terminal engagements.  These threats include 
re-entry vehicle (RV) as well as the associated debris and decoys of the threat. 
THREAT SUMMARY 
The Radar will be deployed in one of two basic scenarios.  The first is to be forward 
deployed near a projected threat country or area positioned to search for ballistic missile 
launches.  The second is a homeland defense position where the ship will be positioned to detect 
sea based launches from submarines or undisclosed threat surface ships.  The forward deployed 
scenario could put the ship in a position where it is in harms way. Because the time line between 
detection and engagement is very short, shooters, armed with very fast interceptors or lasers, 
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must be stationed close to the launch location.  The proximity of this position to the threat means 
the ship is subject to attack.  The ship will be subject to the same threats posed to current and 
future surface combatants such as Anti Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) and other air, surface, and 
subsurface threats.  The ship can be expected to be deployed and positioned for long periods of 
time while on station providing surveillance. 
The ship/radar would normally be operated in conjunction with other BMD units.  These 
units could be Patriot or Aegis platforms providing terminal phase defense.  Where long-range 
ballistic missiles are launched, BMD fixed assets in Alaska or CONUS will be cued to support 
mid course tracking in support of Ground Based interceptors or other engagement means. 
Ballistic missiles have proliferated over the last four decades and are now prevalent 
across the globe with over 24 countries capable of launching some form of this threat.  As an 
example, over 100 foreign ballistic missile launches occurred around the world in 2004.lxiv Many 
countries also have capability to configure these missiles with Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMDs) including nuclear, chemical and biological payloads.  Additionally submarines can 
launch Ballistic Missiles dramatically increasing threat launch areas increasing surprise and need 
for sensors with increased capabilities and search volume.  Ballistic Missiles are classified in the 
following 5 main categories as described by the following table. 
 
Ballistic Missile Category Maximum Range Apogee 
Short-range ballistic missile 
(SRBM) <1,000 km(621 mi) 160 km 
Medium-range ballistic missile 
(MRBM) 1,000-3,000 km (621-1,864 mi) 500 km 
Intermediate-range ballistic 
missile (IRBM) 3,000-5,500 km (1,864 – 3,418 mi) 900 km 
Intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM) >5,500 km (3,418 mi) 2500 km 
Submarine-launched ballistic 
missile (SLBM) 
Any ballistic missile launched from a 
submarine, regardless of maximum 
range 
Varies 
Ballistic Missile Flight Path Characteristics 































Ballistic Missile Flight Paths 
 
The range and apogees reported are examples of maximum capabilities.  Trajectories can 
support shorter ranges with lower or depressed apogees. Some may fly a trajectory that has a 
lower apogee to achieve maximum range.  A ballistic missile is a projectile that has been given 
some level of initial power, operates within the earth’s atmosphere or the immediate space above 
the atmosphere, and follows a path governed mainly by the laws of gravity.  Notional trajectories 
for the above categories are depicted in the following figure. 
Tactics for deploying these threats will involve surprise.  Submarine launched threats are 
based on a stealthy launch platform that can hide its position and intent until after weapons 
release.  Many BMD threats are launched from Transportable Erectable Launchers (TEL) that 
can hide their position until desired and then erect and launch in just a few minutes.  TELs can 
virtually be hidden within the boundaries of an entire county.  ICBMs are generally housed in 
silos that have generally known positions.  While the probably known location of these launchers 
may help in destruction once rules of engagement permit, initial launches in an unprovoked 
attack can be achieved with little to no warning. 
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PROGRAM SUMMARY 
Program strategy will be to develop class of ships that utilize the DARBC concept as a 
primary design driver and the capabilities as a primary mission function for the ship.  The range 
capabilities of the radar provide order of magnitude capability over existing sensors along with 
the ship integration benefits of stealth ship design provide capabilities that need to be matched to 
a unique ship development.  Initial Operational Capability will be reached when one DARBC 
ship is fully tested and delivered to the fleet to support a homeland defense mission.  Full 
capability will be reached when sufficient ships are available to meet forward presence missions 
in two hazard areas and homeland defense missions on both east and west coast simultaneously.  
Future capabilities of the radar beyond those addressed in the initial fielding are not in the scope 
of this CDD.  Planned spiral development of prototypes to reach initial capability is described. 
The development of DARBC has a number of technical risks associated with it that will 
be reduced through a series of prototype developments and evaluations.  Since the radar design 
and subsequent ship integration of the aperstructure concept are considerably more extensive 
than typical sensors, a mature design of the radar is required prior to ship design.  A longer than 
typical development period will be used to reduce risks and lower over all future ship 
development time and costs.  This is a concept that has been used before where the Norton 
Sound (AV-1) was used to proof concepts, design and performance of the SPY-1 Radar prior to 
Aegis cruiser initial construction.  Primary design areas that will be assessed using shipboard 
prototypes will be: 
• Wireless communication of radar elements 
• Beam formation and control in a random dispersed radar array 
• Collection of performance information to be used in development of and verification and 
validation of models 
• Impact of ship flexure on performance and on evaluation of methods to measure flexure 
and compensate for. 
• Aperstructure ship integration 
• Cooling 
Prototype development will be centered on reducing known technological risk areas 
identified above and identifying new risk areas.  Three primary prototype configurations will be 
employed and are: 
• Land based prototype for aperstructure integration.  This will be accomplished on a 
small scale.  Array elements will be integrated into composite deck material and 
evaluated for performance of individual element transmit and receive sensitivity.  The 
prototype can also be used to evaluate radar cross-section and infrared signature impacts 
of the design.  Array element design and performance parameters will be used to help 
scale the other prototypes.  Antenna array design will be used if possible in the ship 
integration prototype. 
• Land based prototype for early development of a dispersed array in a controlled 
environment.  This prototype will be used to provide early design concept validation.  
This prototype will be a small scale (e.g. ¼ size), and will not be used to demonstrate 
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Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) such as maximum range detection.  It will be used 
to demonstrate beam formation and wireless communications of elements.  This 
prototype will be used a risk mitigation prior to ship based prototype for continued 
development and demonstration of beam formation and control in a dynamic at sea 
environment.  Prototype will be ½ to ¾ scale and will be used to demonstrate many radar 
performance parameters but not to eventual IOC configuration parameters.  Ship flexure 
impacts, seawater and ocean environmental impact such as corrosion, multi-path, 
ducting, will be assessed.  Evaluation of supportability concepts and risks will be 
evaluated equally with performance.  Impact to and from other UHF/VHF systems for 
interference will be assessed and mitigated including other ship and land based systems. 
This prototype will be used during BMD test events as a collateral test and will track 
threat representative targets.  Test ship will not be evaluated for aspects such as radar 
signature.  The radar may only be employed on one side of the ship to keep costs 
minimized.  Notional schedule of the three prototypes and how they relate to DARBC 
ship design is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Notional Schedule of Three Prototypes 
Test & Evaluation will be dependant highly on Modeling and Simulation to keep scale 
and costs of prototypes minimized.  M&S will be developed with the concept to support the 
program through its life cycle, and not just Development and Operational Test (DT/OT) periods.  
Testing will be accomplished to reduce design risks prior to ship development.  This will include 
supportability requirements like maintenance, reliability, tactics, and operator interface in 
addition to performance. 
Program strategy will emphasize design concepts that permit minimal manning 
requirements including remote maintenance and monitoring, Built-In Test (BIT) and calibration, 
reliable and fault tolerant designs. 
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SYSTEM CAPABILITIES REQUIRED FOR THE CURRENT 
INCREMENT 
DETECTION RANGE 
The DARBC system shall have the capability to detect the signal returned from a notional 
ballistic missile target characterized by a RCS of 10 m2 RCSlxv at the handoff range of 748 kmlxvi 
where the DARBC would likely cue the S-band radar in order to engage the threat with a signal 
to noise ratio sufficient to exceed the receiver’s sensitivity threshold.  The notional ballistic 
missile target described in this project is defined as having a 77m2 RCS in the UHF band and a 
146 m2 RCS in the VHF band14.  It shall provide a consistent, timely, and accurate and target 
information in any environmental conditions. This capability provides the ability to protect the 
nation against WMD attack and coercion; and to render an adversary’s cruise and ballistic 
missiles ineffective. 
PROBABILITY OF DETECTION 
The DARBC system shall have 0.90 probability of detection on a notional ballistic 
missile target described in the section 6.1 at a range of 748 km. 
PROBABILITY OF ACQUISITION 
The DARBC system shall have 0.90 probability of acquisition on a notional ballistic 
missile target described in the section 6.1 at a range of 748 km. 
TRACK ACCURACY 
At the conclusion of the acquisition cycle, the DARBC shall be capable of providing 
position and velocity information about target.  Azimuth and elevation shall be accurate within 
± 0.5°.  Range shall be accurate within ± 0.5 km.  Velocity shall be accurate within ± 100 m/s. 
THERMAL SIGNATURE 
DARBC system is design for long range detection and is beyond the limitation of the 
thermal image technology that exists today. However, in the future if the technology is available, 
study will be conducted to evaluate the feasibility of insert this capability to the DARBC system. 
RELIABILITY, MAINTAINABILITY, AND AVAILABILITY 
DARBC system shall have met the reliability, maintainability, and availability under 
normal operating condition. The Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability values are 
referenced from an existing phased-array radar system Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) 
124 for DDG 51 Guided Missile Destroyer document since the DARBC models phased array 
radar system functionality. The thresholds and objectives are the same. The operational 
requirements are listed in Key Performance Parameters table below. 
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Key Performance Parameter Table 
(U)   Key Performance Parameters 
Key System 





Detection     
  Detection Range 748 km 1000 km 
 Probability of Detection 0.90 0.95 
Acquisition    
  Probability of 
Acquisition 
0.90 0.95 
Track Accuracy     
Azimuth ± 0.5° ± 0.2° 
Elevation ± 0.5° ± 0.2° 
Range ± 0.5 km ± 0.2 km 
  
Velocity ± 100 m/sec ± 80 m/sec 
Reliability     




(U) 130.0 Hrs (U) 130.0 Hrs   




(U) 25.0 Hrs (U) 25.0 Hrs 
Maintainability     
Mean Corrective 




(U) 2.0 Hrs (U) 2.0 Hrs 
Mean Corrective 




(U) 18 sec (U) 18 sec 
Scheduled Maintenance 
Time Per 24 Hours 
(U) 2.0 Hrs (U) 2.0 Hrs 
Restoration Time (Max 
Time) (From Scheduled 
Maintenance) 
(U) 10.0 Min (U) 10.0 Min 
  
Restoration Time (Max 
Time) (From System 
Test) 
(U) 3.0 Min (U) 3.0Min 
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(U)   Key Performance Parameters 
Key System 





Availability     
  Ao (Ballistic Missile 
Defense Mission 
Profile) 
(U) 0.9 (U) 0.9 
FAMILY OF SYSTEM AND SYSTEM OF SYSTEM SYNCHRONIZATION 
Currently, there are no Joint Capabilities Documents (JCDs) which define requirements 
for the DARBC.  The requirements for the DARBC are being developed as if other Joint systems 
will be online at the time that the DARCB achieves Initial Operational Capability (IOC).  For 
this current increment the DARBC will only need to integrate with systems on board the ship 
which the DARBC is installed.  For this increment, the ship would be responsible for sending 
data from the DARBC out to other systems external to the ship. 
The ship system interfacing with the DARBC needs to be one capable of employing the 
aperstructure concept as well as the communication interface.  The DARBC development must 
be synchronized with the development of a new construction USN surface combatant as the 
aperstructure is not the type of system that could be backfit onto existing classes of ships due to 
the high level of physical integration required.  The DARBC must be heavily considered during 
the design of the platform.  Data from the DARBC should be capable of interfacing with other 
organic ship weapon systems for this increment. 
The DARBC will not be integrated as part of a weapons system therefore, the presence of 
a BMD capable weapon system or external communications system is required onboard the 
DARBC ship.  
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS 
SUPPORTABILITY 
The DARBC system capabilities described by this CDD are concerned with radar 
functions.  DARBC is anticipated to have secondary functions that can support communications 
in the VHF and UHF bands.  An Information Support Plan (ISP) has not bee produced to 
describe these capabilities.  Communications functions of DARBC are considered outside the 
scope of the CDD at present.  DARBC operational requirements necessary to support 
information exchange for battle management Command and Control (C2) in a joint system of 
systems will be covered in the CDD for the DARBC ship and are outside the scope of this CDD. 
Any discussion concerning information technology and/or National Security capabilities is 
considered to be not applicable at this juncture.  However, if at a later date a decision is made to 
upgrade the radar system to include these requirements, a CDD revision will include these 
requirements. 
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INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTABILITY 
 Intelligence support requirements are considered outside the scope of this CDD.  While 
the DARBC is anticipated to have security requirements that will permit inputs on intelligence 
data to support radar search requirements (e.g. potential BMD launch locations, projected threats 
and flight profiles) the definition of these requirements cannot be supported within current 
distribution criteria.   Any discussion concerning Intelligence Supportability is considered to be 
not applicable at this juncture. 
ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS (E3) 
The DARBC radar system shall be mutually compatible and operate effectively in the at-
sea electromagnetic environment.  It shall not be operationally degraded or fail due to exposure 
to Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3). Radar system and subsystem performance 
requirements are specified in MIL-STD-464A and MIL-STD-461E (equipment and 
subsystem/system level) for all electromagnetic disciplines.  Threat countries seek to degrade 
senor performance using spoofing and high-power jamming.  DARBC will need to operate in a 
high threat environment operating close to threat countries in hostile Electronic Attack 
environment. 
The DARBC radar system shall be required to comply with Department of Navy (DON) 
requirements for topside design and ship EMC certification in accordance with NAVSEA S9040-
AA-GTP-00/SSCR Rev 4, Change 1. The DARBC radar equipment will comply with the 
applicable DOD, Navy, National, and International spectrum management policies and 
regulations and will obtain spectrum certification prior to operational deployment. DD Form 
1494 will be submitted to the Military Communications Electronics Board Joint Frequency 
Panel. 
The DARBC system shall meet E3 control performance requirements as specified is this 
document. E3 control shall minimize electromagnetic radiation to personnel, fuels, electronic 
hardware, and ordnance in accordance with DOD INST 6055.11, and NAVSEA OP3565 / 
NAVAIR 16-1-529.  Radiation hazards breakdown into three categories: Hazards of 
Electromagnetic Radiation to Personnel (HERP), Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to 
Ordnance (HERO), and Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Fuel (HERF). 
The DARBC transmitter shall not produce electric fields exceeding the following level in 
accordance with MIL-STD-464A: 
• Metallic: 10 V/m from 10 kHz to18 GHz. 
• Non-metallic: 10 V/m from 10 kHz to 2 MHz, 50 V/m from 2 MHz to 1 GHz. 
The DARBC system shall be electromagnetically compatible, given operating 
frequencies over the following frequency bands (216-225 MHz and 420-450 MHz) with its 
external RF Electro-Magnetic Environment (EME) such that its system operational performance 
requirements are met. The electric field from the DARBC shall not exceed the following levels 
for operation on flight, weather deck, and transmitter main beam during system operation. 
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Frequency Range 
Flight Deck Weather Deck Main beam of Transmitter 
Electric Field 
(V/m – rms) 
Electric Field 
(V/m – rms) 
Electric Field 
(V/m – rms) 
Frequency Range 
(MHz) 
Peak Average Peak Average Peak Average 
150 - 225 61 61 61 61 10 10 
225 - 400 61 61 61 61 25 25 
400 - 700 151 71 151 71 1940 260 
ASSETS REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE INITIAL OPERATIONAL 
CAPABILITY (IOC) 
The technology required to integrate the Digital Array Radar for Ballistic Missile 
Defense and Counter-Stealth (DARBC) system into a new and advanced ship design will require 
several years of Research and Development prior to achieving Initial Operational Capability 
(IOC) of the system.  IOC is likely to depend largely on integration of the DARBC into either an 
existing development spiral of a ship construction program or into a new ship construction 
program.  IOC for DARBC is projected for fiscal year 2019 or beyond.  The following systems 
and capabilities will be required at IOC: 
• DARBC radar integrated into a ship employing the aperstructure concept.  
• Ship systems capability of supporting Joint interoperability sufficient to support a 
Homeland defense mission.  Systems will need to receive track information and 
distribute across BMD network for Command and Control (C2).  Cueing to other sensors 
is not required at IOC.  
• Initial spares, documentation, and support infrastructure capable of supporting the 
maintenance concept described in section 6 of this CDD.  An interim support concept 
using OEM or other organization is acceptable at IOC.  Support includes remote 
maintenance and monitoring systems and personnel. 
• Capability for static alignment and calibration of DARBC array.  Capability can be 
either embedded in the radar itself or as a mobile support system located at the 
homeport. 
• Interim training for ships force and any government infrastructure. 
• Joint Infrastructure C2 capable of receiving track information from the DARBC ship.  
Associated tactics, doctrine and procedures to use and disseminate this information will 
be required.  Cueing to BMD networked sensors is desired and anticipated but not 
required at IOC. 
SCHEDULE AND IOC AND FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (FOC) 
DEFINITIONS 
IOC will be reached when one ship configured with a DARBC system is fielded and 
delivered to the fleet.  The development of the DARBC ship and its associated systems is not 
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under the scope of this CDD.  The mission of the ship and capabilities that will be required 
beyond those provided by DARBC will have a direct impact on DARBC schedule.  The IOC 
ship will only be required to support BMD search, detection and tracking in a homeland defense 
scenario.  Development of ship self defense capabilities that permit the ship to be forward 
deployed will extend the ship development time and cost.  Ship self defense in a homeland 
defense mission should be less strenuous.  The ship must be configured with Command and 
Control (C2) systems to be capable of performing homeland defense mission of detection of 
ballistic missile launches against the continental United States (CONUS). 
OTHER DOTMLPF AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The policy considerations for the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership 
and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) associated with fielding the DARBC are 
addressed at a high level in this document.  The doctrine for the DARBC includes publications, 
tactics, techniques, and procedures on how the radar will function on its own and in a system-of-
systems environment.  This doctrine will guide the way the military utilizes the DARBC system.  
Doctrine will be heavily influenced by the overall mission of the DARBC ship and associated 
weapons systems.  A forward deployed DARBC tasked to engage ballistic missiles over a threat 
nation will apply a different set of rules of engagement than a homeland defense positioned ship. 
The organizational reporting structure for the DARBC platform will be influenced by 
other platforms that may be operating in conjunction.  A DARBC ship positioned for early 
detection of launch supporting engagement from other platforms will need an organization 
structure that supports ship positioning and launch considerations in addition to system that can 
pass track information.  DARBC search areas can be optimized if threat sectors and types are 
known.  Timely reporting of this intelligence information through the organizational elements is 
required to ensure effective use by DARBC to accomplish its mission. 
DARBC training will be documented by a Navy Training System Plan (NTSP) and will 
cover all elements of instructor requirements, shipboard operator and maintainer courses, remote 
maintenance support personnel, and all hands on training including embedded training 
capabilities. 
DARBC will apply Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) equipment, military developed 
equipment, and Non-Developmental Item (NDI) to minimize development and procurement 
costs.  Application of these items needs to consider life cycle cost and ability to meet key system 
capabilities such as reliability. Significant materiel costs and timing will be associated with the 
development and procurement of the DARBC ship platform. 
The requirement for minimal manning will depend largely on availability of qualified 
personnel.  The competencies, skills, and abilities of personnel must be established and known 
and be considered as a driver for design decisions.  DARBC personnel requirements will 
consider all levels of operations and maintenance including shipboard, remote maintenance and 
depot. 
Facilities for DARBC need to ensure infrastructure capabilities to meet unique design 
aspects of DARBC.  The integrated hull structure of DARBC may impact ability of tugs to 
approach and interface with the ship in order to not damage array elements.  Calibration and 
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alignment of the array elements may require unique design features at piers to allow direct 
visibility to antenna elements during radiation.  Remote maintenance facilities will require 
bandwidth, trained personnel, and representative systems to assist in trouble shooting and repair 
recommendations so ships force is seamlessly supported 24/7.  Pier facilities will need to be able 
to support DARBC such that aperstructures are not damaged. 
OTHER SYSTEM ATTRIBUTES 
Key cost driver risk areas for DARBC are anticipated as follows: 
• Manning:  DARBC will be developed using concepts that will support reduced 
shipboard manning.  The distributed nature of the array elements will make maintenance 
functions difficult and time consuming.  Having fault tolerant design that can support 
operations with reduced array elements due to failure, high reliability, built in test and 
remote diagnostics and support can drastically reduce the man-hours required for 
preventative and corrective maintenance. 
• Reliability:  A key tradeoff to reduce manning is improved reliability reducing the need 
for maintenance.  Design for reliability and procurement cost for high reliability parts 
can drive costs up dramatically. 
• Maintainability:  Built in test and monitoring will be applied and information forwarded 
to remote monitoring and assistance center.  Ships crew will be relieved of preventative 
maintenance and troubleshooting requirements.  Corrective maintenance will be 
minimized and applied for critical failures only.  
• Dynamic Radar-Ship alignment:  The distributed array elements are anticipated in 
needing a dynamic compensation system for measuring ship flexure and providing real 
time feedback that can be used in dynamic correction of beam formation and alignment.  
This system has not been developed yet let alone tested in an integrated ship 
environment.  
• Static Radar-Ship alignment or calibration of the entire array of elements will be 
complicated and labor intensive due to the large number of array elements.  Unless 
calibration can be accomplished automatically, alignment of individual array elements 
will need to be as is done today in Combat System alignment.  Ships today have a 
number of sensors and weapon systems where individual elements are compared to a 
ship reference point.  Alignment of individual array elements in today’s sensors such as 
SPY-1, are accomplished during production.  The SPY array face is aligned to the ship 
during production of the ship.  For DARBC this integration of elements will take place 
only during ship production and will be time consuming when 1000+ elements are used. 
PROGRAM AFFORDABILITY 
DARBC program costs and projections of Life Cycle Costs are outside the scope of this 
CDD.  DARBC provides mobile long range BMD detection and tracking capability.  The total 
program costs of DARBC and development of the associated ship can be favorably assessed or 
compared against other sensor options.  Purchase of multiple Aegis platforms would be required 
in order to obtain the same search volume and detection capabilities as a single DARBC.  
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Ground assets would lack the range, mobility and would need to be deployed in multiple 
locations around the globe in order to achieve similar capabilities.  Access to suitable land for 
ground based sensors may not be achievable from a political standpoint.   Air assets would need 
to be purchased in significant quantities to achieve readiness levels for sustained coverage. 
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Appendix A:  ACRONYMS 
ACRONYM DEFINITION 
AD Air Defense 
AoA Analysis of Alternatives 
ASCM Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
BA Battlespace Awareness 
BMD Ballistic Missile Defense 
C2 Command and Control 
CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
CONUS Continental United States 
CR # Change Request Number 
CSG Carrier Strike Group 
DARBC Digital Array Radar for BMD and Counter-Stealth 
DoD Department of Defense 
DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, 
Personnel, and Facilities 
DT/ OT Developmental Test/ Operational Test 
E3 Electromagnetic Environmental Effects 
EA Electronic Attack 
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility 
EMCON Emission Control 
EME Electromagnetic Environment 
EMI Electromagnetic Interference 
EMP Electromagnetic Pulses 
ESAD Electronic Safe and Arm Device 
ESG Expeditionary Strike Group 
FOC Full Operational Capability 
FoS Family of Systems 
FP Force Protection 
HEL High Energy Laser 
HEMP High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse 
HERF Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Fuels 
HERO Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordinance 
HERP Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to People 
ICBM Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile 
ICD Initial Capabilities Document 
IO Information Operations 
IOC Initial Operational Capability 
IR Infra-Red 
IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile 
ISR Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance  
JBMC2 Joint Battle Management Command and Control 
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ACRONYM DEFINITION 
JFC Joint Functional Concept 
KEI Kinetic Energy Interceptor 
KPP Key Performance Parameters 
LORA Level of Repair Analysis 
LOS Line of Sight 
MHz Megahertz 
MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile 
NCOW Network-Centric Operations and Warfare 
OA Opportunistic Array 
OODA Observe Orient Decide Act 
OV Operational View 
RADHAZ Radiation Hazard 
RCS Radar Cross Section 
RV Re-entry Vehicle 
SATCOM Satellite Communication 
SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile 
SM-3 Standard Missile - 3 
SPY-1 AN/SPY-1 Radar 
SRBM Short Range Ballistic Missile 
T/R Transmit-Receive 
TBD To Be Determined 
TBM Theater Ballistic Missile 
TEL Transportable Erectable Launchers 
U.S. United States 
UHF Ultra High Frequency 
UJTL Universal Joint Task List 
USN United States Navy 
USN United States Navy 
VHF Very High Frequency 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
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Appendix B:  OV-1 





Long range ICBM, IRBM MRBM 
launch detection and track
SRBM, MRBM launch detect/track/
engage on ascent
Area defense






OV-1 High-Level Operational Concept 
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Midcourse Engagement Terminal Engagement













OV-2 Second Level Operational Processes 
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NAVY DIGITAL ARRAY RADAR SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND 
PARAMETER TRADEOFF STUDY  
 
Abstract 
United States Navy (USN) sources indicate 
a need for long-range shipboard radar for the 
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program to 
augment and expand the USN’s current capabilities.  
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) conducted a 
study on radar architecture research based on a 
digital Opportunistic Array (OA) integrated into a 
ship’s hull. 
 The recently completed research 
defined the operational and technical requirements 
for the system, called the Digital Array Radar for 
BMD and Counter-stealth (DARBC).  Initial 
analysis included characterization of the threat and 
definition of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  
Basic operational Key Performance Parameters 
(KPPs) were defined.  Based on a notional ballistic 
missile Radar Cross Section (RCS), a radar 
technical parameters study derived the technical 
requirements for the radar necessary to meet the 
KPPs.  Related research topics included radar 
parameter sensitivity, cooling, search pattern 
options, Electronic Attack (EA), ship flexure, 
topside array layout, supportability, and cost.  
Finally, reaction time modeling was conducted to 
quantify the increase in search volume and decision 




The threat from ballistic missiles to the US 
and its allies is ever increasing in quantity and 
capability.  The recent war in Lebanon has seen 
hundreds of small rockets launched into Israel.  Had 
Hezbollah gained access to longer range missiles, 
much greater damage to property and loss of life 
throughout Israel could have occurred.  North Korea 
flexed its military muscle on 6 July, 2006 with the 
test firing of seven ballistic missiles in one day, 
including a Taepo Dong II.  While the failure of the 
dual stage Taepo Dong II, capable of reaching over 
5000 kilometers into US soil, captured all the 
attention, the success of the other 6 missiles shows 
an increasing capability of this rogue nation.  
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) will be a common 
theme of military for years if not decades to come.  
“The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) mission 
remains one of developing and incrementally 
fielding a joint, integrated, and multilayered BMD 
system to defend the United States, our deployed 
forces, and our allies and friends against ballistic 
missiles of all ranges by engaging them in the boost, 
midcourse, and terminal phases of flight.”lxvii   
The paper explores a Very High Frequency 
(VHF) / Ultra High Frequency (UHF) ship-based 
Opportunistic Array (OA) radar, called the Digital 
Array Radar for BMD and Counter Stealth 
(DARBC), and describes the operational and 
technical requirements for this notional system.  
The combination of a large effective radar aperture 
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created by the OA and relatively low VHF / UHF 
transmit frequencies are expected to allow the 
DARBC system to achieve the long detection 
ranges needed by the MDA.  These attributes may 
also provide the added advantage of being able to 
detect and track targets with low Radar Cross 




 This project was based on tasking from the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in a proposal 
made to the MDAlxviii to provide a detailed radar 
systems analysis and parameter tradeoff study for a 
long-range VHF / UHF OA Surveillance Radar 
(OASR).  The tasking further requested operational 
and technical requirements along with the resultant 
impact to ship.  Discussions with faculty advisors 
provided initial assumptions which included 
limiting research on ship integration impacts.  The 
project assumes that an aperstructure concept, or 
combination of radar aperture with ship’s structure 
would be utilized and the DARBC radar would be 
implemented in a new ship design.  Detailed 
integration and back-fit considerations were 
eliminated from the scope.   
 
Concept of Operations 
 The DARBC radar will provide long-range 
search, detection and track of the various types of 
ballistic missiles for cueing to other organic sensors 
or systems in an overall Joint Battle Management 
Command and Control (JBMC2) network.  The 
radar will provide early detection of ballistic missile 
launches over large areas of land or sea space not 
currently or adequately covered by existing sensors.  
Ships configured with DARBC will be forward 
deployed to positions where they have the greatest 
potential for detection of launches.  Early detection 
and tracking increases overall engagement timeline, 
providing more time for decision making, weapon 
assignment, and weapon engagement from the 
overall BMD family of systems.  Early detection 
using forward based sensors permits engagement of 
ballistic missile threats during boost and ascent 
phase when the threats are slower, larger and easier 
to engage.   The early detection, track and cueing 
will also improve engagement by other BMD 
systems that engage the threat in midcourse or 
terminal phases of flight.  Deployment of the ship to 
provide midcourse and terminal search, detection, 
and tracking of ballistic missiles is possible as well.  
Secondary benefits include search, detection and 
track of all stealth air threats.  Detection of these 
threats will be at ranges where they pose a 
secondary threat to the ship or units in the 
immediate operational area either by launch of 
weapons or as weapons themselves.  The radar also 
could provide tertiary benefits to support VHF / 
UHF communications either in Line Of Sight (LOS) 
or by SATCOM link.   
The ship/radar would normally be operated 
in conjunction with other BMD units.  These units 
could be Patriot or Aegis platforms providing 
terminal phase defense.  When long-range ballistic 
missiles are launched, BMD fixed assets in Alaska 
or Continental United States (CONUS) will be cued 
to support midcourse tracking in support of ground-
based interceptors or other engagement means. 
Ballistic missiles have proliferated over the 
last four decades and are now prevalent across the 
globe with over 24 countries capable of launching 
some form of this threat.  As an example, over 100 
foreign ballistic missile test launches occurred 
around the world in 2004.  Many countries also 
have the capability to configure these missiles with 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) including 
nuclear, chemical and biological payloads.  
Additionally, submarines can launch ballistic 
missiles, dramatically increasing threat launch 
areas, escalating the need for sea-based sensors with 
enhanced capabilities in search volume. lxviilxvii 
above  Ballistic missiles are classified in five main 
categories as described by Table 2lxix. 
The ranges and apogees reported are 
estimated maximum capabilities.  These weapons 
can support shorter ranges with lower or depressed 
apogees.  Some may fly a trajectory that has a lower 
apogee to achieve maximum range.  A ballistic 
missile is a projectile that has been given some level 
  141
of initial power, operates within the earth’s 
atmosphere or exo-atmosphere, and after boost, 
follows a path governed mainly by the laws of 
gravity.  Notional trajectories for the above 
categories are depicted in Figure .  The DARBC 
Operational View (OV-1) is depicted in Figure .  
The output of the Threat RCS analysis concluded 
that a notional ballistic missile has a RCS of 10m2 
when viewed by radar operating in the S-band.  
Assuming a fixed near-normal aspect angle of 88.4° 
which is based on the anticipated ballistic missile 
flight path characteristics relative to the DARBC 
ship, this notional ballistic missile had an equivalent 
RCS of 77m2 in the UHF band and 146m2 in the 
VHF band.  These values aided in determining both 
operational and technical requirements for the 
DARBC.  A Swerling Case of 0 (a non-varying 
RCS) was assumed for this initial analysis. 
 
System Requirements Definition 
 
One of the main KPPs for the DARBC was 
to quantify the required level of performance for the 
system.  Based on the previous research, it was 
decided that the DARBC should have a single pulse 
Probability of Detection PD of 0.90 at a range where 
the DARBC would cue another radar system 
(assumed to be a notional S-band fire control radar) 
for handoff and engagement.  In order to determine 
the notional handoff range, a radar performance 
model was developed using Waterloo Maple® 7.  It 
produced parametric plots of PD vs. Range for a 
radar system with specified characteristics.  Based 
on a notional set of inputs for characteristics such as 
power, effective aperture, temperature, receiver 
noise figure and noise bandwidth, parametric plots 
of a range of RCSs were graphed on a PD vs. Range 
chart for the S-band radar.  The basic equation 
governing this relationship between PD and RMAX is 

























σ  (1) 
The handoff range was chosen to be the 
range where the S-band radar had a single pulse PD 
of 0.5 for a notional ballistic missile (RCS of 10m2).  
This range was calculated to be 748 km as seen in 
Figure .  Ignore the vertical lines on the plots as 
they are an artifact generated by Maple ® 7 when 
the values go to zero. 
Based on the operational requirement for the 
DARBC to have a 0.90 PD for a notional ballistic 
missile at a range of 748 km, further analysis, 
including tradeoffs and sensitivity studies were 
conducted on the radar technical parameters using 
the Maple ® tool.  Along with this analysis, array 
density and basic Transmit / Receive (T/R) module 
layout research was conducted concurrently with 
the technical parameters analysis providing 
information such as T/R module spacing and 
quantity.   The final analysis defined the technical 
requirements for the DARBC so that the system 
would be capable of meeting its operational KPP 
while keeping the numbers realistic.  The final 
results of this collaborative effort showing the 
values for the DARBC as well as the notional S-
band radar can be seen in Table 3. 
 
Calculated System Performance 
 
With the parameters above, the DARBC’s 
anticipated level of performance was calculated.  
The DARBC KPP required a 0.90 PD at this range 
of 748 km vs. the notional ballistic missile target 
(RCS of 146m2 for VHF and 77m2 for UHF) and 
the model showed that the DARBC is able to obtain 
0.906 ≈ 0.91 using both VHF and UHF spectrums 
as seen in Figure   The power parameter is a 
conservative estimate of 500 kW.  For that number 
of elements, the system may be capable of radiating 
at a much higher power level.  Increasing the power 
would only increase the PD values for the radar and 
the power was left at its current level in the Maple 
® model.  The graphs below show the anticipated 
performance of the DARBC using the parameters 
from Table 3.  See Figure  and Figure  for 
the PD vs. Range parametric plots for both the VHF 
and UHF frequencies for the DARBC.  Based on 
these plots, the DARBC should have an effective 
range of approximately 2600 km. 
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Along with the CONOPS, RCS, 
aperstructure array density, topside layout, and 
radar technical parameters studies, other research 
was conducted which further defined the 
requirements for the DARBC.  Results from T/R 
module cooling, ship flexure, Electronic Attack 
(EA), search pattern options, and budget and 
logistics studies can be found in the Joint Applied 
Project (JAP) Report for the DARBC, Naval 
Postgraduate School, September 2006. 
 
Modeled System Benefit 
 
With the technical parameters and calculated 
performance of the DARBC defined, the next major 
step in the research project called for the system to 
be modeled in an attempt to quantify the benefits of 
the system.  The specific modeling goals were to 
calculate the extra volume covered and the extra 
decision making time with the DARBC as 
compared to the notional S-band system alone.  The 
approach to accomplishing this took two specific 
routes.   
The first model was a stochastic reaction 
time model using the Arena ® 10 process 
simulation software.  The model was built with two 
baselines.  The first one with the DARBC cueing to 
an S-band radar.  The second was the S-band radar 
operating unaided.  Both models had targets with 
uniformly distributed ranges, RCSs, and velocities 
with maximum and minimum values as seen in 
Table 4.  
Also assumed in these models is that the 
target velocity is the closing velocity with respect to 
the ship.  Initial detection time was collected based 
on a process simulation.  For the model with the 
DARBC, if the target was generated at a position 
outside the maximum range of the DARBC 
(assumed to be 2000 km) then the target would not 
be detected until it closed to within that range limit 
and the detection time process was complete.  If the 
target was generated inside the detection range, the 
detection time was assumed to be time of 
completion of the detection time process.  If the 
target RCS was less than that of the notional 
ballistic missile, then the target was not detected.  
As the target closed on the handoff range, an 
engagement process simulation occurred which 
considered target acquisition, time to establish a fire 
control track, identify the target, compute the firing 
solution, grant permission to launch a missile, 
process launch sequence, and launch the missile.  
The total time from initial detection to the time of 
missile launch was measured during each run and 
over an average of 10 runs.  This was done for both 
models.   
The BMD system equipped with the 
DARBC has approximately 53.5% more time to 
respond to the threat than the system without the 
DARBC, specifically the DARBC lets you have 
16.2 seconds versus the stand-alone S-Band 
system’s 10.5 seconds. 
The second reaction time model was done 
using Microsoft ® Excel and applied a more 
complex 2 degree of freedom target flight path.  The 
more complex flight path allowed for the reaction 
time to be more accurately quantified in the time 
domain.  The model varied the distance between the 
radar and the launch point of the ballistic missile, 
effectively varying how far forward the DARBC 
and S-band radar systems were deployed.  Time-
range plots for significant launch ranges of SRBMs, 
IRBMs, and MRBMs were generated, providing the 
time and area coverage benefits possible for each 
type of ballistic missile.   
The model assumed a constant velocity of 
7.5 km / s around the entire elliptical flight path 
unlike the real threat where the ballistic missile is 
significantly slower during boost and ascent phases.  
The model assumed a flat, non rotating Earth.  The 
model only considered a flight path, where the 
TBM flies directly over the DARBC and S-band 
radar.  Overall, the model provides a good basic 
estimate for the benefits of evaluation time and 
extra area coverage for short, intermediate, and 
medium-range TBMs as the assumptions make this 
a more conservative model. 
Figure  shows a flight profile of an IRBM at 
a launch range of 1200 km.  The DARBC and S-
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band radars are assumed to be located at the origin 
on the flight profile (top plot).  On the lower plot, 
the top horizontal line represents the maximum 
DARBC detection range of 2000 km.  The middle 
horizontal line represents the handoff range between 
the DARBC and the S-band radar.  In this scenario, 
the IRBM would have never been detected had the 
S-band radar been functioning alone as seen when 
the target range to sensor never gets within the 
maximum detection range of the stand alone or 





Final results of the Excel DARBC reaction 
time model are listed as follows: 
For the SRBM, the DARBC provides: 
• Up to 22 seconds of additional 
engagement time at a launch range of 
400 km 
• Up to 28 seconds of additional 
evaluation time at a launch range of 
900 km 
• Increased coverage from 400 km to 
900 km launch range 
For the MRBM, the DARBC provides: 
• Up to 96 seconds of additional 
evaluation time at a launch range of 
1200 km 
• Increased coverage from 300 km to 
1200 km launch range 
For the IRBM, the DARBC provides: 
• Up to 182 seconds of additional 
evaluation time at a launch range of 
1300 km 
• Increased coverage from 300 km to 
1300 km launch range 
 
This showed that the DARBC can add up to 
3 additional minutes for decision making and 
engaging the threat while covering an additional 
1000 km in range.   
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
This research project concluded that the OA 
concept as defined by the DARBC operational and 
technical requirements has the potential of 
providing a very real and significant benefit to the 
USN and BMD program.  More research is required 
in the areas of ship integration as these topics were 
barely addressed by this research project.   
Future modeling efforts could be improved 
by incorporating the benefits of both system 
performance models together along with the 
addition of more realistic parameters such as a 3 
dimensional flight path, varying target speed, 
Earth’s curvature & rotation consideration, and 
environmental effects. 
The model should combine and expand on 
the aspects of the two reaction time models, 
providing a more threat representative 6th degree of 
freedom threat flight profile for various ballistic 
missiles. 
Future RCS modeling should be conducted 
considering more realistic Swerling Case scenarios, 
varying aspect angles, and should all be stochastic.  
Stealth target RCS analysis should be incorporated 
into future studies in order to determine the 
effectiveness of the DARBC in the counter-stealth 
role.      
Radar propagation analysis could be 
conducted including environmental factors such as 
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Figure 8 - Calculated Handoff Range to S-Band radar 
 
Parameter Description Value Used 
Pmax Transmitted power [W] 500 kW (VHF, UHF), 
4 MW (S-band) 
σ Radar cross section of target 
[m2] 
146 (VHF), 100, 77 
(UHF), 10, 1, 0.1 [m2] 
n Number of pulses integrated 1 
Ei(n) Integration efficiency 1 
kB Boltzmann’s constant 
[J/degree K] 
 
1.3806503E-23 J/ K 
T0 Standard temperature [degrees 
K] 
290 degrees K 
Bn Receiver noise bandwidth 
[Hz] 
23 kHz (VHF), 44 kHz 
(UHF), 4 MHz (S-band) 
Fn Receiver noise figure 1×103/5 = 6 dB 
PFA Probability of False Alarm 0.01 
f Radar Transmit Frequency 216 MHz (VHF), 420 
MHz (UHF), 3 GHz (S-
band) 
η Effective Aperture Efficiency 0.7 
Handoff Range of 748 km 
for a PD of 0.5 for an RCS 
of 10 m2 
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Parameter Description Value Used 
n Number of Array Elements 
contributing to 1 beam 
3411 
λ Wavelength [m] 1.3879 (VHF), 0.7138 
(UHF), 0.0999 (S-band) 
Ae Antenna effective aperture 
[m2] 
This is a function of n 
and η; 1193.85 (VHF & 
UHF), 17.5 (S-band) 
G Antenna gain This is a function of Ae 
and λ; 38.9 dB (VHF), 
44.7 dB (UHF), 43.4 dB 
(S-band) 
S/N Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) 
required for detection based 
on a single pulse 
Not directly calculated.  
This is a function of 
Rmax. 
Rmax Maximum radar range or 
detection range [m] 
Variable (see plot) 
PD Probability of Detection Variable (see plot) 
Table 3 - Radar Technical Parameters for DARBC and notional S-band radar 
 
 
Figure 9 - Calculated output of Maple model for performance against a ballistic 




Figure 10 - DARBC PD vs. Range performance using the VHF spectrum 
 
 
Figure 11 - DARBC PD vs. Range performance using the UHF spectrum 
 
Notional Ballistic Missile 
RCS is black line, next to 
red line. 
Notional Ballistic Missile 
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A Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the Digital Array Radar for Ballistic Missile Defense 
(BMD) and Counter-Stealth (DARBC) system is required to help define and articulate the Operational 
Requirements for this Opportunistic Array Surveillance Radar (OASR) system.  The CONOPS is 
envisioned to be a tool to help TEAM R discuss and come to consensus on just when, why and how the 
system would be deployed and operated.  The CONOPS should describe the missions of the Radar and 
identify any constraints envisioned by Radars design or employment including particulars of interfacing 
systems.  The CONOPS would also be an early start to describing the threat and possible Key 
Performance Parameters (KPP) for Operational Requirements including identification of thresholds. 
Expected Outputs of study: 
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OV-1 
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PURPOSE 
This Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the DARBC system was developed to help define and 
articulate the Operational Requirements for this radar system.  The CONOPS is envisioned to be a tool to 
help TEAM R discuss and come to consensus on when, why and how the system would be deployed and 
operated.   
This TECHNOTE is comprised of the following sections: 
I. Purpose:  This section describes the purpose of the technote and its organization. 
II. Background: This section provides information on key topics that must be understood in order 
to understand the operational requirements for the DARBC system. 
III. Discussion: This section provides a CONOPS for the DARBC as well as a detailed 
description of the threat. This CONOPS describes the missions of the Radar and identifies any constraints 
envisioned by the Radar’s design or employment including particulars of interfacing systems.  The 
CONOPS also identifies how the DARBC will counter the threat. 
IV. Conclusions:  This section describes probable trade studies to be completed and 
recommendations for requirements to be included in the ICD.  
Attachment 1:  Ballistic Missile Description  
Attachment 2:  OV-1 
References    
 
It is generally the purpose of a CONOPS to represent the systems user’s operational view for a 
system under development. This operational view is stated in terms of how a system will operate in its 
intended environment. 
 
The most important step in the system development process is the accurate communication of 
operational requirements from those who need the system to those who will build it.  As Systems Engineers 
often close to the development process we (Team R) need to be careful in our process of developing 
Operational Requirements.  Problems we may encounter include: 
1. We may not adequately convey the needs of the user. 
2. We may describe requirements in terms of specifications describing attributes such as:  
functions, performance factors, design constraints, system interfaces and quality attributes,  
3. We may avoid describing terms concerning operational characteristics of the specified system 
such as: 
classes of users and modes of operation  
• normal mode • emergency mode • maintenance mode • backup mode • degraded mode  
• diagnostic mode  
essential needs, desirable needs – prioritized, optional needs – prioritized,  
If we can accurately identify and prioritize user needs then we can provide the basis for 





A. number of resources and references has been generated in support of the overall Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) program in defining and developing a UHF/VHF OA radar.  These studies and 
Theses have described many advantages and possible uses for the DARBC system.  The Statement Of 
Work (SOW) and associated Theses concerning this OASR have been reviewed and proposed operational 
requirements identified and included in an overall assessment of operational needs.   
II. DISCUSSION 
The following is a general CONOPS Document for the VHF/UHF Opportunistic array radar 
1. Scope. This CONOPS will cover the VHF/UHF radar for ship installation into a new class or 
combatant.  The assumption used by the team and agree to by faculty advisors is to only look at a new 
platform class as opposed to looking at a backfit into existing platforms.  This assumption is based on the 
use of an aperstructures hull integration concept that would not be backfit compatible.  The platform would 
likely be a modification of the DDX class.  Using DDX as a baseline assumption may be used for 
computations of array size or development of other options that impact radar design. The CONOPs scope 
will not be based on an assumption that the ship is armed with weapons that are capable of engaging 
Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) threats and stealth air threats.     
1.1 Identification.  The VHF/UHF radar is multi-element “Digital Array Radar for BMD and 
Counter-Stealth (DARBC)”.  Its purpose is to search, detect and track TBM threats.  It has a secondary 
purpose to search, detect and track stealth air threats. 
1.2 System Overview.  The Radar is an Opportunistic Array (OA) installed in ships over the ships 
superstructure including deckhouse and hull form to provide a very large radar aperture.  The UHF or VHF 
frequencies and large aperture can provide significant performance in detection and tracking performance 
of Ballistic Missile threats at increased ranges over current phased array radars using C, S, L, or X bands.  
The radar requires no additional mast or structure for space and support helping to reduce ship RCS and 
overall size and signature.  The array elements are integrated into the hull in an aperstructures (aperture/ 
structure) design concept described by references (a) and (b). 
2. Threat Descriptions. Threats that the VHF/UHF radar would encounter would fall into the 
following general categories: 
• Air Threats 
o Ballistic Missiles (Primary) 
 Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) 
 Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) 
 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) 
 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) 
o Anti Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) (Secondary) 
 Subsonic Sea skimming 
 Supersonic Sea skimming 
 High Altitude  






• Surface Threats (Tertiary and only if radar has basic capability)   
o Large Ships 
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2.1 Ballistic Missiles.  Ballistic missiles have proliferated over the last four decades and are now 
prevalent across the globe with over 24 countries capable of launching some form of this threat.  Many 
have capability to configure these missiles with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) including nuclear, 
chemical and biological payloads.  Additionally submarines can launch Ballistic Missiles dramatically 
increasing threat launch areas, surprise and need for sensors with increased capabilities and search volume.  
Ballistic Missiles can be broken into 5 main categories as described by the following table. 
 
Ballistic Missile Category Maximum Range Apogee 
Short-range ballistic missile 
(SRBM) <1,000 km (621 mi) 
160 km 
Medium-range ballistic missile 
(MRBM) 1,000-3,000 km (621-1,864 mi) 
500 km 
Intermediate-range ballistic 
missile (IRBM) 3,000-5,500 km (1,864 - 3,418 mi) 
900 km 
Intercontinental ballistic missile 




Any ballistic missile launched from a submarine, 
regardless of maximum range 
Varies 
Table-1 
The range and apogees reported are examples of maximum capabilities.  Trajectories can support 
shorter ranges with lower or depressed apogees. Some may fly a trajectory that has a lower apogee to 
achieve maximum range.  A Ballistic Missile is a projectile that has been given some level of initial power, 
operates within the earth’s atmosphere or the immediate space above the atmosphere, and follows a path 
































Figure 1. Ballistic Missile Trajectories 
2.1.1. Launchers and Command and Control (C2).  Ballistic Missiles can be launched from a 
variety of systems and platforms.   
2.1.1.1. The most prolific is for Transportable Erectable Launchers (TELs).  TELs are generally 
truck mounted for transportation to a launch location.  They can be hidden in buildings or in geographical 
features such as trees and tunnels.  The launch control is part of the truck system.  Time to plan missions 
and achieve launch are dependant on factors such as the range, initialization requirements, mission 
planning requirements, and requirement to obtain launch permission but are probably on the order of 
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magnitude of minutes.  The ability of sensors to locate a launcher prior to launch is very dependant on 
intelligence.  The first indication that a ballistic missile has been launched will likely be a detection of the 
vehicle in flight.  Placing a TEL on a commercial ship has been depicted as a potential scenario for 
engagement against the U.S. with SRBMs or MRBMs.  This can complicate BMD capability requirements 
by requiring far greater number and location of assets to protect the U.S.  
2.1.1.2 ICBMs and some IRBMs are very large and require substantial physical support and 
require storage in a permanent launch facility.  These are generally protected facilities where the missile is 
stored in a silo.  The permanent nature of a silo allows location of the site to be known compared to a TEL 
which can hide, move, and hide again.  
2.1.1.3 A third launch capability is submarine launched.  Submarines are a very stealthy platform 
and the sheer size of the world’s oceans provides a great deal of space for hiding.  Attacks against the U.S. 
from a submarine could greatly reduce flight time and reactions times from launches originating from 
countries across the globe.  The ability to place a submarine over such a wide area makes locations of land 
based sensors and engagement systems inadequate for detection and engagement during boost phases.   
2.2.2   Guidance methods.  Ballistic Missiles often require various guidance methods in order to 
get close enough to the target so that payloads can meet their objectives.  Payloads of mass destruction do 
not require accuracy associated with strike targets.  Often cities and civilians are the targets where mass 
casualties can result.  Sophisticated guidance methods are not required in these instances. Inertial, Global 
Positioning System (GPS) and GLONAS can provide sufficient accuracies.   The path/trajectory of a 
Ballistic Missile includes three phases: a boost phase, a mid-course phase, and a terminal phase. These 
same trajectory phase names are used to describe the intercept phases and systems. Boost phase is the time 
period when the missile is given the thrust to reach its target. This period can last a few seconds or several 
minutes depending on the amount of thrust needed for the missile to travel to the target.  The mid-course 
phase follows the boost phase, as the missile ascends to its highest point (the apogee) and then descends 
(via gravity) to its target. For Ballistic Missiles with a range of over 300 kilometers, the mid-course phase 
extends outside the earth’s atmosphere (exo-atmosphere). If the missile has several stages, mid-course is 
also the phase in which the warhead separates from these stages and travels under its own inertia. This 
phase can last from a few minutes to up to 25 minutes. The final phase is the terminal phase, in which the 
missile or warhead re-enters the earth’s atmosphere (endo-atmosphere), accelerates, and descends towards 
its target. It is the stage where the atmosphere affects the warhead and may cause unpredictable deviations 
to its previously predictable trajectory. This phase lasts less than a minute. The entire trip can take a few 
minutes or up to 30, depending upon the distance traveled.  Figure 1 provides a notional trajectory and 
breakout of flight phases.  This figure is from reference (c).   
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2.2.3 Payloads.  Payloads or warheads consist of conventional high explosive, submunitions, 
chemical or biological warheads, or even nuclear warheads.  Some missiles have multiple warheads 
capable of engaging multiple targets.  This can cause significant problems for engaging as missiles would 
be required for each payload.  Use of decoys amongst the actual warheads can cause problems for engaging 
missiles and systems.  The decoys can draw weapons off the actual target and multiple objects whether real 
or decoy will cause a depletion of inventory.  Payloads/warheads are called re-entry vehicles (RV) as they 
are the only portion of the many of the threat missiles to actually reach the target.  They are considerably 
smaller in size and resulting Radar Cross Section (RCS) that the original missile.  The choice of payload 
depends on the political will and objectives of the threat country and their technical ability to develop or to 
purchase.  Any indentations to take over the area being engaged may preclude use of nuclear, chemical or 
biological weapons that would create problems for advancing troops.  Ballistic Missiles can be used to 
cause severe devastation to break the political will and infrastructure of the engaged nation. 
2.2.4. Propulsion.   Ballistic missiles use from a single to triple stage motors.  The motors are 
liquid or solid fuel and in some cases use liquid for first stages and solid for second and follow on stages.  
Choice of fuel depends on the size, and transportation needs of the missile and on range requirements. 
2.2.5. Proliferation of threat.  The threat faced from proliferating and evolving Ballistic Missile 
systems and associated technologies and expertise continues unabated. There were nearly 100 foreign 
ballistic missile launches around the world in 2004. This is nearly double the number conducted in 2003 
and slightly greater than the number of launches in 2002. More than 60 launches last year involved short-
range ballistic missiles, over ten involved medium range missiles, and nearly twenty involved land- and 
sea-based long-range ballistic missiles.70 
2.2.6. Engagement of threat.  The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) mission remains one of developing 
and incrementally fielding a joint, integrated, and multilayered BMD system to defend the United States, 
our deployed forces, and our allies and friends against Ballistic Missiles of all ranges by engaging them in 
the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases of flight. 71   Countering Ballistic Missile threats is a series of 
challenges requiring multiple integrated capabilities.  Detection and tracking sensors are needed to see the 
missile. Computers are needed to calculate the missile’s predicted trajectory and impact point and the 
interceptor’s aim point.  A significant technological challenge is to destroy the warhead.  Intercepting the 
missile may prevent the warhead from reaching its intended target, but it does not necessarily destroy the 
warhead. It will fall somewhere, perhaps near the intended target or in some heavily populated area enroute 
to the target.  The warhead needs to be destroyed.  The best time to destroy a missile is during the boost 
phase when detection is easy, the missile is traveling at relatively slow speeds, and it is therefore most 
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vulnerable.  Attacks in this phase offer the added attraction that the warhead (and the missile) may fall back 
into the shooter’s territory, and therefore, there may be no need to worry about destroying the warhead.  
However, there are operational factors that complicate boost phase engagements.  Because the time line 
between detection and engagement is very short, shooters, armed with very fast interceptors or lasers, must 
be stationed close to the launch location. Geography may not permit this.  Even if geography does allow 
boost phase shooters to get into the right position to attempt the intercept, the sheer closeness of this 
position means that the shooters are subject to interception and attacks themselves.  This creates its own set 
of self-defense problems for the shooter that may interfere with the Ballistic Missile engagement.  
Destroying the warhead in the mid-course phase also has challenges.  The warhead needs to be destroyed 
and the real warhead must be distinguished from dummy warheads, empty stages, inter-stages, and other 
debris.  This challenge is real and remains an issue except in terminal phase engagements when the 
atmosphere separates the real from the dummy warheads and other objects such as chaff, balloons, decoys, 
and makes identification easier.  Over the years, people have suggested various ways to destroy the 
warhead in mid-course.  These have ranged from getting close enough and exploding a large (i.e., nuclear) 
bomb, to throwing destructive debris (pebbles) in the warhead’s path. The U.S. has settled on kinetic hit-to-
kill technology (hitting a bullet with a bullet), which is now being built into U.S. systems.  Destroying the 
warhead in the terminal phase presents its own set of technological challenges.  As the warhead reenters the 
atmosphere it is affected by atmospheric friction, which may cause the warhead to twist and turn erratically 
at the most critical time of engagement (the end game).  This complicates intercepts within this phase. This 
lack of predictability requires the interceptor to be highly maneuverable, to make rapid responses within the 
final seconds or milliseconds of the intercept, when both it and the warhead are moving at very high 
speeds.  
2.2 Anti Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs).  ASCMs have also been proliferated over the last few 
decades and can be launched from land, surface or subsurface vessels.  Key characteristics of these 
weapons include their terminal speed and maneuver capabilities, RCSs, operating altitudes, payloads, 
seeker characteristics, and raid size when employed.  Generally these weapons rely on stealth by flying low 
to avoid radar detection, having low RCS, using terminal maneuvers, speed, using passive seekers, or other 
techniques to avoid detection and potential for either hard or soft kill. These threats may be examined in 
further detail in future Technotes but are not the focus of this paper.      
2.3 Aircraft.  Aircraft generally pose a missile threat by launching ASCMs but can also be threats 
to ships as suicide attack or employ jamming, guns or other weapons that could harm a ship or friendly 
forces.  They could also employ sensors that would provide unfriendly forces information about the 
location and operational status of naval forces.  Attack aircraft could also employ stealth technology.  The 
reduced RCSs that stealth technology gives could potentially be countered by the DARBC as the use of the 
VHF/UHF frequency bands would provide an enhanced ability to detect these targets over radars of other 
frequency bands.  These threats may also be examined in further detail in future Technotes but are not the 
focus of this paper.   
2.4 Surface Threats.  Surface craft may launch missiles, or fire guns and Rocket Propelled 
Grenades (RPGs) to counter a ship.  Suicide attacks are also possible.  Navy ships are employing signature 
control techniques just as is the U.S navy to keep RCS and other signatures minimized.  Small commercial 
craft by the nature of their design can produce small signatures and can be quite stealthy especially in sea 
states that create clutter and swells.  Submarines while not surface threats do break the surface to obtain 
visual information or communications from periscopes.  The submarine threat is so vital that periscope 
detection is a valued capability for any sensor.  Surface threats will not be addressed in this paper nor are 
likely to be examined in future Technotes.   
3. The Current System or Situation.  BMD relies on a complex layered structure supported by 
all military services and involves some allied components.  The system consists of a network of sensors, 
weapons and Battle Management C2.  Sensors are a key element for detection, reporting, tracking and 
updating C2 for engagement systems.  The short reaction timelines required to counter the threat depend on 
extremely accurate and timely information.  In threat situations where launch locations can occur over large 
expanses of land or ocean, Navy assets will be limited in total area covered by current assets.  Launches 
that occur deep inside a states’ territory require Navy ships to get as close as possible to shorelines to 
provide deeper surveillance coverage, creating greater vulnerability to attack.  AEGIS ships configured 
with SPY-1 radar must balance search for Ballistic Missile launch with surveillance around the ship for air 
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defense.  Off loading BMD functions to another sensor would improve AEGIS time budget and coverage 
for Air Defense (AD) functions.   Defense support system satellites provide spaced based surveillance and 
early warning detection of launch in IR and visible spectrums.  These sensors provide track though mid-
course flight and intercept.  
Existing systems consist of the following: 
• Ground-Based Interceptors located at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California and Ft. Greely, 
Alaska 
• Upgraded Cobra Dane radar (Alaska) 
• Upgraded Flyingdales radar (United Kingdom) 
• Upgraded Beale radar (California) 
• Sea-Based X-band radar (Alaska) 
• Forward-Based X-band radar 
• Aegis Long-Range Surveillance and Track Destroyers 
• Aegis Engagement Cruisers 
• Standard Missile-3 sea-based missiles 
• Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missiles 
• Battle Management Command, Control and Communications 
 
3.1 Background, Objectives, & Scope.  Per the reference (d) SOW, NPS has been discussing 
with MDA a United States Navy (USN) requirement for a very long range shipboard radar to support BMD 
surveillance, tracking, and discrimination functions.  NPS has been working on a radar concept that could 
use the ships structure to support distributed antenna elements for a very large array antenna in UHF or 
VHF bands.  NPS has included a team from the MSSE program at NSWC PHD, COHORT # 4 to 
participate in the project by developing, defining and documenting operational requirements.  This 
CONOPS will attempt to describe operational requirements to meet the global objects of MDA.  The NPS 
studies have also provided a good deal of potential additional capabilities that the VHF/UHF radar could 
support in addition to those described by the MDA.    These capabilities cover additional threats beyond 
BMD and functions of the system for communications. 
3.2 Operational Policies & Constraints.  Current USN assets while quite capable are limited in 
numbers and sensor range.  By the end of 2005 a total of 10 AEGIS DDGs and 2 CGs have BMD sense, 
track engage capability.  Engage capability is limited by available SM-3 assets which are increasing in 
inventory.  Deployment and positioning of ships must consider political situations and tensions as well as 
attack capabilities of our potential enemies.  Increasing the search volume by extending range can help 
provide greater flexibility for coverage without violating international waters.   The potential for sea-based 
threats either from submarines or mobile launchers placed on commercial ships increases threat launch 
areas and opportunities.  Ground based sensors and ground based interceptors are limited in locations 
where they can achieve detections of Ballistic Missiles during early launch phases and engagements during 
boost phases.  This means that engagements can only be accomplished during midcourse or terminal phases 
of flight where threat speeds are higher, RCS of the RV is low and multiple objects (RVs and decoys) may 
be present. 
3.3 Description.  The existing BMD system components consist of sensors, weapons and an 
integrated Joint Battle Management C2. 
3.3.1 Sensors.  BMD sensors are comprised of: 
Existing Defense Support System Satellites – These can detect launches and provide tracking 
which leads to cueing to other sensors for engagement. 
Upgrades to existing early warning radars at Beal Air Force Base in California, Shemya Alaska, 
and Flyingdales United Kingdom   
Aegis Cruisers and Destroyers using the SPY-1 radar 
Sea-based Terminal operating from Adak Alaska 
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Mobile operating station – Several of these systems are fixed sites that cannot provide early 
detection and tracking from launches on the Pacific Rim.  The mobile terminal will be limited to land based 
locations that may be masked by range or terrain features.   
The Aegis SPY-1 equipped ships are flexible in location but are limited in maximum search range 
by capabilities of the SPY-1.  SPY resources must also be managed between search for ballistic missiles 
and search and track of other air and surface threats.  The Sea based terminal is somewhat flexible for 
repositioning as a mobile platform but is not likely to be deployed in harms way.  If it is not moved 
significantly from it’s location of Adak Alaska, it will have similar constraints to that of the Shemya Alaska 
site. 
3.3.2. Weapons.  Missiles used for BMD are: 
STANDARD Missile 3 (SM-3), which is capable against short and medium range threats in 
terminal and midcourse engagements.    
Ground based mid course defense missiles which are capable against intermediate and long range 
missiles. 
Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) which is capable against short range missile and terminal 
defense missions. 
A Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) is in development and will be a future capability.  A USN 
mobile interceptor is planned for integration in ships and possibly submarines.  This weapon will provide 
engagement capability during boost and ascent phases.  Providing sensor capabilities commensurate with 
the capabilities of this weapon will be necessary. 
 
 
4. Justification for and Nature of Proposed Changes & New Features 
4.1 Justification.  The Ballistic Missile threat is proliferating in numbers, capabilities and 
potential for U.S. homeland defense from sea based firings from submarines and surface ships, potentially 
even commercial vessels.  Current BMD capabilities lack forward based long range detection and tracking 
capabilities to assist in supporting mid-course engagements from ground based interceptors.  Forward 
based long range sensors would help provide early waning and confirmation of launch from existing 
satellite systems.  Current ship based sensors lack range capability for detection and track to support future 
ship based KEIs.  These weapons would provide mobile boost and ascent phase engagements that would 
dramatically increase defended area and keep WMD payloads from leaving their country of origin.  Future 
high energy weapons will provide even greater capability for engagements in boost and ascent phase, 
increasing need for long range sensor.  Potential for sea-based launches of Ballistic Missiles increases need 
for ocean based surveillance.  Long-range surveillance capability reduces quantity of assets required to 
cover sea based launches.  Engagements with KEI missile or high-energy lasers would also help support 
engaging these threats.  Long range sensors can support platforms close to enemy shores to improve boost 
phase engagements, but operating in Emissions Control (EMCON) to avoid detection.  
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5. Concepts of Operations for the New or Modified Proposed System 
5.1 Background, Objectives & Scope.  The objective of the DARCB is to be the major sea-based 
sensor for surveillance and tracking of Ballistic Missiles from launch through midcourse.  The radar will be 
integrated with the overall BMD framework.  The description of this framework and its capabilities are not 
in the scope of this paper or the capstone project.  As capabilities of individual elements of this system and 
the overall BMD system are generally classified and are evolving it is not sensible to make determinations 
on individual capabilities.  Rather assumptions will be made and sensitivity analysis about the assumptions 
will be used to address needs. 
5.2 Description of Proposed System.  The DARCB will be a ship-based radar with sufficient 
power, aparture and frequency (Operation at 216-225 MHz and 420-450 MHz) to provide long range 
search, detection and track of Ballistic Missiles from great distances.  The ship will likely be a combatant 
equipped with a weapon of sufficient range and capability to provide boost and mid-course phase 
engagements of SRBM, MRBMs, IRBMs, SLBMs, and ICBMs. Standard radar design requirements, 
including frequency, bandwidth, peak and average power, aperture, beam width, main-lobe and side-lobe 
gains, scan coverage, pulse recurrence frequency (PRF), pulse width (PW), inter- and intra-pulse 
modulation, coherent and non-coherent processing gain, range / Doppler / angular resolution and accuracy, 
etc will be investigated.  Capabilities for the radar are documented in other technotes under development by 
Team R. 
5.3 Modes of Operation.   
5.3.1 Volume Search. 360 degrees to elevation angle of 90 deg and a range of 2000 km.  The 
radar will be able to continue volume search even while providing other search and track functions.  
Limitations may result in volume searched as function of time. 
5.3.2 Horizon Search.  Primary search mode of radar looking for Ballistic Missile launches 
during boost phase.  Horizon search can be sectored when a threat is coming from a know location or 
direction.   
5.3.3 Search on a Cue by satellite.  Radar can search based on a cue from source such as satellite 
or other radar.  Search scan will be dependant on the originating sensors known capabilities and limitations, 
time latency, and potential trajectories.  
5.4.4 Fence Search.  Fence search may be the primary mode used for detection of ballistic 
missiles during boost phase.  In fence search a picket or constant scan is established across some sector 
such that any ballistic missiles launched that pass through this fence will be detected.  The size and number 
of sectors will need to be managed to optimize use of radar resources.  Fence search can be thought of as a 
from of horizon search.  When threat locations are known, the fences can be set up to cover only potential 
threat locations.  This requires reception of this particular intelligence data.  
 
5.3.4 Tracking.  DARCB  
5.3.4.1 Active Monostatic tracking.  Tracking of ballistic missiles will be required with sufficient 
accuracy in position and time to allow designation to other sensors.  These sensors are assumed to be on the 
same ship and off the ship as part of the overall Ballistic Missile Defense system.  The small RCS and high 
rate of speed of these targets will require some degree of accuracy.  Tracking to support fire control in 
support of a missile engagement requires much tighter accuracy than cueing.  Capability of DARBC to 
support this level of accuracy is questionable and may require new techniques in radar beam control and 
missile technology for sensors that can operate across a larger volume than exists today.  
5.3.4.2 Passive Bi-static tracking.  This includes operations for both the active emitter ship or 
location and passive tracking platform.  
5.4 Capabilities.  Radar will support exo-atmospheric functions.  Functions are assumed to be 
search, track, discrimination, and handover of Ballistic Missile or its RV. 
• Handover is assumed as a minimum to be to SPY radar as an additional organic shipboard sensor.  
Handover is not limited to SPY and not limited to same ship.  Handover or other sensor cuing could 
also be done through a Joint communication system such as ForceNet which would take the role of 
sending the cue to other sensors or weapon systems.   
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• The DARBC Antenna may be able to support communications.  An example could be a data link to 
another ship, UAV or other unmanned vehicle. 
• Antenna may be able to support Electronic Warfare (EW) functions such as electronic attack. 
5.5 Changes/Features Considered but Not Included.  Operational requirements for a new ship 
based sensor are many as sea and air threats continue to evolve and improve.  Requirements for missions 
outside of BMD are not considered in this paper.   
5.6 User Classes 
5.6.1 Organization Structures.  DARCB will be installed in USN combatants with BMD 
missions.  Operators maintainers of the radar will be Navy enlisted.  Ships will have minimal manning so 
that radar maintenance and reliability requirements need to minimize labor for support.  The radar will be 
very complicated and will require automated features for set up, calibration, maintenance and trouble 
shooting, fault isolation and diagnosis.  Distance support features that allow off ship experts to support and 
analyze problems will be utilized.      
5.6.2 Profiles of User Classes.  It is assumed that these ships will have additional sensor(s) for 
tracking and fire control during engagements.  Interoperability with other BMD sensors for engagements is 
also assumed.  The DARCB will support cueing of other sensors including all existing sensors.  
5.6.3 Interactions among User Classes.   
6. Proposed Operational Scenarios 
6.1 Forward Deployed DARCB detects SRBM/MRBM/IRBM/ICBM and cues an engagement 
with KEI round during ascent phase from the same platform. 
6.1.1 Forward Deployed DARCB detects MRBM/IRBM/ICBM and cues an engagement with KEI 
round during Midcourse phase from the same platform. 
6.1.2 Forward Deployed DARCB receives cue from Satellite for detection of 
SRBM/MRBM/IRBM/ICBM and cues an engagement with KEI round during ascent phase from the same 
platform. 
6.2 Forward Deployed DARCB detects SRBM/MRBM and cues an engagement with SM-3 round 
during midcourse or terminal phase from the same platform. 
6.3 Forward Deployed DARCB detects SRBM/MRBM and forwards track information to Aegis 
platform that engages with SM-3 round during midcourse or terminal phase. 
6.4 Forward Deployed DARCB detects ICBM and forwards track information to Aegis/SM-3 
platform, PAC-3, or ground based interceptor that engages in terminal phase or ground based interceptor 
that engages in midcourse phase. 
6.5 Homeland defense deployed DARCB detects SRBM/MRBM or SLBM and engages with KEI 
round during boost phase or forwards track information for engagement during terminal phase. 
7. Summary of Impacts 
7.1 Operational Impacts.  The DARCB provides early detection of all types of Ballistic Missiles 
in boost or ascent phases.  This will allow engagements by existing and future sea-based weapons during 
boost/ascent phase where this would not be feasible today.  The radar provides a large volume search area 
reducing numbers of Aegis based systems to support launch surveillance only.  This supports homeland 
defense scenarios against sea-based launches from ships or submarines.  This also supports forward 
deployed scenarios where this sensor can cue Aegis ships positioned to provide defended area coverage but 
not positioned well for surveillance and early initial track establishment for maximum time reaction. 
III. CONCLUSION 
This section is not applicable to the CONOPS for this Technote. 
Attachment 1: Threat Description Details 
The information below was extracted from the following two web sites. 
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Reference: http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/bcmt/bcmt.html 
National Air Intelligence Center 








Ballistic Missile Category Maximum Range 
Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) <1,000 km (621 mi) 
Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) 1,000-3,000 km (621-1,864 mi) 
Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) 3,000-5,500 km (1,864 - 3,418 mi) 
Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) >5,500 km (3,418 mi) 













Missiles Producer Propellant Deployment Mode Maximum Range(miles) 
SCUD B (SS-1c Mod 1) Russia Liquid Road-mobile 185 
SS-1c Mod 2  Russia  Liquid Road-mobile  150+ 
SS-21 Mod 2 Russia  Solid Road-mobile  43 
SS-21 Mod 3 Russia Solid Road-mobile 75 
SS-23 Russia* Solid Road-mobile 185+ 
SS-X-26 Russia Solid Road-mobile 185+ 
Iskander-E Russia Solid Road-mobile 170+ 
CSS-6 China Solid Road-mobile 370 
CSS-7 China Solid Road-mobile 185 
CSS-8 China First stage: solid  Second stage: liquid Road-mobile 93 
SCUD B North Korea Liquid Road-mobile 185 
SCUD C North Korea Liquid Road-mobile 310 
Prithvi I India Liquid Road-mobile 93 
Prithvi II India Liquid Road-mobile 155 
Dhanush India Liquid Ship-based 155 
Hatf-1 Pakistan Solid Road-mobile 50 
Shaheen Pakistan Solid Road-mobile 280+ 
Vector ** Egypt Solid Road-mobile 425+ 
Al Hussein Iraq Liquid Road-mobile 350+ 
Al Samoud Iraq Liquid Road-mobile 90+ 
 
SRBM Order of Battle---Selected Countries 
Country Missile System No. of Launchers* Country Missile System No. of Launchers* 
Afghanistan SCUD B Fewer than 50 North Korea SCUD B Fewer than 50 
Belarus SCUD B Fewer than 50   SCUD C Fewer than 50 
  SS-21 Fewer than 100 Pakistan Hatf-1 Undetermined 
Bulgaria SCUD B Fewer than 50   CSS-7 (M-11) Fewer than 50 
  SS-23 Fewer than 50   Shaheen Not yet deployed 
China CSS-6 Fewer than 50 Russia** SS-1c Mod 2 Undetermined 
  CSS-7 Not yet deployed   SS-21 More than 200 
Egypt SCUD B Fewer than 50   SS-X-26 Not yet deployed 
  Vector Not yet deployed Slovakia SS-21 Fewer than 50 
India Prithvi Fewer than 50   SS-23 Fewer than 50 
Iran CSS-8 Fewer than 50 Syria SCUD B Fewer than 50 
  SCUD B Fewer than 50   SCUD C Fewer than 50 
  SCUD C Fewer than 50   SS-21 Fewer than 50 
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Country Missile System No. of Launchers* Country Missile System No. of Launchers* 
Iraq Al Hussein Undetermined Turkmenistan SCUD B Fewer than 50 
  Al Samoud Not yet deployed Ukraine SCUD B Fewer than 100 
Kazakhstan SCUD B Fewer than 50   SS-21 Fewer than 100 
  SS-21 Fewer than 50 Vietnam SCUD B Fewer than 50 
Libya SCUD B Fewer than 100 Yemen SCUD B Fewer than 50 





Missiles Country No. of Stages Propellant Deployment Mode Maximum Range (miles) No. of Launchers* 
CSS-2 China 1 Liquid Transportable  (limited mobility) 1,750 Fewer than 50 
CSS-2** Saudi Arabia 
(Chinese- 
produced) 
1 Liquid Transportable  
(limited mobility) 
1,500+ Fewer than 50 
CSS-5 Mod 1 China 2 Solid Road-mobile 1,100+ Fewer than 50 
CSS-5 Mod 2 China 2 Solid Road-mobile 1,100+ Fewer than 50 
No Dong North Korea 1 Liquid Road-mobile 800 Fewer than 50 
Taepo Dong 1*** North Korea 2 Liquid Undetermined 1,250+ Not yet deployed 
Agni II India 2 Solid Mobile 1,250+ Not yet deployed 
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Missiles Country No. of Stages Propellant Deployment Mode Maximum Range (miles) No. of Launchers* 
New IRBM**** India 2 Solid Mobile 2,000+ Not yet deployed 
Ghauri Pakistan 1 Liquid Road-mobile 800 Not yet deployed 
Shaheen II Pakistan 2 Solid Road-mobile 1,250+ Not yet deployed 
New MRBM**** Pakistan Undetermined Undetermined Undetermined 1,500+ Not yet deployed 
Shahab 3 Iran 1 Liquid Road-mobile 800 Not yet deployed 
Shahab 4**** Iran Undetermined Liquid Undetermined 1,200+ Not yet deployed 














Range* (miles) No. of Launchers 
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Range* (miles) No. of Launchers 
SS-18 Mod 4 Russia 2 + PBV 10 Liquid Silo 5,500+ 
SS-18 Mod 5 Russia 2 + PBV 10 Liquid Silo 6,000+ 180 (total for Mods 4 and 5) 
SS-19 Mod 3 Russia 2 + PBV 6 Liquid Silo 5,500+ 150 
SS-24 Mod 1 Russia 3 + PBV 10 Solid Rail-mobile 5,500+ 36 
SS-24 Mod 2** Russia 3 + PBV 10 Solid Silo 5,500+ 10 
SS-25 Russia 3 + PBV 1 Solid Road-mobile 7,000+ 360 
SS-27 Russia 3 + PBV 1 Solid Silo and road-mobile 7,000+ 20 
New ICBM*** Russia Undetermined Undetermined Solid Silo and/or mobile 5,500+ Not yet deployed 
CSS-3 China 2 1 Liquid Silo and transportable 3,400+ Fewer than 25 
CSS-4 Mod 1 China 2 1 Liquid Silo 8,000+ 
CSS-4 Mod 2 China 2 1 Liquid Silo 8,000+ 
About 20  (total for Mods 1 
and 2)  
DF-31 China 3 1 Solid Road-mobile 4,500+ Not yet deployed 
New ICBM*** China 3 1 Solid Mobile 7,000+ Not yet deployed 






Missiles Country No. of Stages Warheads per Missile Booster Propellant Submarine Class
Maximum Range 
(miles) 
Total No. of Launch 
Tubes 
SS-N-8 Russia 2 1 Liquid DELTA I 5,000+ 48 
SS-N-18 Russia 2 + PBV 3 Liquid DELTA III 3,500+ 176 
SS-N-20 Russia 3 + PBV 10 Solid TYPHOON 5,500+ 120 
SS-N-23 Russia 3 + PBV 4 Liquid DELTA IV 5,000+ 112 
Bulava-30* Russia Undetermined Undetermined Solid DOLGORUKIY 5,000+ Not yet deployed 
CSS-NX-3 China 2 1 Solid XIA 1,000+ 12; not yet deployed 
JL-2* China 3 1 Solid Type 094 4,500+ Not yet deployed 
Sagarika* India Undetermined Undetermined Undetermined Undetermined 180+ Not yet deployed 
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Attachment 2:  OV-1 





Long range ICBM, IRBM MRBM 
launch detection and track
SRBM, MRBM launch detect/track/
engage on ascent
Area defense








(a)  Office of Naval Research (ONR) One Page Aperstructures Slide, undated 
(b)  Solitario, Bill, Northrop Grumman Ship Systems Integrated Topside 
Demonstration System presentation, undated 
(c) Congressional Budget Office, Alternative for Boost-Phase Missile Design, 
July 2004  






DARBC-TN-02 RADAR CROSS SECTION 
Document Document 
Technical Note DARBC-TN-02 
Program: Classification: 
DARBC   Unclassified 
TITLE:  Digital Array Radar for BMD and Counter-Stealth 
(DARBC) Radar Cross Section Model 
 
PROBLEM STATEMENT: 
Determining target RCS data from model simulations is a critical starting point for 
radar system range and power calculations.  This technical note deals with the Radar Cross 
Section (RCS) parameter of the radar range equation for the detection of ballistic missiles.  
This technical note provides calculations used to model a notional ballistic missile RCS.  
Conditions are described that should be taken into consideration when determining DARBC 
system requirements such as radar position relative to the target, target angular orientation to 
the radar system, target geometry, radar frequency or wavelength, radar frequency 
polarization, glint, and RCS scintillation statistical models. 
Expected Outputs of study: 
RCS model in excel 
RCS data based on a defined assumption set 
RCS Model in Matlab 
  171
Prepared by: Original Date: Comments: 
Mark Mihocka 31 August 2006 Last revision submitted 
Reviewed by: Date:  
Carla Bacchus   
Reviewed by: Date:  
Jack Chung 1 Sept 2006 Final Addendum to last revision submitted 
Reviewed by: Date:  
Ian Barford   
Reviewed by: Date:  
David Bedford   
Reviewed by: Date:  
Paul Dailey 1 September, 2006 Final submission of technote 
Reviewed by: Date:  
Robert Hazle  Checked problem statement 
Reviewed by: Date:  
Stan Hill   
Approved by: Date:  
Professor Green   
I. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this technical note is to propose a model to approximate the Radar 
Cross Section (RCS) of a notional ballistic missile threat.  The following section will 
provide some discussion and theory involved with modeling RCSs.  Finally, the model 
will be described and used to estimate the RCS of a ballistic missile threat to be used in 
the Radar Technical Parameters research for the Digital Array Radar for Ballistic Missile 





Electromagnetic waves with any specified polarization are normally diffracted or 
scattered in all directions when incident on a target.72  Scattered waves are broken down 
into two parts, those waves with the same polarization as the receiving and antenna and 
those with different polarization as the receiving antenna, which the antenna does not 
respond.  The two parts are orthogonal to each other and referred to as Principal 
Polarization (PP) and Orthogonal Polarization (OP).  The intensity of the backscattered 




When a target is illuminated by RF energy it acts like an antenna and has near and far 
fields.  In general, waves reflected and measured in the near field are spherical.  In the far 
field the wave fronts are decomposed into a linear combination of plane waves.73 
 
Assume the power density of a wave incident on a target located at a range R away from 
the radar is DP .  The amount of reflected power from the target can be shown as follows. 
 
  rP = iDPσ        (Equation 1) 
 




P  as the power density of the scattered waves at the receiving antenna.  The 




P = 24 R
Pr
π        (Equation 2) 
 
Combining the equations 
 









       (Equation 4) 










R 24π       (Equation 5) 
 
In order to ensure the receiving antenna is in the far field (i.e. the scattered waves 
received by the antenna are planar) write the equation as 
 











R lim4 2π      (Equation 6) 
 
This is the defining equation for monostatic RCS, backscattered RCS or what is simply 
known as target RCS.75 
 
Backscattered RCS is measured from all waves scattered in the direction of the radar and 
has the same polarization as the receiving antenna.  Backscattered RCS represents a 
portion of the total scattered RCS tσ , shown as follows, 
 
  σσ >t        (Equation 7) 
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Assuming a spherical coordinate system defined by ( )ϕθρ ,,  then at range ρ  the target 
scattered cross section is a function of ( )ϕθ , .  Let the angles ( )ii ϕθ ,  define the direction 
of propagation of the incident waves.  Let the angles ( )ss ϕθ ,  define the direction of 
propagation of the scattered waves.  Monostatic RCS is defined as the special case when 
is θθ =  and is ϕϕ = . 
 
The bistatic RCS is the RCS measured by the radar at angles is θθ ≠  and is ϕϕ ≠ .76  The 
total target scattered RCS is given by the equation 
 







sssst dd    (Equation 8) 
 
The amount of backscattered waves from a target is proportional to the ratio of the target 
extent (size) to the wavelength, λ , of the incident waves. 
 




c=λ         (Equation 10) 
 
where c  represents the speed of light, f  represents frequency and λ  represents 
wavelength 
 
A radar will not be able to detect targets much smaller than its operating wavelength. 
 
The frequency region where the target extent and the wavelength are comparable is 
referred to as the Rayleigh region.  The frequency region where the target extent is much 
larger than the radar operating wavelength is referred to as the optic region.  Typically, 
the majority of radar applications fall within the optical region. 
 
The analysis presented here assumes far field monostatic RCS measurements in the optic 
region. The RCS analysis presented here is mainly concerned with narrow band cases 
(i.e. extent of the target under consideration falls within a single range bin of the radar). 
 
RCS DEPENDENCY ON ASPECT ANGLE AND FREQUENCY 
 
RCS fluctuates as a function of radar aspect angle and frequency.  For this analysis, 
isotropic scatterers shall be considered (i.e. ones that scatter incident waves equally in all 
directions).  For example, consider the geometry in the following figure.  Consider two 
unity (i.e. one square meter) isotropic scatterers with spacing of one meter are aligned 






Figure 1.  RCS Dependency on Aspect Angle 77 
 
To compute the composite RCS of the two scatterers measured by the radar as the aspect 
angle is changed from 0 to 180 degrees the following analysis is used.  The composite 
RCS consists of the superposition of the two individual RCSs.  The composite RCS is 
dependent upon the phase that corresponds to the electrical spacing between the two 
scatterers.  For a zero degree aspect angle, the composite RCS is two square meters. 
 
If the scatterer (scat1) closest to the radar in the previous figure is the phase reference, 
when the aspect angle is varied, the composite RCS changes by the phase corresponding 
to the electrical spacing between the two scatterers.  The electrical spacing between the 
two scatterers can be represented by the following equation.78 
 
  ( )λ
θcos2 ×× d        (Equation 11) 
 
  d  is the physical distance between scatterers in meters 
  θ  is the aspect angle in degrees 
  λ  is the radar operating wavelength 
 
RCS is dependent on radar aspect angle; thus, knowledge of the constructive and 
destructive interference between the individual scatterers can be very critical when a 
radar tries to extract the RCS of maneuvering targets.79  RCS is dependent on the radar 
aspect angle for two reasons:  (1) the aspect angle may be continuously changing and (2) 
complex target RCS can be viewed to be made up from contributions of many individual 
scattering points (often referred to as scattering centers) distributed on the target surface. 
 
Many approximate RCS prediction methods generate a set of scattering centers that 
define the backscattering characteristics of such complex targets.  Small frequency 
changes can cause large RCS fluctuations when the scatterer spacing is large.  More 
variation in frequency is required to produce significant RCS fluctuation when scattering 
centers are relatively close. 
 
RCS DEPENDENCY ON POLARIZATION 
 
In most radar simulations it is desirable to obtain the complex-valued electric field 
scattered by the target at the radar.  In such cases it is useful to use a quantity called the 
normalized electric field.  Assume the incident electric field has a magnitude of unity and 
the phase of the field is centered at a point at the target, typically, the center of gravity.80 
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eE        (Equation 12) 
 
where   
→
ir  is the direction of incidence with respect to the phase center  
  
→
r  is a location at the target with respect to the phase center   
 
The normalized scattered field is given by the following equation. 
 
is EE σ=        (Equation 13) 
 
The quantity sE  is independent of radar and target location.  It may be combined with an 




The x and y electric field components for a wave traveling along the positive z direction 
are given by the following equations. 
 
  )sin(1 kztEEx −= ω       (Equation 14) 
 
  )sin(2 δω +−= kztEEy      (Equation 15) 
 
where  λπ /2=k  
  =ω wave frequency 
  =δ time phase angle at which yE  leads xE  
 =1E wave amplitude in x-direction 
=2E wave amplitude in y-direction 
                                                                                                                                                                 
When two or more electromagnetic waves combine, their electric fields are integrated 
vectorially at each point in space for any specified time.  In general the combined vector 






Figure 2.  Ellipse Traced by Combined Vector83 
 
The ratio of the major to the minor axes of the polarization ellipse is called the axial ratio 
(abbreviated as AR).  When the AR is unity, the polarization ellipse becomes a circle and 
the corresponding wave is referred to as circularly polarized.  When the wave amplitude 
along the x-direction is zero and AR approaches infinity (i.e. very large) the wave is 
referred to as linearly polarized. 
 
Combining the two previous equations gives the instantaneous total electric field. 
 
  yx EEE +=
→
       (Equation 16) 
 
  )sin(ˆ)sin(ˆ 21 δωω +−+−= kztEakztEa yx    (Equation 17) 
 
where  =xaˆ  unit vector in the x-direction 
  =yaˆ  unit vector in the y-direction 
 
at z = 0 )sin(1 tEEx ω=       (Equation 18) 
  )sin(2 δω += tEEy       (Equation 19) 
 
Substituting )sin( tω  with the ratio 
1E
Ex  and using trigonometric properties, the equation 
becomes the following. 
 
  yx EEE +=
r
       (Equation 20) 
  )sin(21 δω ++= tEE      (Equation 21) 
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EEE x ++=    (Equation 24) 














E yyxx     (Equation 25) 
 
For z=0, observe that the above equation for the instantaneous total electric field is 




Figure 3.  A General Case of the Polarization Ellipse84 
 
The previous figure illustrates the most general case of the polarization ellipse.  The tilt 
angle of the ellipse is defined as angle ξ .  The tilt angle is the angle between the major 
axis of the polarization ellipse and the positive x-axis. 
 
When 01 =E , the wave is said to be linearly polarized in the y-direction (more 
commonly known as vertical polarization).  When 02 =E , the wave is said to be linearly 
polarized in the x-direction (more commonly known as horizontal polarization).  Linear 
polarization also occurs at a tilt angle )(ξ  of 45°, when 21 EE = .  When 21 EE =  and the 
tilt angle equals 90°, the wave is said to be left circularly polarized (LCP).  When 
21 EE =  and the tilt angle equals negative 90°, the wave is said to be right circularly 
polarized (RCP).   
 
In general, an arbitrarily polarized electric field may be written as the sum of two 
circularly polarized fields.  For an arbitrarily polarized electric field, 
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  LR EEE
rrr +=        (Equation 26) 
 
where   RE
r
 is the RCP field and 
LE
r
 is the LCP field. 
 
The RCP field can be written as 
 
  HVR EjEE
rrr +=       (Equation 27) 
 
and the LCP field can be written as 
 
  HVL EjEE






 are the fields with vertical and horizontal polarizations, respectively. 
 












jEEE −=       (Equation 30) 
 
Using matrix notation the RCP and LCP fields and the vertical and horizontal 
polarization fields can be written as follows. 
 



























1     (Equation 31) 
 
























1    (Equation 32) 
 [ ]T  is the transformation matrix 
 
For many targets the scattered waves will have different polarization than the incident 
waves.  This phenomenon is known as depolarization or cross-polarization.  Perfect 
reflectors reflect waves in such a way that an incident wave with horizontal polarization 
remains horizontal and an incident wave with vertical polarization remains vertical but 
are phase shifted 180°.  An incident wave that is RCP becomes LCP when reflected and a 
wave that is LCP becomes RCP after reflection from a perfect reflector.  When a radar 
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transmits LCP waves the receiving antenna needs to be RCP in order to receive the 
principal polarization (PP) RCS and LCP to receive the orthogonal polarization (OP). 
 
RCS OF SIMPLE OBJECTS 
 
Electromagnetic wave scattering from simple objects has historically received a great 
amount of attention as analytical expressions since the scattered fields can often be 
derived.  The RCS of complex targets can be computed in many cases by using the RCS 
of simple shapes.  The most common procedure is to break the target into component 
parts and to combine them vectorially.85 
 
The study of simple objects is of great value as they tend to provide insight into the 
important scattering mechanisms inherent to wave interactions with real world objects.  
The expressions presented in this analysis represent an approximation to the radar cross 
section of the object when it is large compared to the wavelength, known as the "high 
frequency" or "optical" scattering regime.  These expressions are derived from analytical 
expressions using asymptotic limits for wavelength or empirical fits to simplify their 
evaluation.86  Computational methods can also be used in the "low frequency" or 
"resonance" regime to calculate the RCS. 
 
The perfectly conducting sphere is considered as the simplest target to examine.  For this 
case, the complexity of the exact solution is overwhelming when compared to the optical 
region approximation.87  The formulas used in this analysis are typically physical optics 
(PO) approximations for the backscattered RCS measured by a far field radar in the 
direction ( )ϕθ , as illustrated in the following figure. For the formulas used in this 
analysis, the radar is illuminating an object from the positive z-direction.88 
 
 





Circular Flat Plate 
 
Since the plate has circular symmetry the backscattered RCS has no dependency on ϕ , 
see the following figure.90  The circular flat plate backscattered RCS is only aspect angle 
)(θ  dependent.  For normal incidence (i.e. 0=θ ), the backscattered RCS for a circular 









Figure 5.  Circular Flat Plate91 
 
For normal incidence, the backscattered RCS for any linearly polarized incident waves 
can be approximated by either of the following equations.92 
 
  2))(tan(sin8 θθπ
λσ r=       (Equation 34) 
 





krJrk=     (Equation 35) 
 
where  λ
π2=k  and 
  )(1 βJ  is the first order spherical Bessel function evaluated at β  
 
Rectangular Flat Plate 
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Figure 6.  Rectangular Flat Plate 
 
The two sides are denoted by 2a and 2b.94 For a linearly polarized incident wave in the x-
z plane, the horizontal and vertical backscattered RCS are, respectively, given by95 
 
  ( ) 215432212 4cos
1 −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++−= VVVVVVV b σσσσθσσπσ   (Equation 36) 
 
  ( ) 215432212 4cos
1 −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−−= HHHHHHH b σσσσθσσπσ  (Equation 37) 
where   λπ2=k   
 
















=       (Equation 39) 
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e      (Equation 40) 
 



































































−=       (Equation 46) 
 
Equations 36 and 37 are valid and quite accurate for aspect angles .800 oo ≤≤θ 96 For 
aspect angles near o90 , empirical expressions for the RCS are given by the following 
equations97 
 
  0→Hσ        (Equation 47) 
 








































V  (Equation 48) 
 
The backscattered RCS for a perfectly conducting thin rectangular plate for incident 
waves at any ϕθ ,  can be approximated by98 
 




















akba  (Equation 49) 
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Equation 49 is independent of the polarization, and is only valid for aspect angles 
o20≤θ .99 
The equation used for Tables 4 and 5 below is as follows and gives a maximum 
approximation of the maximum backscatter RCS of a perfectly conducting thin 









The normal and non-normal incidence backscattered RCS due to a linearly polarized 



















Typically there is relative motion between the radar and observed target.  This implies the 
observed RCS measured by the radar fluctuates over time as a function of frequency and 
target aspect angle.  This observed RCS is referred to as the dynamic cross section or 
dynamic RCS.101 
 
The dynamic RCS may fluctuate in amplitude or phase or both simultaneously.  Phase 
fluctuation is called glint.  Amplitude fluctuation is called scintillation.102  Glint causes 
the target far field backscattered waveforms to be non-planar.  Glint affects radar 
performance in applications where high precision and accuracy are required due to 
introduction of linear errors in radar measurements.  These applications include missile 
seekers, precision instrumentation tracking systems and automated aircraft landing 
systems.103  RCS scintillation variations are dependent on target size, shape, dynamics 
and relative motion to the radar antenna.  Due to the variety of sources of RCS 
scintillation, RCS changes are modeled statistically as random processes.104 
 
RCS SCINTILLATION STATISTICAL MODELS 
 
The most commonly used RCS scintillation statistical models are the chi-square and 




The chi-square distribution of degree 2 is applicable to a number of targets.  The 
probability density function (pdf) is given by the following equation.  As the degree 
becomes larger the distribution corresponds to a smaller range of values (i.e. approaches 






















)(  for 0≥σ   (Equation 53) 
 
where  =Γ )(m gamma function with argument m  
  =avσ RCS overall target fluctuation 
 
Swerling I and II 
 
Swerling I and II fluctuations correspond to a chi-square of degree 2 distribution.  
Swerling I RCS samples are correlated throughout an entire scan but uncorrelated scan to 
scan.  Swerling I is a characteristic of slowly fluctuating RCS samples.  Swerling II 
fluctuations are faster than Swerling I but the samples are uncorrelated pulse to pulse.  
Swerling I and II cases apply to targets consisting of many independent fluctuating point 
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scatterers of approximately equal physical dimensions.  These targets can be represented 
as a number of independently fluctuating reflectors of about equal echoing area.106  The 











1)(  for 0≥σ    (Equation 54) 
 
Swerling III and IV 
 
Swerling III and IV fluctuations correspond to chi-square of degree 4 distribution.  
Swerling cases III and IV are applicable to targets that can be represented by one 
dominant scatterer and many other small reflectors.108  These targets can be represented 
as one large reflector together with a number of small reflectors or as one large reflector 
subject to small changes in orientation.109  Swerling III fluctuations are similar to 
Swerling I and Swerling IV fluctuations are similar to Swerling II.  The pdf of Swerling 
III and IV cases is given by the following equation.110 
 








σσ 2exp4 2  for 0≥σ    (Equation 55) 
 
III. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
The Excel model uses Equations 51 and 52 to determine the normal and non-normal 
backscatter RCS for a right cylinder.  From Table 1, the inputs to the model are the 
cylinder radius and height, in meters, DARBC frequency, in megahertz, and roll viewing 











Table 1.  Model Inputs and Outputs 
 
are the non-normal and normal backscatter RCS in decibels referenced to one square 
meter.  Figure 8 shows a screenshot of the model.
Symbol Description Units Status 
r  radius  meters  input  
h  height  meters  input  
f  frequency  MHz  input  
θ  angleviewingroll  degrees input  
σ  RCSrbackscattenonnormal dBsm  output  






Figure 8.  Screenshot of Model in Microsoft Excel 
 
 
A second model using Matlab simulation analysis software was used to generate 
mathematical algorithms to calculate the RCS for circular cylinder shape to simulate the 
ballistic missile target. The normal and non-normal incidence backscattered RCS 
equations (51) and (52) for a finite length right cylinder were used.  Apply the radius and 
height values for the normal broadside 90 degree backscatter RCS calculation and 
calculation of radius value with non-normal aspect angle backscatter calculation to get a 
RCS value in meter square.  The calculated RCS value is then converted to dbsm and 
plotted against aspect angle. VHF, UHF, and S-band frequencies were plotted to compare 
the different RCS resolution to determine the range of aspect angle required to in order to 
maintain 10 meter square or greater target resolution. 
 
IV. MODEL RESULTS 
Defined Assumption Set for Excel model 
a. DARBC System bandwidths:  216-225 MHz & 420-450MHz 
b. Initial assumption of 10 square meters for threat RCS in the S-band 
c. Roll viewing angle will be o90  for RCS calculations 
d. DARBC system detection range will be 1,500 kilometers 
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e. Threat will be detected during boost stage 
f. Ignore non-normal RCS backscatter 
 
f (MHz) 216 225 420 450 
λ  (m) 1.3889 1.3333 0.7143 0.6667 
λ  (in) 54.6807 52.4934 28.1215 26.2467 
Table 2.  Wavelengths of DARBC System Bandwidth Limits 
 
Description 
For the BM RCS analysis presented here, the non-normal RCS value will be 
ignored.  From assumptions 4 and 5, the roll viewing angle will not change for this 
analysis.  The roll viewing angle is another name for the aspect angle.  The threat will be 
in its boost stage 180 to 320 seconds after launch (see DARBC CONOPS).  Another 




216 220 225 420 435 450 
Normal RCS 
(dbsm) 
35.76 35.84 35.94 38.65 38.81 38.95 
Table 3.  Model Output for a Threat Similar to Taep’o-dong 2 
 
For example, use a cylinder length of 35 meters and diameter of 1.36 meter.  
These dimensions are similar to North Korea’s Taep’o-dong 2 missile.  The model results 
for the normal backscatter RCS are shown in Table 3.  The results vary from 
approximately 36 to 39 dBsm, which equates to 3900 to 7900 square meters.  Data on 
several missile threats has been tabulated with rectangular flat plate and cylinder normal 





























RCS @ 3.3 
GHz (sqm) 
6.4 .65 119.2 466.1 26,313.8 61.3 121.4 1,840.1 
35.0 2.1 36,507.9 142,731.8 8,214,307.0 5,930.8 11,726.8 177,798.9 
35.0 1.36 15,311.8 59,863.2 3,445,166.0 3,840.9 7,594.5 115,145.9 





























RCS @ 3.3 
GHz (sqm) 
27.0 0.88 3,827.9 14,965.8 858,398.8 1,479.0 2,924.4 44,338.8 
27.0 1.36 9,102.1 35,585.9 2,050,225.3 2,285.7 4,519.5 68,523.6 
32.0 0.88 5,374.2 21,010.9 1,205,761.9 2,077.5 4,107.8 62,281.1 
32.0 1.36 12,787.6 49,994.8 2,879,877.6 3,210.7 6,348.4 96,252.6 
36.0 3.35 98,289.3 384,273.6 22,115,199.7 10,009.4 19,791.2 300,070.6 
13.0 2.25 5,801.6 22,682.0 1,300,912.2 876.6 1,733.4 26,281.1 
18.4 2.25 11,582.8 45,284.2 2,606,135.1 1,756.2 3,472.5 52,649.2 
25 2 16,894.8 66,052.0 3,801,336.0 2,881.8 5,698.1 86,394.0 

































6.4 .65 20.7 26.6 44.2 17.9 20.8 32.7 
35.0 2.1 45.6 51.5 69.2 37.7 40.7 52.5 
35.0 1.36 41.9 47.8 65.4 35.8 38.8 50.6 
16.2 1.36 35.2 41.1 58.7 29.2 32.1 43.9 
27.0 0.88 35.8 41.7 59.3 31.7 34.7 46.5 
27.0 1.36 39.6 45.5 63.1 33.6 36.5 48.4 
32.0 0.88 37.3 43.2 60.8 33.2 36.1 47.9 
32.0 1.36 41.1 47.0 64.6 35.1 38.0 49.8 
36.0 3.35 49.9 55.8 73.5 40.0 43.0 54.8 
13.0 2.25 37.6 43.5 61.1 29.4 32.3 44.2 
18.4 2.25 40.6 46.6 64.2 32.4 35.4 47.2 
25 2 42.3 48.2 65.8 34.6 37.6 49.4 
Table 5.  RCS Data in Decibels for Several Unnamed Threats 
 
Defined Assumption Set for Matlab model 
1. DARBC System bandwidths:  216-225 MHz & 420-450MHz 
2. Initial assumption of 10 square meters for threat RCS in the S-band 
3. All aspect angles including o90  will be for RCS calculations 
4. Threat will be detected during boost stage so a near-normal RCS 
should be used 
5.  Non-normal RCS backscatter will not ignored 
6. Using normalized target value of 2 meters for radius and 18 meters 
for height to simulate a ballistic target 
 
Description 
Using normalized target value of 2 meters for radius and 18 meters for height to 
simulate a ballistic target for normal broadside 90 degree backscatter RCS calculation, 
equation 51 and non-normal aspect angle backscatter RCS calculation, equation 52.  The 
following figures describe the results of the Matlab analysis using VHF (225 MHz), UHF 













    Figure 10. Matlab model output for 425 MHz 
 
       
 
 
    Figure 11. Matlab model for 3.3 GHz 
 
Figures 9, 10, and 11 shown that for DARBC radar to maintain RCS resolution of 10 
dbsm or greater it must at least retain aspect angle range between 84.1 and 95.88 degrees 
for VHF, 85.75 and 94.28 degrees for UHF radar when compared with 88.46 and 91.54 
degrees for S-band Radar. From the above equations the range of aspect angle dependent 
on the wavelength. The lower the frequency, the larger is the wavelength.  Therefore, the 
simulation had shown that DARBC radar provides wider angular resolution range (11.78 
degrees for VHF and 8.53 degrees for UHF) due to its use of lower frequency versus 3.08 




This TECHNOTE has presented a brief background to RCS theory.  An attempt has been 
made to describe the effect that radar aspect angle, target geometry, radar frequency, 
polarization and RCS fluctuation has on RCS measurement.  To build a better model, 
more information is required about the scattering center set of the threat.  Although a 
missile threat is considered between a simple and complex shape, the RCS can vary 




rectangular flat plate and right cylinder shows how much the data can vary without taking 
into account aspect or azimuth angle.  To accurately develop probability of detection 
curves for the DARBC system, statistical modeling of the RCS is required.  The 
statistical model selection is dependent on more knowledge of the range of missile 
threats.   
 
The RCS analysis shows a range of calculated normal RCS values from 119.2 to 
384,273.6 square meters in the DARBC system proposed bandwidths.  From this 
analysis, the following should be considered.  An initial assumption was made to use a 
threat RCS of 10 square meters for DARBC system calculations.  The lowest calculated 
value is only one order of magnitude higher than the initial assumption.  The output data 
from the model supports the initial assumption of using an RCS of 10 square meters.  
Designing the DARBC system to detect a launch of a 10 square meter target within the 
proposed bandwidths with a high probability of detection will make this radar an 
effective part of a ballistic missile defense system.   
Complementing  the Excel model, Matlab analysis output shown in figure 1, 2, and 3 uses 
the assumption that a fixed near-normal aspect angle of 88.4° is based on the anticipated 
ballistic missile flight path characteristics of 10 meter square RCS in S-band relative to 
the DARBC ship. This notional ballistic missile had an equivalent RCS of 77m2 in the 
UHF band and 146m2 in the VHF band.  These values aided in determining both 
operational and technical requirements for the DARBC.   
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I. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this technote is to define and articulate the radar search pattern for 
the DARBC.  The technical information provided by this analysis will assist Team R in 
other analysis including the Probability of Detection (PD) calculations.  Tradeoff studies 
can be done between the technical requirements and the physical limitations which will 
aid in choosing the most viable solution for the radar search pattern requirement that is 
required for the DARBC system. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
1In order to describe where a target is located, its range (distance) and angle 
(direction) are required. The radar range to target is defined as R = c/2 * t where c is the 
speed of light and t is the round trip propagation time.  The angle is broken down into a 
horizontal component (azimuth) and a vertical component (elevation).  They are 
measured by determining the antenna’s pointing angles at the time signal detection is 
made, on the presumption that signals detected always originate from the direction of the 
antenna’s beam at the time of detection. 
2Radars can differentiate between targets in various directions as well as detect targets at 
greater ranges. The radar’s antenna concentrates the radiated energy into a narrow beam. 
To find a target, the beam is systematically swept through the region in which targets are 
expected to appear. The beam’s path is known as the search scan pattern. The region 
covered by the scan is called the scan volume or frame and the length of time the beam 
takes to scan the complete frame is called the frame time. We will explore some search 
scan patterns and determine which one will be best suited for our purpose. 
 
 
III. DISCUSSION   
3 Radar systems are often identified by the type of SCANNING used.  Scanning is 
the systematic movement of a radar beam in a definite pattern while searching for or 
tracking a target.  The type and method of scanning used depends on the radar.  In some 
cases, the type of scan will change with the particular system mode of operation.  For 
example the search mode scan may be quite different from that of the track mode scan. 
The two basic methods of beam scanning are MECHANICAL and ELECTRONIC. In 
mechanical scanning, the beam can be moved in various ways: (1) The entire antenna can 
be moved in the desired pattern; (2) the energy feed source can be moved relative to a 
fixed reflector; or (3) the reflector can be moved relative to a fixed source.  In electronic 
scanning, the beam is effectively moved by such means as (1) switching between a set of 
feeder sources, (2) varying the phasing between elements in a multi-element array, or (3) 
comparing the amplitude and phase differences between signals received by a multi-
element array.  A combination of mechanical and electronic scanning is also used in 
some antenna systems.  Since the DARBC will be a digital phased array radar, it will be 
steered electronically. 
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Electronic scanning can accomplish lobe motion more rapidly than, and without 
the inherent maintenance disadvantages of, the mechanical systems. Because electronic 
scanning cannot generally cover as large an area of space, it is sometimes combined with 
mechanical scanning in particular applications.  Since the DARBC will have the majority 
of its elements on the port and starboard sides of the ship, it may be necessary to orient 
the ship so that one side of the array is facing the desired area to scan.  This will allow the 
maximum swing of the beam to be used to cover the largest amount of area where the 
threat is expected to come from. 
With MONOPULSE (SIMULTANEOUS) LOBING, all range, bearing, and 
elevation-angle information of a target is obtained from a single pulse.  Monopulse 
scanning is used in fire-control tracking radars.  
For target tracking, the radar discussed here produces a narrow circular beam of 
pulsed-rf energy at a high pulse-repetition rate.  Each pulse is divided into four signals 
which are equal both in amplitude and phase.  These four signals are radiated at the same 
time from each of four feed-horns that are grouped in a cluster.  The resulting radiated 
energy is focused into a beam by a lens.  Energy reflected from targets is refocused by the 
lens back into the feed-horns.  The total amount of the energy received by each horn 
varies, depending on the position of the target relative to the beam axis.  This is 
illustrated in figure 2 for four targets at different positions with respect to the beam axis.  
Note that a phase inversion takes place at the microwave lens similar to the image 





Figure 2- Monopulse Scanning 
 
The amplitude of returned signals received by each horn is continuously 
compared with those received in the other horns.  Error signals are generated which 
indicate the relative position of the target with respect to the axis of the beam.  Angle 
servo circuits receive these error signals and correct the position of the radar beam to 
keep the beam axis on target. 
The TRAVERSE (BEARING) SIGNAL is made up of signals from horn A added 
to C and from horn B added to D. By waveguide design, the sum of B and D is made 180 
degrees out of phase with the sum of A and C.  These two are combined and the traverse 
signal is the difference of (A + C) - (B + D). 
Since the horns are positioned as shown in figure 2, the relative amplitudes of the 
horn signals give an indication of the magnitude of the traverse error.  The elevation 
signal consists of the signals from horns C and D added 180 degrees out of phase with 
horns A and B [(A + B) - (C + D)].  The sum, or range, signal is composed of signals 
from all four feed-horns added together in phase.  It provides a reference from which 
target direction from the center of the beam axis is measured.  The range signal is also 
used as a phase reference for the traverse and elevation-error signals. 
The traverse and elevation error signals are compared in the radar receiver with 
the range or reference signal.  The output of the receiver may be either positive or 
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negative pulses; the amplitudes of the pulses are proportional to the angle between the 
beam axis and a line drawn to the target.  The polarities of the output pulses indicate 
whether the target is above or below, to the right or to the left of the beam axis.  Of 
course, if the target is directly on the line of sight, the output of the receiver is zero and 
no angle-tracking error is produced. 
An important advantage of monopulse-tracking radar over mechanically steered 
radars is that the instantaneous angular measurements are not subject to errors caused by 
target SCINTILLATION.  Scintillation can occur as the target maneuvers or moves and 
the radar pulses bounce off different areas of the target.  This causes random reflectivity 
and may lead to tracking errors.  Monopulse tracking radar is not subject to this type of 
error because each pulse provides an angular measurement without regard to the rest of 
the pulse train; no such cross-section fluctuations can affect the measurement.  An 
additional advantage of monopulse tracking is that no mechanical action is required.3 
4The U.S. military operates an extensive early warning network consisting of 
ground-based radars and space-based sensors in order to detect Inter-Continental Ballistic 
Missile (ICBM) and sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) raids against the United 
States and Canada. Part of this early warning network includes two PAVE PAWS 
(Phased-Array Warning System) sites at Beale Air Force Base (AFB), California, and 
Cape Cod Air Force Station (AFS), Massachusetts, and one Ballistic Missile Early 
Warning System (BMEWS) site at Clear AFS, Alaska.  Each of these sites use the same 
type of radar system, a Solid-State Phased-Array Radar System or SSPARS, to 
accomplish the missions of missile warning and space surveillance. 
To detect and determine attack characteristics of ICBMs and SLBMs aimed at the 
United States and Canada, the radar devotes approximately one-half of its time 
generating what is called a “surveillance fence.”  This constitutes the center of the main 
beam scanning at elevations between 3 and 10 degrees above horizontal over a 240-
degree (120 degrees per face) scan area.  The surveillance fence is normally at 3 degrees.  
In the surveillance mode, the direction of the beam is steered according to a computer-
programmed pattern, moving from one position to another in tens of microseconds.  In 
the surveillance mode, both faces of the radar are simultaneously active, sending out two 
parallel beams moving in a fashion similar to windshield wipers.  Under normal 
operational circumstances, the radar is transmitting 11 percent of the time to maintain the 
surveillance fence and waiting/receiving the return signal 89 percent of the time. The 
SSPARS is capable of transmitting for up to 18 percent of the time to perform the 
surveillance mission with no space surveillance mission. The diagrams below 
demonstrate the Fence Search Scan/Pattern as well as how the fence search could cue 














 A volume search is a 360° search pattern that covers all area around the sensor out 
to a defined range.  This volume search is best used in the Air Defense (AD) role where 
all areas of the sky should be monitored.  This type of search is effective against multiple 
kinds of threats as long as the threat is within the volume being covered and is detectable 
by the radar (i.e. has a large enough Radar Cross Section (RCS) and is not to fast for the 
sensor).  The downside of the volume search is that it requires a lot of the radar’s 
resources to cover the full volume, taking a relatively large amount of time to complete 
the search pattern compared to the fence search.  Also, in order to reduce the time 
required to complete the search, the radar detection range is reduced in order to decrease 
the volume.  This has an impact on long range performance which is needed for the BMD 
mission. 
A sector search is similar to a volume search except range, bearing, and elevation 
windows are defined, effectively creating a volume search on a limited and defined area.  
The sector search can be defined in the area where hostile threats are expected to 
originate reducing the resources required as compared to using a volume search.  With 
the extra available resources, it would be possible to perform one or several sector 
searches while also performing a fence search. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
5Successful detection is a precondition for setting the entire BMD system in 
motion.  The problem with detection is that a huge volume of space has to be covered to 
enable a reliable surveillance, and this entails the implementation of special search 
techniques. 
The DARBC is a phased-array radar performing a search for ballistic missiles 
primarily.  That being said, a combination of a fence search along with a sector or volume 
search pattern should be used depending on the operational scenario.  In fence-
surveillance one or more rows of radar beams create narrow-elevation “fences” which in 
azimuth extend the full width of the desired surveillance sector. Every ascending missile 
has to cross these fences and thus be detected.  However, this technique is radar-energy 
intensive.  Sector-surveillance concentrates a sufficient number of radar beams to cover a 
smaller volume of space, in azimuth, elevation and range.  The choice to use one or both 
techniques will be made by tactical and other policy decisions.5  
 
References 
1. Byron Edde, Radar: Principles, Technology, Applications 
2. George W. Stimson, Introduction to Airborne Radar. 
3. Navy Electricity and Electronics Training Series: Module 18 – Radar Principles   
   NAVEDTRA 14190   
4. http://www.pavepaws.org/About.htm 
5. Ben-Zion Naveh and Azriel Lorber: Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, Progress in 










DARBC-TN-04 RADAR TECHNICAL PARAMETERS 
Document Type: Document Number: 
Technical Note DARBC-TN-04 
Program: Classification: 
DARBC   Unclassified 
TITLE: DARBC Technical Parameters Analysis 
 
PROBLEM STATEMENT: The Digital Array Radar for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and Counter-
stealth (DARBC) has a Key Performance Parameter (KPP) described in the DARCB Capabilities Development 
Document (CDD) to be able to detect a target with a Radar Cross Section (RCS) of 10m2 at the calculated 
handoff range to a notional S-Band radar with a Probability of Detection (PD) of 0.90.111  This notional handoff 
range needs to be calculated for this KPP.  In order for the DARBC to meet this requirement, the characteristics 
of the radar need to be tuned properly.  A tradeoff study between the various parameters of the radar equation for 
the DARBC system is needed in order to properly design the radar to meet its objectives.  With these parameters 
defined, parametric analysis is needed to characterize the radar’s ability to detect different sized targets (in RCS) 
at different ranges. 
               Expected Outputs of Study: 
1. Analysis of DARCB radar equation including description and tradeoff study of all parameters defining 
values (or range of values) for those parameters so that the DARCB will be capable of meeting its 
operational requirements. 
2. Calculated handoff range where the DARBC will cue a notional S-band radar for engagement purposes. 
3. Parametric analysis of the Probability of Detection as a function of Range for various RCSs for the 
DARCB. 
 
Prepared by: Original Date: Comments: 
Paul Dailey 23 August, 2006 Submission of Rev 4. 
Reviewed by: Date:  
Carla Bacchus   
Reviewed by: Date:  
Ian Barford   
Reviewed by: Date:  
David Bedford   
Reviewed by: Date:  
Bob Hazle 20 August 2006 Review 
Reviewed by: Date:  
Stan Hill   
Reviewed by: Date:  
Mark Mihocka   
Approved by: Date:  
Professor Green   
  202
I. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this Technote is to describe and define the radar parameters of the 
DARBC so that the radar system will be capable of meeting the operational requirements 
for the system.  Once the parameters are defined, analysis will be done in an effort to 
characterize the radar’s ability to detect different types of targets.  This study will also 
calculate the notional handoff range from the DARBC to a notional S-band radar for 
engagement purposes. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Radar systems like the DARBC can be technically described by the Radar Equation.  The 
Radar Equation is made up of parameters which represent characteristics of the radar, the 
target, and the operational environment.  The parameters can be optimized for maximum 
operational performance using the equation.  The optimized values for these parameters 
will be the technical requirements for the system so that it will be capable of achieving 
the KPPs specified in the CDD.   
 
Equation 1 is the Radar Equation solved for Signal to Noise Ratio (S/N).  Note that in 















Equation 2 is the relationship between S/N and the Probabilities of Detection (PD) and 
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Equations 1 & 2 can be combined to form Equation 3.  This equation is the base of 
the radar parameters analysis, allowing for the radar parameters to be adjusted so that 




































The overall approach for the analysis was to first look at the way in which the DARBC 
would be used in operation.  Current S-band radars used by the US Navy to search for 
ballistic missiles use up a lot of resources in search mode and are actually capable of 
tracking targets at ranges greater than their maximum search range.  The DARBC will 
provide a benefit to current S-band radar systems by extending the search capability to 
detect ballistic missiles and cueing the S-band systems to track the target at a range that 
would have been outside the search range for the S-band radar alone.    
 
Analysis using Equation 3 was first planned for a notional S-band radar to form a 
baseline needed to determine at what maximum range the current radar will be able to 
accurately track a ballistic missile if cued by the DARBC.  A PD vs. Range plot should be 
generated for the S-Band radar with parametric cures on the graph for different Radar 
Cross Sections (RCSs).  Since the predicted RCS for a notional ballistic missile is 10m2 
in the S-band frequency band (assuming an aspect angle of 88.46°) equaling to 77m2 in 
the UHF band and 146m2 in the VHF band at the same aspect angle112, the generated plot 
can be analyzed to see at what range the S-band radar would have a PD of 0.5 for this 
RCS.  This range will be the desired track handoff range from the DARBC to the S-Band 
radar. 
 
Following the analysis on the S-Band radar, the same analysis should be generated to 
analyze the capabilities of the DARBC.  The approach said that the DARBC should be 
capable of tracking the notional ballistic missile with a PD of 0.90 at the handoff range to 
the S-Band radar.  The Range / PD combination will drive one of the Key Performance 
Parameters (KPPs) for the DARBC system.  The radar parameters for the DARBC should 




The values for the parameters listed in Equation 3 for the DARBC were derived using 
this equation and other equations to be described in this section.   Analysis and 
calculations described in this section were conducted using Waterloo Maple 7 Computer 
Algebra System (CAS).  Initially, notional values were used as the radar equations were 
set up in the Maple code.  After the completion of the Maple code, the values of the 
various parameters were researched, manipulated and analyzed for their affect on the 
overall PD as well as their feasibility. 
 
Equation 4 calculates the wavelength (λ) for a given frequency.  Calculations were done 
using one VHF (216 MHz) and one UHF (420 MHz) frequency for the DARBC.  For the 








Equation 5 is the equation used to calculate the Antenna Effective Aperture (Ae).  A 
typical value of 0.7 will be used for Effective Aperture Efficiency η. 113  Analysis on the 
array element density being conducted concurrently with this analysis shows that there 
are can be up to 2 elements / m2 on the DARBC aperstructure.114  With this specified 
density, Ae can be calculated based on the number of elements within the aperstructure 
which contribute to a single beam (n) multiplied by the efficiency η.  Based on a notional 
hull for a new construction ship, it was found that 3411 elements can be placed one side 
of the ship.  For this research, 3411 was used for n but sensitivity analysis will be 
conducted which relates PD to n. 
 
5) η×= nAe  
 
Equation 6 is how Gain (G) is calculated based on the Antenna Effective Aperture (Ae) 
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Doppler Shift (fD) occurs when the target being tracked is non-stationary.  The echo 
returning to the radar receiver will be higher or lower in frequency than the transmission 
wave depending on if the target is closing or moving away from the radar (See Figure 1).  
Using the predicted velocity for a ballistic missile, fD was calculated.  Based on this fD 
value, receiver noise bandwidth (BN) was calculated to be double the value of fD so that 
the DARBC would be able to track targets coming towards or going away from the radar.  
Calculations for BN for the UHF and VHF frequencies are shown below.  These values 
were used as inputs to the Maple program. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Illustration of the Doppler Shift Effect 
 
Doppler Shift and Bn115 
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Rules of Thumb for two-way signal travel  
(divide in half for one-way ESM signal measurements) 
At 10 GHz, fD = 
35 Hz per Knot 
19 Hz per km/Hr 
67 Hz per m/sec 
61 Hz per yd/sec 
20 Hz per ft/sec 
To estimate fD at other frequencies, multiply these by: 
 
Ballistic Missile travels at 7.5 km/s = 27000 km/hr 




19 =×=  per kHzhr
km
hr
km 08.1127000 =×  
i. Bn(VHF) ×≥ 2  fD(UHF) = 23kHz 




19 =×=  per kHzhr
km
hr
km 55.2127000 =×  
i. Bn(UHF) ×≥ 2  fD(VHF) = 44kHz 
 
Based on the Maple calculations and parameter sensitivity analysis, the following 
parameters were used for the DARBC and S-band radar calculations (Table 1).  The 
values listed for the DARBC in this table are the recommended values for the DARBC 
technical parameters (Expected Output #1). 
 
Parameter Description Value Used Maple Name 
Pmax116 Transmitted power [W] 500 kW (VHF, UHF),  
4 MW (S-band) 
P (VHF & 
UHF), P2 (S-
band) 
σ117 Radar cross section of target 
[m2] 
146 (VHF), 100, 77 
(UHF), 10, 1, 0.1 [m2] 
H1V (146), H1 
(100), H1U 
(77), H2 (10), 
H3 (1), H4 
(0.1) 
n Number of pulses integrated 1 N 
Ei(n) Integration efficiency 1 E 
kB Boltzmann’s constant 
[J/degree K] 
 
1.3806503E-23 J/ K K 
T0 Standard temperature [degrees 
K] 
290 degrees K T 
Bn Receiver noise bandwidth 23 kHz (VHF), 44 kHz B1 (VHF), B2 
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[Hz] (UHF), 4 MHz (S-band) (UHF), B3 (S-
band) 
Fn118 Receiver noise figure 1×103/5 = 6 dB F 
PFA Probability of False Alarm 0.01 fa 
f119 Radar Transmit Frequency 216 MHz (VHF), 420 
MHz (UHF), 3 GHz (S-
band) 
f1 (VHF), f2 
(UHF), f3 (S-
band) 
η120 Effective Aperture Efficiency 0.7 Ef 
n121 Number of Array Elements 
contributing to 1 beam 
3411 n 
λ Wavelength [m] 1.3879 (VHF), 0.7138 




Ae Antenna effective aperture 
[m2] 
This is a function of n 
and η; 1193.85 (VHF & 
UHF), 17.5 (S-band) 
A1 (UHF), A2 
(VHF), A3 (S-
Band) 
G Antenna gain This is a function of Ae 
and λ; 38.9 dB (VHF), 
44.7 dB (UHF), 43.4 dB 
(S-band) 
G1 (VHF), G2 
(UHF), G3 (S-
band) 
S/N Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) 
required for detection based 
on a single pulse 
Not directly calculated.  
This is a function of 
Rmax. 
S1 (VHF), S2 
(UHF), S3 (S-
band) 
Rmax Maximum radar range or 
detection range [m] 
Variable (see plot) R 
PD Probability of Detection Variable (see plot) D 
Table 1 – Parameter values used in the Maple analysis 
 
 
Based on these values above, the “Handoff Range” where the DARBC will cue the S-
band radar to track a ballistic missile target will be at a range of 748 km.  This is the 
range where the S-band radar has a PD of 0.5 for an RCS of 10 m2 (See Figure 2).  Ignore 





Figure 2 – Calculated Handoff Range to S-Band radar 
 
The DARBC should have a 0.90 PD at this range of 748 km vs. a similar ballistic missile 
target (RCS of 146m2 for VHF and 77m2 for UHF).  Using the parameters in Table 1, the 
Maple model shows that the DARBC is able to obtain 0.906 ≈ 0.91 using both VHF and 
UHF spectrums.  The graphs below show the anticipated performance of the DARBC 
using the parameters from Table 1.  See Figures 3 and 4 for the PD vs. Range parametric 
plots for both the VHF and UHF frequencies for the DARBC. 
 
> VHFPsubD:=evalf(eval(P4VHF,R1=748000),5);#VHF Pd at handoff range vs. 
Ballistic Missile (146m^2 RCS) 
:= VHFPsubD .90616  
> UHFPsubD:=evalf(eval(P4UHF,R2=748000),5);#UHF Pd at handoff range vs. 
Ballistic Missile (77m^2 RCS) 
:= UHFPsubD .90651  
 
Handoff Range of 748 km for a 
PD of 0.5 for an RCS of 10 m2 
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Figure 3 – DARBC PD vs. Range performance using the UHF spectrum 
 
 
Figure 4 – DARBC PD vs. Range performance using the VHF spectrum 
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C. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
The current model (using parameters defined in Table 1) of the DARBC shows that the 
radar system will be capable of meeting its KPP of a 90% PD at the handoff range (748 
km) against a notional ballistic missile target however, sensitivity analysis was performed 
on various parameters to see how easily PD could be raised for the DARBC.  Power, 
Gain, and number of elements were analyzed against PD at the handoff range to see if 
minor adjustments could increase the predicted performance. 
 
i. Power Sensitivity 
 
Power sensitivity analysis shows that major increases in PT would not bring the 
performance of the DARBC up significantly.  As you can see in Figures 5 and 6, 
increased levels in power beyond several tens of kW have a mild affect on PD.  Power 
levels for the DARBC would have to be raised to an unfeasible level in order to have an 
increase of 1 – 2 % in PD.   
 
 




Figure 6 – UHF Radar PD vs. Power at a range of 748 km 
ii. Gain Sensitivity 
 
Gain sensitivity analysis shows that increases in G of about 10dB or so have the ability to 
increase the performance of the DARBC with some level of significance depending on 
the RCS of the target.  The smaller RCSs will benefit more from this type of adjustment 
to the radar parameters.  See figures 7 and 8 for the gain sensitivity analysis. 
  




Figure 8 – UHF Gain vs. PD at a range of 748 km 
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iii. Aperstructure Size Sensitivity (number of elements) 
 
Since G is a function of wavelength (λ) and antenna effective aperture (Ae), further 
analysis is needed to look into Ae since λ is fixed at the VHF and UHF bands.  Ae is a 
dependent on the number of elements in the array as they are fixed in size.  Figure 9 
shows the sensitivity curves for number of elements as a function of PD for the DARBC 
using the VHF spectrum.  There is some level of performance to gain by boosting the 
number of active elements for the lower RCSs for this system.  
 
 
Figure 9 – VHF PD vs. Number of Elements at a range of 748 km 
 
Results show that an increase in the number of active elements from the value specified 
in Table 1 will have a minor but significant affect on PD against targets with lower RCS 
values, however this sensitivity analysis also shows the impact of having less elements 





Based on the Maple analysis, using parameters listed in Table 1, the calculated handoff 
range between the DARBC and the S-band radar should be 748 km (Expected Output 
#2).  At 748 km, the S-band radar is able to track a notional ballistic missile target (RCS 
of 10 m2) with a PD of 0.50.  At this same range, the DARBC is capable of tracking the 
same target (RCS of 146m2 for VHF and 77m2 for UHF) with a PD of 0.91 using the 
parameters listed in Table 1 (Expected Output #1).  With these recommended parameters, 
the performance of the DARBC can be characterized in the PD vs. Range plots seen in 
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Figures 3 and 4 (Expected Output #3).  Figure 3 is the PD vs. Range plot for the DARBC 
operating in the UHF band.  Figure 4 is the PD vs. Range plot for the DARBC operating 
in the VHF band.  Figure 2 is the PD vs. Range plot for the notional S-band radar.   
 
V. APPENDIX – MAPLE SOURCE CODE 
Here is the maple source code used to perform the mathematical analysis.  Important 
results are listed in Table 1 and in section IV of this Technote.  The maple file will also 
be imbedded in this document.  These same commands were modified to conduct the 







> #Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
> #Masters of Science in Systems Engineering (MSSE) 
> #Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Port Hueneme Division (PHD) 
> #Team "R" Capstone Project, Radar Technical Parameters Research 
> #23 August, 2006, PRD 
>  
> restart;  #Reset of Maple's Memory 




:= P 500000  
 := p .3 107  
:= H1 100  
:= H1V 146  
:= H1U 77  
:= H2 10  
:= H3 1  
:= H4 .1  
:= N 1  
:= E 1  
 := K .138065 10-22  
:= T 290  
:= B1 23000  
:= B2 44000  
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 := B3 .4 107  
 := F 10
( )/3 5
 
:= fa .01  
 := f1 .216 109  
 := f2 .420 109  
 := f3 .3 1010  
:= L1 100  
:= L2 5  
:= W1 40  
:= W2 5  
:= Ef .7  
:= n 3411  
> WL1:=299792458/f1; 
:= WL1 1.387928046  
> WL2:=299792458/f2; 
:= WL2 .7137915667  
> WL3:=299792458/f3; 
:= WL3 .09993081932  
> A1:=Ef*(n/2); 
:= A1 1193.850000  
> A2:=Ef*(n/2); 
:= A2 1193.850000  
> A3:=Ef*L2*W2; 
:= A3 17.5  
> G1:=(A1*4*Pi)/(WL1^2): 
> G1db:=evalf(10*log10(G1),5); 
:= G1db 38.914  
> G2:=(A2*4*Pi)/(WL2^2): 
> G2db:=evalf(10*log10(G2),5); 
:= G2db 44.689  
> G3:=(A3*4*Pi)/(WL3^2): 
> G3db:=evalf(10*log10(G3),5); 
:= G3db 43.428  
> RE1VHF:=(R1)^4=(P*G1*A1*H1V*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B1*F*S1):# VHF Radar Equation using RCS 
of 146m^2 
> RE1:=(R1)^4=(P*G1*A1*H1*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B1*F*S1):# VHF Radar Equation using RCS of 
100m^2 
> REA1:=(R1)^4=(P*G1*A1*H2*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B1*F*S1):# VHF Radar Equation using RCS of 
10m^2 
> REB1:=(R1)^4=(P*G1*A1*H3*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B1*F*S1):# VHF Radar Equation using RCS of 
1m^2 




> RE1U:=(R2)^4=(P*G2*A2*H1*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B2*F*S2):# UHF Radar Equation using RCS of 
100m^2 
> RE1UHF:=(R2)^4=(P*G2*A2*H1U*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B2*F*S2):# UHF Radar Equation using RCS 
of 77m^2 
> REA1U:=(R2)^4=(P*G2*A2*H2*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B2*F*S2):# UHF Radar Equation using RCS 
of 10m^2 
> REB1U:=(R2)^4=(P*G2*A2*H3*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B2*F*S2):# UHF Radar Equation using RCS 
of 1m^2 
> REC1U:=(R2)^4=(P*G2*A2*H4*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B2*F*S2):# UHF Radar Equation using RCS 
of 0.1m^2 
>  
> RE1S:=(R3)^4=(p*G3*A3*H1*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B3*S3):# S-Band Radar Equation using RCS 
of 100m^2 
> REA1S:=(R3)^4=(p*G3*A3*H2*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B3*F*S3):# S-Band Radar Equation using 
RCS of 10m^2 
> REB1S:=(R3)^4=(p*G3*A3*H3*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B3*F*S3):# S-Band Radar Equation using 
RCS of 1m^2 
> REC1S:=(R3)^4=(p*G3*A3*H4*N*E)/(((4*Pi)^2)*K*T*B3*F*S3):# S-Band Radar Equation using 

























































































Detection"],labeldirections=[HORIZONTAL,VERTICAL],legend=["RCS=146","RCS = 100","RCS = 
10","RCS = 1","RCS = 
0.1"],view=[0..3E6,0..1],color=[black,red,magenta,blue,navy],thickness=2,font=[HELVETICA,
BOLD,12],title="VHF Radar Pd vs. R"); 
 
> plot([P4U,P4UHF,PA4U,PB4U,PC4U],R2=0..8000000,D2=0..1,xtickmarks=3,labels=["Range 
(m)","Probability of Detection"],labeldirections=[HORIZONTAL,VERTICAL],legend=["RCS = 
100","RCS = 77","RCS = 10","RCS = 1","RCS = 
0.1"],view=[0..3E6,0..1],color=[red,black,magenta,blue,navy],thickness=2,font=[HELVETICA,
BOLD,12],title="UHF Radar Pd vs. R"); 
 
> plot([P4S,PA4S,PB4S,PC4S],R3=0..8000000,D3=0..1,xtickmarks=3,labels=["Range 
(m)","Probability of Detection"],labeldirections=[HORIZONTAL,VERTICAL],legend=["RCS = 
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100","RCS = 10","RCS = 1","RCS = 
0.1"],view=[0..3E6,0..1],color=[red,magenta,blue,navy],thickness=2,font=[HELVETICA,BOLD,1
2],title="S-Band Radar Pd vs. R"); 
>  
 
> eval(PB4S,R3=425000);#S-Band Radar's "Range" using 1m^2 RCS. (Range is R (450km)) 
(Result should be 0.5)  
.4904985725  
> eval(PA4S,R3=748000);#S-Band Radar's max Range for Handoff (Handoff Range is R (748km)) 
(Result should be 0.5) 
.5000286862  
> VHFPsubD:=evalf(eval(P4VHF,R1=748000),5);#VHF Pd at handoff range vs. Ballistic Missile 
(146m^2 RCS) 
:= VHFPsubD .90616  
> UHFPsubD:=evalf(eval(P4UHF,R2=748000),5);#UHF Pd at handoff range vs. Ballistic Missile 
(77m^2 RCS) 
:= UHFPsubD .90651  
>  
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I.  PURPOSE 
This paper provides two scenarios and their reaction times for evaluating the 
OODA loop model for the DARBC Radar System.  The purpose of the modeling is to 
measure the benefit of the DARBC radar while considering the operational environment.  
The simulation will consider all elements involved in the prosecution of an engagement 
of a ballistic missile and will use targets which are detected randomly at various ranges in 
order to evaluate a normalized reaction time.  
II. Background  
Reference (a) provided methods and procedures for using the ARENA 10.0 
simulation software for simulating the OODA loop model.  Basic processing modules 
from the ARENA simulation software were used to assess the OODA loop model.  The 
following table provides definition for the modules used: 
Module Definition (see Ref (b)) 
Create This module is intended as the starting point for entities in a simulation model. 
Entities are created using a schedule or based on a time between arrivals. Entities 
then leave the module to begin processing through the system. The entity type is 
specified in this module.  
Assign This module is used for assigning new values to variables, entity attributes, entity 
types, entity pictures, or other system variables. Multiple assignments can be made 
with a single Assign module.  
Decide This module allows for decision-making processes in the system. It includes options 
to make decisions based on one or more conditions (e.g., if entity type is Gold Card) 
or based on one or more probabilities (e.g., 75% true; 25% false). Conditions can be 
based on attribute values (e.g., Priority), variable values (e.g., Number Denied), the 
entity type, or an expression (e.g., NQ (ProcessA.Queue)).  
Process This module is intended as the main processing method in the simulation. Options 
for seizing and releasing resource constraints are available. Additionally, there is the 
option to use a "submodel" and specify hierarchical user-defined logic. The process 
time is allocated to the entity and may be considered to be value added, non-value 
added, transfer, wait or other. The associated cost will be added to the appropriate 
category.  
Record This module is used to collect statistics in the simulation model. Various types of 
observational statistics are available, including time between exits through the 
module, entity statistics (time, costing, etc.), general observations, and interval 
statistics (from some time stamp to the current simulation time). A count type of 
statistic is available as well. Tally and Counter sets can also be specified.  
Dispose This module is intended as the ending point for entities in a simulation model. Entity 
statistics may be recorded before the entity is disposed. 






The Arena ® Model analysis software was used to simulate the DARBC detection 
time, data handover time to local sensor, and the local fire control loop engagement 
sequence time.  The following figures represent the OODA loop configurations for the 
DARBC and local sensor (Figure 1) and the local sensor only (Figure 2). 
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     Figure 2.    Model 2 (Ref (c)) 
The OODA loop models were executed for ten repetitions for each of the two 
scenarios.  The first scenario, figure 1, calculated the average DARBC detection time and 
total time from the DARBC’s first detection of the threat to handover of threat data to 
local sensor and to the launch of interceptor from the local ship to disable the ballistic 
target.  
The second scenario, figure 2, calculates the local sensor only average detection 
time and average engagement time to disable the ballistic target. 
The following notional attributes were used to model the OODA loop: 
Arrival Time: TNOW 
RCS: Uniformly Distributed between 1 to 300 m2 
Target Speed: Uniformly Distributes between 1 to 10 km/sec 
Target from Own-ship: Uniformly Distributed between 500 to 5000 km (DARBC aided) 
Target from Own-ship: Uniformly Distributed between 50 to 300 km (Local Sensor only) 





DARBC Radar Aiding Local Sensor Average (sec) Minimum Value (sec) Maximum Value (sec) 
Record Time to Detect  1.4573664 1.0087536 1.983207
Record Handover Time  5.652 0.629757 9.99
Local System Engagement Time 9.0906336 8.7594894 9.008793
Record Total Time  16.2 10.398 20.982
     Table 3. 
 
Local Sensor Only Average (sec) Minimum Value (sec) Maximum Value (sec) 
Record Time to Detect  1.5256 1.013 1.9939
Record Total Time  10.554 8.136 12.81
     Table 4. 
Table 3 indicated that DARBC Radar on average takes 1.46 seconds to detect a high 
velocity target in the range between 500 km to 2000 km.  Total time from first detection 
by DARBC to the time when data handover occurs to the local sensor in order to launch 
the interceptor is 16.2 seconds. 
Table 4 indicated that local sensor without aid of the DARBC radar takes average of 1.52 
seconds to detect a high velocity target in the range between 50 km to 300 km.  The total 
time from the first detection to interceptor launch is 10.55 seconds.  The comparison 
indicated that with the aid of DARBC radar the average local system engagement time 
improves from 10.55 seconds to 9.09 seconds.  
III. CONCLUSION 
The OODA model indicated that average DARBC radar assisted reaction time is 
less than without the use of it.  With the DARBC present, the overall reaction time to the 
threat was increased by 53.5% on average.  One draw back to this approach is that the 
OODA models presented here do not take into considerations of earth curvature, ballistic 
target flight path, earth gravity, and vary target velocity.  However, as long as the same 
approach is taken for both systems, with the DARBC and without, a significant 
improvement is seen in the overall reaction time.  In the future, studies and simulations 
need to include these more realistic technical parameters to further improve the OODA 
model in order to simulate a more realistic operational environment.  
 
References 
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I. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this Technote is to describe and calculate the comparative benefit in 
reaction time of a ship equipped with the Digital Array Radar for Ballistic Missile 
Defense (BMD) and Counter-stealth (DARBC) over one without. 
II. BACKGROUND 
For the purpose of this technote the subject ship is, in all cases, equipped with a weapon 
system.  The weapon’s range exceeds the tracking range of the Weapon Control Radar 
(WCR).  The WCR has two track range parameters.  The first is the range at which the 
unaided WCR can detect, acquire, and track a TBM.  The second range is achieved when 
the WCR receives a cue or designation from another source, the DARBC in this case.  
For this investigation the ranges of our notional WCR are 300 km unaided and 748 km 
aided122. 
 
The calculations made in this technote are based on some assumptions supported by a 
Congressional Budget Office study.  According to the study a typical TMB burnout 
velocity ranges from 6 to 7 km/sec.  Because the study is two years old and the DARBC 
is a future system the high end of the range, 7.5 km/sec is used.  As shown in the Team R 
DARBC Concept Development Document (CDD), the ranges of TBMs are up to 1000 
km for a Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM), between 1000 and 3000 km for a 
Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM), between 3000 and 5500 km for an 
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)123.  Again high range values of 1000, 3000, 
and 5500 and apogee values of 160, 500, and 900 km are used to compensate for future 
advances in TBM design124. 
 
Flight path calculations can be complex.  They can be based on a rotating, oblate earth 
with a four-thirds aspect ratio.  However, this evaluation is based on a flat, non-rotating 




x is the horizontal (range) axis. 
y is the vertical (altitude) axis. 
Yc is the vertical center of the flight path ellipse in kilometers from the ship due to the 
curvature of the earth (assigned 0 in this analysis). 
Ship is always at x = 0, y = 0. 
ADJUSTABLE VARIABLES 
Xc is the horizontal center of the flight path ellipse in kilometers from the ship. 
a is the semi-major (horizontal) axis of the ellipse in km. 
b is the semi-minor (vertical) axis of the ellipse in km. 










Aided RD is the maximum acquisition range of the WCR when aided by a DARBC 
designation. 
Un-aided RD is the maximum acquisition range of the un-cued WCR. 
 
In conducting this analysis, the range of each TBM is divided into 1000 segments.  The 
length of the chord across each flight path segment is calculated and assumed to be a 
good estimate of the length of the flight path arc.  Next the chord length is divided by the 
TBM velocity to determine the time taken to travel that segment of the flight path and to 
maintain a running total flight time.  The range is then calculated using the x and y 
coordinates of the end of the segment, which is then used to calculate the change in range 
for that segment.  Total time for each of the three range-spaces was calculated as a sum of 
the segment times for applicable flight path segments.  A segment’s flight path was 
determined to be applicable to a range-space as follows: 
 
1. Range-Space #1:  0 km out to the Unaided RD 
a. The segment ends within the range-space, or, 
b. Both 
i. The segment ends in range-space #2 on the outbound leg, and, 
ii. The range-space #1 time is greater than 0 
2. Range-Space #2:  Unaided RD out to the Aided RD 
a. The segment ends within the range-space, and 
b. Either 
i. The segment ends in range-space #2 on the inbound leg, or, 
ii. The range-space #1 time is equal to 0 
3. Range-Space #3:  Aided RD out to the DARBC RD 
a. The segment ends in range-space #3 on the inbound leg 
 
The justification for 1.b above is that if a target has been in range-space #1, the WCR is 
already tracking it and is capable of maintaining that track out to Aided RD.  The 
justification for 2.b above is that the unaided WCR is not capable of acquiring a target in 
range-space #2.  So, if the target has not yet entered range-space #1, acquiring it with the 
WCR is only possible if the WCR is aided by the DARBC.  Criterion 3.a above is 
justified because an outbound target in range-space #3 is un-engagable. 
 
This analysis does not account for the acceleration of the TBM.  It is assumed to be at full 
speed immediately after launch.  This assumption makes the analysis much simpler and 
the errors it induces are of smaller magnitude than those that result, or would result from 
uncertainty about velocity and acceleration values and launch angle.  This assumption 
also leads the results of this analysis to be more conservative.  If the target initial velocity 
was zero and it accelerated to full speed at some later time, the time-benefit from the 
DARBC would be greater. 
 
Because the objective of this analysis was to identify engagability gains attributable to 
the DARBC, the analysis only considered TBMs that could be engaged, i.e., those with 
launch ranges for which the flight path at least entered the Aided RD.  The Excel analysis 
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tool allows the boost phase duration to be set as a percentage of the total flight time.  For 
this analysis, boost phase duration was set at 25% and flight paths are only analyzed from 




The figures in Tables 7, 8, and 9 show the flight paths and time-range plots for Short-, 
Medium-, and Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles, respectively.  The launch ranges 
shown were selected to present an evenly spaced coverage of launch ranges that present 
some engagability time.  For each flight path plot, the DARBC ship is located at the 
origin of the axes. 
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Figure 32 through Figure 34 are based on further analysis of the time-range plots in 
Tables 8, 9, and 10.  Each plot shows the times in each range-space stacked, i.e., showing 
the additional time presented by each range-space.  The area under the Unaided-t line 
shows launch ranges that would be engagable by an isolated WCR and how long a target 
would be engagable.  The area between the Unaided-t and the Aided-t lines shows the 
launch ranges that would be engagable by a WCR when cued by the DARBC and 
duration of that engagability.  The area between the Aided-t and DARBC-t lines shows 
how much extra time would be available to evaluate a target with a given launch range.  
They also show improvement in the launch range coverage as the horizontal distance 
between the point before reaching zero on the Unaided-t line and the Aided-t line.  They 
show information about a TBM launched at a range of 0 km.  The span of launch ranges 
shown begins at 0 km and ends at the smallest launch range that presents 0 engagability 
time.  The ends of the span are shown for continuity but are not meaningful and are not 
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Figure 34.  DARBC Gains for IRBM 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
DARBC would provide the generic benefits of having an additional sensor available, 
increasing the overall Probability of Detection (PD).  That would allow the time resources 
of the WCR to be re-prioritized.  Using only a handoff to an organic weapon system, the 
DARBC also shows the following benefits: 
As shown in Figure 32, for the SRBM, the DARBC provides 
• up to 22 seconds of additional engagement time at a launch range of 400 km, 
• up to 28 seconds of additional evaluation time at a launch range of 900 km, 
• increased coverage from 400 km to 900 km launch range. 
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Figure 33, for the MRBM, the DARBC provides 
• up to 96 seconds of additional evaluation time at a launch range of 1200 km 
• increased coverage from 300 km to 1200 km launch range. 
As shown in Figure 34, for the IRBM, the DARBC provides 
• up to 182 seconds of additional evaluation time at a launch range of 1300 km 
• increased coverage from 300 km to 1300 km launch range. 
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I. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this technote is to show how to integrate several hundred wireless 
Transmit/ Receive (T/R) module elements into the outside skin of a ship’s hull.  The 
elements will be arranged in clusters called “Arrays” and these arrays will be close 
enough to generate the needed radar envelope. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
In order to have no interference between OA elements the minimum physical 
spacing between the elements on the hull of the ship has to be greater than ½ of the 
wavelength of the beam in use.  Since the DARBC radar will operate in the UHF (216-
225 MHz) and VHF (420-450 MHz) frequency bands the desired minimum spacing 
between elements (the spacing which will cause no interference) will be the shorter 
distance of ½ of the wavelength of each of the two frequencies.  The current spacing 
between elements of one meter will cause no interference.   
Furthermore, periodic array designs typically maximize the spacing between individual 
antenna elements yet keep it small enough to eliminate grating lobes. The condition for 
avoiding grating lobes under all conditions of beam-steering is: 
 
      
2
λ≤d  
d = space between individual elements 
λ = wavelength 
 
Phased array radars are most commonly designed as periodic arrays. In 
developing the aperstructure concept, however, it is important to investigate if aperiodic 
arrays are able to achieve comparable performance. The reasoning is the ship’s 
superstructure makes it physically unfeasible to implement a uniform, periodic array over 
the entire structure. In addition, integrating an array of closely spaced antenna elements 
across the entire structure is impractical and likely to be extremely costly125. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
Each element is a 0.5-meter square aperstructure that will be fitted into a circular 
(0.5 meter diameter) hole for minimum ship flexure126.  The elements will be integrated 
into the ship as it is being built.  The array faces will be flush with the surface of the hull 
and no protrusions will exist from the array or hardware to attach the array.  This design 
is not intended for a backfit to any ship or hull design because of the extreme mechanical 
engineering difficulties of cutting hole into the side of a ship while trying to maintain its 
structural integrity.  Figure 1 gives a visual of the starboard side of the proposed ship 
with the populated array faces.  The array faces are situated to not interfere with existing 
hardware.  The array faces are strategically located above the waterline tumblehome hull, 
and will not bump against the pier while ship is docked.  No array faces are on any deck 
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of the ship so no one on the crew will be in the radiation path and the movement of stores 
and ordnance during replenishment will not damage to T/R elements.127  Table 1 shows 
the proposed location of array faces.  On the starboard side there is an array face that 
consists of 3411 array elements.  On the port side, there is the same number of elements.  




Figure 1 – Notional Placement of Array Faces on Starboard Side 
 
Side of Ship Number of Array 
Faces 
Number of 
Elements per Array 
Face 
Total Number of 
Elements 
Starboard 1 3411 3411 
Port 1 3411 3411 
Aft 1 200 200 
  TOTAL 7022 
Table 1 – Number of Proposed Elements 
 
Figure 2 is a pictorial view of the 95 elements that make up an array and shows the 
notional layout of each element with their spacing.128  In 1 m2, there are a total of 2 array 





Figure 2 – Notional Placement of Elements within an Array Face 
 
 One of the inherent disadvantages to using this spacing between OA elements is 
the effect known as mutual coupling.  Mutual coupling occurs between closely spaced 
antenna elements.  Coupling may occur by radiation, from surface paths, from paths 
within the feed structure or from reflections at the antenna terminal due to impedance 
mismatches.  The effects of mutual coupling include distortions in the radiation pattern 
and variations in the element gains.  Mutual coupling may be characterized by a coupling 
coefficient mnc  that relates the current flowing into the nth element due to the current 








mnd  = distance between nth and mth elements 
        K =  coupling coefficient constant 
 
 Figure 3 below graphs the relationship between the mutual coupling coefficient 
and the separation between antenna elements.  Observe that the equation for mnc  is 
simply a sin function. Hence, the effects of mutual coupling are undulatory with the 









Figure 3 - Relationship between Coupling Coefficient and Antenna Element Separation 
 
 Theoretically, the effects of mutual coupling can be calculated and hence 
compensated. In reality, the coupling coefficient is not easily measured, is not stable with 
scan angle and is not conveniently controlled; especially for large ship-sized arrays which 
are too big to be tested in a controlled environment.  The best way to reduce the effects of 
mutual coupling is to increase the distance between individual antenna elements beyond 
the requisite 
2
λ  criteria presented in the equation for mnc .  This process is commonly 
known as “thinning.”  This approach can possibly result in higher sidelobes and increased 
grating lobe levels unless an aperiodic array is designed.129 
 
 In order to have minimal interference between OASR elements, the minimum 
physical spacing between the elements on the hull of the ship should be greater than ½ of 
the wavelength of the beam in use.  The DARBC radar will operate in the VHF (216-225 
MHz) and UHF (420-450 MHz) frequency bands.  Calculation of the wavelengths for the 
































 The desired minimum spacing between elements (the spacing which will cause 
minimal interference at any frequency of operation) will have to be ½ VHF λ (max) 
which is 0.695m.  Our goal is to have this minimum separation between array elements in 
all directions within the aperstructure.  This spacing will minimize phase interference 
between elements which plays a part in optimizing the DARBC’s ability to have the 
narrowest beam possible.  A one degree beam-width will translate to a 35 km beam width 
at a range of 2000 km so it is necessary to consider everything within the design of the 
radar which can influence the beam width. A narrower wavelength separation may cause 
the beam to have a large scatter point when it illuminates the target, thereby causing the 
convergent point of the beam to be off slightly. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Table 2 shows the parameters for the ship topside integration. 
Array Element Size 0.5 square meters x 2” thick 
Feed Horn Size 0.0762 meters (diameter)  
Calculated Element Spacing (Min) 0.695 meters  
Proposed Element Spacing (Min) 0.707 meters  
Number of Elements per Face 
(Min) 200 elements  
Number of Elements per Face 
(Max) 3411 elements  
Number of Array Faces 3 faces 
Total Number of Elements 7022 elements (see Table 2 for explanation) 
Average Power per Element 400 Watts 
Maximum Power 2.80 Mega Watts 
Weight of Each Element 10 lbs 
Total Weight of Elements 70,220 lbs 
Table 2 – Ship Integration Parameters 
Maximum power is based on 100% of T/R elements transmitting to port or starboard 
(3411 elements).  Operationally it would be anticipated that less than 100% of the 
elements would be used and performance characterization may be based on a different 
value for Power.
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I. PURPOSE 
Ships are subject to flexure due to a variety of construction, environmental and 
operational parameters.  The Digital Array Radar for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 
and Counter-stealth (DARBC) has radar Transmit/Receive (T/R) elements dispersed 
throughout the ship hull and superstructure.  Ship flexure can impact system performance 
by introducing alignment errors between elements.  Traditionally these errors occur 
between various elements such as a fire control radar and a gun system.  For the DARBC, 
errors introduced by ship flexure will be across T/R elements which will affect beam 
forming and antenna alignment.  This can impact radar system performance for detection 
of threats and in providing accurate track information for handover to other sensors in the 
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system network.  Current systems performance has not 
suffered as error budgets absorb ship flexure errors.  Increasing ranges and capabilities of 
ballistic missile threats and resulting system capability requirements may not allow this in 
future systems like DARBC.130  This paper attempts to identify errors and classify in a 
system error budget.  This paper will also describe potential methods for compensation. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Ships need to flex to prevent intolerable buildup of stresses in the ship structure 
when subjected to operational conditions of the sea.131  Ship flexure shows up as relative 
rotational motion between two points and can result in unfavorable misalignment 
between elements located between these two points.  In traditional (current) combat 
system configurations this results in static or bias errors and dynamic errors between 
various combat system elements.  These errors have been calculated and handled through 
system error budgets as opposed to providing a compensation to eliminate or reduce these 
errors.  Despite being the largest error contributor, ship flexure is deemed acceptable as 
its impact is reduced by systems with closed loop tracking, large beamwidths of 
illuminators, and close in engagements (relative to ballistic missile engagements).  As 
engagements increase in range from ship to meet increasingly capable threats, these 
errors can become intolerable to support functions such as handover to sensors (organic 
and off platform) and engagements with missile or other weapon systems.  DARBC is a 
non traditional sensor.  As the array elements are distributed across the ship hull and 
superstructure, ship flexure will have a significant impact on element to element 
positional spacing and alignment resulting in phase differences of T/R element impacting 
overall system performance. 
III. DISCUSSION 
Ship flexure is generally defined as the uncompensated relative angular difference 
between two combat system elements from the compensated aligned state.  Combat 
system alignment is accomplished on every ship to baseline the system.  This is 
accomplished as part of new construction and after major overall maintenance periods.  
Additionally alignments can be done throughout the life cycle of a ship when it is 
believed an error exists.  Alignment is a very time consuming and labor intensive process 
which can be interpreted as costly and therefore undesirable to perform.  Combat system 
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alignment is performed pier side during the night or morning hours before solar heating 
can impact measurements.  Flexure is broken down into static bias errors which occur 
over a long periods (minutes to permanent) and dynamic which is constantly changing 
during an engagement. 
 
Static Flexure Examples: 
1.  Solar loading.  The sun can dramatically impact ship flexure.  If the sun is exposed to 
only one side of the ship as in morning or evening hours it will heat the ship and cause 
expansion relative to the unexposed side.  Solar loading can create changes of several arc 
minutes between elements.  The amount of solar loading and shade, material of the ship 
and its expansion under heating, duration of loading all contribute to amount of change. 
2.  Lead-out.  Ships require a great deal of material for operation including weapons, fuel, 
food stores, spares, personnel and associated materials.  This distributed weight varies as 
the ship operates (consumes fuel and other material).  Alignment of ships is generally 
conducted when ships are loaded to 90% total weight.  This requirement can be difficult 
to achieve as the ship may not be fully equipped at the point of alignment.  Loading 
arrangement during alignment test may also not reflect operational lead-out as weapons 
and material may need to be simulated.    
3.  Temperature.  Similar to solar loading, air and sea temperature can have dramatic 
effects on ship alignment by expansion of hull materials.  
4.  Impact.  A permanent flex or bend to a ship caused by a load such as a large swell, 
impact with another ship or pier, near explosion.  When detected this can be measured 
through another alignment test and compensated for.  
5.  Steady winds. 
6.  Improper measurements during alignment test.  Human error, test equipment error and 
poor procedures can contribute to a static error problem by not properly measuring 
baseline alignment of a ship. 
 
Dynamic Flexure Examples: 
1.  Waves.  Sea state is the most common parameter describing the load that forces ship 
flexure.  Sea state is a standard measure of wind speed, swell size and swell period that 
can cause hogging and twisting moments on the ship.  The length and beam of the ship, 
its speed and direction relative to the seas as well as its height and construction material 
and structure will ultimately determine susceptibility to flexure under load.   A large 
swell of a period that introduces the most significant hogging effects is considered the 
worst condition. 
2.  Vibration.  Vibration on a ship can be causes by a number of sources such as operating 
equipment and operational environment induced by sea state.   
3.  Maneuvers.  Speed and rate of turns will cause torsional loads on ship hull. 
 
 
Flexure Impact to Alignment and Radar Performance: 
Susceptibility to flexure can vary across ship class designs due to a variety of 
impacts.  Ship design aspects such as material (Steel, aluminum, composite), construction 
(material thickness, support structure, open space), length, beam, weight, height, hull type 
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(mono-hull, catamaran, trimaran other) all contribute to the stiffness or flexibility of the 
ship overall or in certain locations.  The further away from amidships on the hull a 
superstructure element is located, the greater the susceptibility to flexure can be expected.  
Also the farther up the mast an element is located the greater flexure can impact.  The use 
of aperstructures needs to be considered due to the use of composites which may have 
different response to flexure than metal hulls.  No analysis is provided in this Technote as 
to whether this would have a positive or negative effect.  The large dispersal of elements 
along the hull can contribute to effect of alignment.  Alignment errors will have the 
following two primary impacts which are depicted in figure 1: 
• T/R elements will be out of relative position resulting in phase shift errors, 
decreasing antenna gain and reducing performance for detection and tracking.   
• Antenna alignment to ships reference will be effected causing bias errors 
resulting in mismatch between antenna and other sensors and possibly 
sections of the antenna.  This could result in lost tracks and poor handover 
between elements. 
 
Dynamic flexure is usually a cyclic event and can be minimized by mathematical 
filters in the radar.  Static flexure is an unknown bias and cannot be undone with filtering.  
Reference (a) discusses criteria for sensor synchronization in detail and provides overall 
azimuth and elevation pointing error as ship does not act as a point source (gun, single 
phased array face, dish radar).  This can be on the order of several milliradians.  At 
1000km, 1 milliradian error equates to a distance of approximately 300 meters.  When 
different portions of the ship array elements provide the radiating portion of the radar, 
misalignment can occur as the track is handed over to other portions of the ship array 
elements due to ship turns and target relative position.   
 
Figure 1. Ship flexure impact to beam formation and detection range reduction 
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Ballistic Missile Defense Problem: 
 
The operating ranges for detection, tracking and engagement of ballistic missiles 
coupled with the small radar cross section of threats, high velocity of both threat and 
interceptor and need to hit-to-kill engagements allow for little error.  Crossing targets 
make the intercept volume for a kinetic kill weapon smaller.  The intercept volume is the 
space that the target and weapon will fill at the same time.  A nose on engagement can 
provide a longer volume as intercept timing will be dependant on the angle of attack.  
Figure 2 shows this aspect angle effect for a straight on and crossing target case.  
Handover between sensors on the same platform is difficult due to time synchronization 
errors of the two systems in addition to alignment errors.  On a single platform the 
sensors are generally aligned to the same reference point and use the same geodesic 
reference.  They can also be keyed to the same clock reference.  Handover to a second 
sensor separated from the ship will increase potential for time synchronization errors and 
positional reference problems.  Sensors can be cued and depending on the particular 
sensor beamwidth capability, can be directed into a search pattern to acquire the target if 
errors are to significant where direct cueing will not generate a track. 
 
If the sensor handover is to an interceptor, the error budget will be determined by 
the onboard sensor range and resultant phase of flight.  This is generally late in flight and 
results in a very small error budget contribution.  If the handover for DARBC is to a fire 
control level quality/accuracy sensor, the error budget can be larger but will depend on 
the characteristics/performance of that sensor (or multiple sensors in the case of a 
network of BMD sensors). 
 
Figure 2.  Two cases of head on and crossing aspect angles 
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Antenna Alignment of DARBC array 
 
Large antenna arrays such as DARBC will naturally flex over time and require a 
cohering or calibration method to determine antenna element locations and provide 
accurate digital beam-forming.  Reference b. provides a description of a broadcast 
reference technique that could be applied for the DARBC.  The method measures phase 
of each element with respect to a number of reference beacons.  Reference (b) also 
describes a self-cohering technique where one element (or possibly more) transmits 
conducting a self survey of the array which also applies the use of reference beacons.  
The uses of beacons in both the far field and near field are implied in the article.     
 
Cost and time to perform a physical measurement and mechanical battery alignment 
of approximately 2000 elements of an Opportunistic Array (OA) would be time and cost 
prohibitive.  The capability to dynamically calibrate, while in port or on a fixed site will 
be required for this radar system.  The use of reference beacons of known location with 
respect to the DARBC ship would potentially require the development of special 
facilities.  The entire radar would need to be visible to the beacons which may not be 
practical in most navy ports.  The ship would need to have the ability to transmit at this 
facility as well which can also be a problem especially at high power levels.  A fixed or 
portable calibration system nearby Navy ports to be used upon exiting port is an option 
but would require the ship to be underway and subject to flexure effects from the sea.  
This calibration system would still be subject to the errors that can occur in alignment 
tests of today.  Ship flexure due to solar loading, wind loading, and temperature 
variations would have the same impacts.  Alignment of DARBC to other sensors would 
also need to be considered.  The beacon array would ostensibly operate in the VHF/UHF 
band.  Co-locating other frequency systems and optical reference objects could allow 
alignment to other primary sensors.  The Shipboard Electronic Systems Evaluation 
Facility (SESEF) utilizes the Universal Radar Moving Target Transponder (URMTT) as 
a supplement to aircraft services and other Electronic Target Generators (ETG) also exist 
which could be used as a repeatable test tool to train ships and to help with alignment.  
Since SESEF facilities are land based, they are limited in assessing elevation.  Placement 





Once aligned, dynamic compensation could be provided by a number of different 
means.  Automatic laser tracking tools exist that can measure positions of targets in 3D 
coordinates with high accuracy.  Ships that flex can use a number of laser elements and 
reflectors on the hull (the targets) to measure flexure dynamically.  The system would 
need sufficient laser systems in certain portions of the hull form and algorithms and 
processing to determine though extrapolation flexure over large sections of the hull. 
 
The use of differential GPS has been speculated and eliminated as an option for 
measuring positions of sensors under reference (a) Miniature Ring laser gyros could be 
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located throughout the ship to measure 3-dimensional rotation and compare to a reference 
plane to determine areas of flexure.  Currently ships have two gyros for redundancy to 
measure ships roll pitch and yaw.  The two gyros will show different responses while 
ship is underway and responses are recorded.  This difference is due to ship flexure, 
differences in hardware alignment or drift of electronics internal to the gyros.  This fact 
could permit multiple gyros to be placed around key positions on the ship that represent 
portions of array elements.    
Reference (a) identified the potential use of Quartz Rate Sensor to detect angular 
rate motions.  By integrating three gyros for three axis and coupling with a clock, angular 
displacement can be determined similar to the gyro concept described above.  They have 
the advantage of being small and low cost but were deemed to immature in design at this 
point to be a viable alternative.   
For all these options integration of these sensors for measuring flexure would 
require development of both hardware and computer software.  Installation of small low 
cost sensor cages at key appropriate combat system elements including DARBC array 
elements would be required.  The software would need to collect, correlate and interpret 
the data from the sensors and translate into dynamic compensation adjustments.   
Gyros are likely to experience gyro drift over time.  One possible way to minimize 
drift would be to develop a hybrid system consisting of both gyros and lasers.  The lasers 
could be used to measure and periodically remove any bias. 
 




RSS= root sum 
squared 




Flexure Static  RSS 39
   Temperature/sun .5 m displacement 30
   Wind loading .3 m displacement 20
   Load-out .2 m displacement 10
   Alignment test errors n/a 5
   Post alignment impact .2 m displacement 10
Flexure Dynamic RSS 32
   Waves/maneuvers .5 m displacement 30
   Vibration .2 m displacement 10
Time latency between sensors  RSS 45
   DARBC to own ship sensor negligible 0
   DARBC to off ship Fire Control sensor > .01 sec 45
DARBC as FC to interceptor missile   n/a 
Geo Position error RSS 50
    DARBC ship to off board sensor > 1 m displacement 50
Total Errors   98
Table 1 – Error Budget Ship Flexure 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The operational requirements for DARBC will provide determination of overall 
mission requirements and capabilities.  The DARBC ship and its outfitted systems and 
interfaced systems to DARBC, will determine the error budget and define the capabilities 
the radar will be designed to.  If ship flexure is determined to be too large of an error 
contributor, dynamic compensation will be looked at to reduce errors.  Ship flexure errors 
may be exceeded by time latencies between platforms and position determination but will 
still be a significant contributor to overall error.  The increased ranges and strenuous 
mission profiles to support BMD scenarios will likely cause tighter error budgets than 
today systems.  The length and distribution of DARBC array elements will make this 
radar susceptible to flexure problems.  Reduced detection ranges and difficulty in 
maintaining track or handing over to other sensors are the likely problems caused by this 
flexure.  No methods exist today to measure and compensate for flexure.  Several 
technologies have potential to provide dynamic compensation but none appear to be a 
clear leader.  Further investigation of mitigating methods is recommended.  Calibrating 
the DARBC array will likely need to be done both pier side and underway to verify 
alignment and determine compensation to remove biases.  This calibration may be 
intensive for facility development due to expected unique configuration of ship and need 
to keep the process non labor intensive. 
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I. PURPOSE 
This paper lists the cooling requirements for the key component of the DARBC 
Radar System, its T/R module.  Different methods of cooling and their tradeoffs are 
considered in order to satisfy a range of requirements.   
II. BACKGROUND 
Reference (a) provided the thresholds for different types of substrate options that 
the T/R module may utilize.  The substrate consists of a dielectric material that affects the 
electrical performance of the antenna, circuits and transmission line for OASR. 
References (b) and (c) provide information on the best method to cool the T/R module. 
III. DISCUSSION 
No initial attempt was made to define measures, thresholds or objectives.    
Requirements were identified from references (a).  Table 1 compares various substrate 
options with relevant properties.  The substrate properties include the different constant 
dielectric, loss tangent, dimensional stability, chemical resistance, and temperature range. 
In addition, the relative cost is also considered as part of tradeoff studies. 
Table 1 
Substrate 









Range (F degree) Relative  Cost 
Ceramic Substrates             
Alumina    9.8 0.0004 Excellent Excellent  to +1600  
Medium to 
high 
Sapphire      9.4, 1.6 0.0001 Excellent Excellent -24 to +370 Very high 
Semiconductor Substrates             
GaAs     13 0.0006 Excellent Excellent -55 to +260 Very High 
Silicon      11.9 0.0004 Excellent Excellent -55 to +260 High 
Ferromagnetic Substrates             
Ferrite 9.0 to 16 0.001 Excellent Excellent -24 to +370 Medium 
Synthetic Substrates             
PTFE (Teflon) 2.1 0.0004 Poor Excellent -27 to +260 Medium 
Polypropylene      2.18 0.0003 Poor Good -27 to +200 Medium 
Composite Material Substrates             




0.0022 Excellent Excellent -27 to +260  Medium 
 
T/R Module Component Analysis 
Table 2 is a list of components from reference (d), that can be use to build the T/R 
module and the substrates that can be used for the component based on the new hybrid 
MIC/MMIC (microwave integrated) architecture: 








Component Substrate Function Area 
Bipolar Transistor Silicon based Transmit 
Pin Diode Silicon based Receive 
Low noise amplifier (LNA) GaAs MMICs  Transmit 
Digital Attenuator  GaAs MMICs  Receive 
Phase Shifter  GaAs MMICs  Receive 
T/R switches  GaAs MMICs  Transmit/Receive 
Microstrip circuitry  Ceramic microwave laminates Transmit/Receive 
 
Analysis of Table 1 and Table 2 indicated that Temperature range for the 
Semiconductor Substrates range from -55 degrees to +260 F degrees and ceramic up to 




The research found that there are many different methods for transferring heat.  
These methods can be use for T/R module cooling. The optimal method depends upon 
the temperatures and tolerances of the application, and impact to system overall 
performance and supportability.  Table 3 is an overview of other cooling techniques and 
their advantages and disadvantages from reference (b) and reference (c):  
      
Table 3 
Cooling Method Advantages Disadvantages 
Thermoelectric coolers 
• Can be used in any orientation  
• Small size  
• No moving parts 
• Cooling below ambient  
• Temperature control  
• Heating capability  
• Compatible with heat sinks, cold 
plates, and heat pipes 
• DC power source required 
• Not practical for large electronic 
system  





Fans and blowers 
• Low cost  
• Installation flexibility 
• Air exchange is required; potential 
 for dust and moisture  
• Ineffective for high-power devices  
• Object cannot be cooled at or below 
ambient 
Heat sinks 
• Low cost  
• Installation flexibility 
• No cooling at or below ambient  
• No temperature control 
Liquid cold plates • Size (at point of attachment)  • Cannot cool below ambient (liquid) 
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Cooling Method Advantages Disadvantages 
(passive) • Heat dissipation effectiveness  temperature  
• No temperature control  
• Potential for leaks  
• Liquid source availability 
Heat pipes • Reliability  
• Size 
• Cannot cool below ambient  
• No temperature control 
Compressor-based cooling 
• Cooling large amounts of heat  
• Cooling below ambient  
• Temperature control 
• Maintenance/ reliability (moving 
parts)  
• Size (units tend to be bulky)  
• Noise  
• Limited installation flexibility 
      
Figure 1, from reference (c) shows the thermal resistance from different types of 
cooling fluids per 10 cm2 area.  Natural air convection provides the highest range of 
thermal resistance and boiling water provides the lowest range of resistance.   
Figure 2 
 
      Figure 1 
 
 
Thermoelectric cooling System 
The most practical method for cooling the T/R module from analysis is the 
combination of heat sink, fan, and thermoelectric device. The combination of this is 
called a “thermoelectric cooling system.”  Figure 2 from reference (c) details the design 
of the thermoelectric cooling system. 
 
     
       
From reference (b), thermoelectric are solid-state heat pumps made from 
semiconductor materials. They have no moving parts. Thermoelectrics are manufactured 
in modular form, where a series of p-type and n-type semiconductor element junctions 
are sandwiched between ceramic plates. At the cold junction, heat is absorbed by 
electrons as they pass from a low-energy level in the p-type element to a higher energy 
level in the n-type element. A DC power supply provides the energy to move the 
electrons through the system. At the hot junction, energy is expelled to a heat sink as the 
electrons move from a high-energy element (n-type) to a lower level element (p-type). A 
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typical thermoelectric cooling module contains as many as 127 junctions and can pump 
as much as 120 W of heat. The amount of heat pumped is proportional to the amount of 
current flowing through the thermoelectric. Therefore, tight temperature control 
(<0.01°C) is possible. By reversing the current, a thermoelectric can be used to heat. This 
is valuable when controlling an object in changing ambient environments or cycling at 
different temperatures. The sizes range from 2 to 62 mm and multiple thermoelectrics can 
be used for greater cooling. Because of the relatively large amount of heat pumping over 
a small area, thermoelectrics require a heat sink and fan to dissipate the heat into the 
ambient environment. 
For the T/R module, a thermoelectric cooling system is the most practical method 
for maintaining the temperature of small enclosures since it does not require fluid 
convection where plumbing is needed.  In addition, thermoelectric system uses forced air 
convection, which has the thermal resistance range between 8 K/W and 100 K/W per 10 
cm2 area, from figure 1.  As shown in figure 1, thermoelectric device is sandwiched 
between two heat sinks. One heat sink is placed into the enclosure, while the other 
remains outside. As current flows through the thermoelectric, the inside heat sink cools, 
allowing it to absorb heat from the enclosed air. A fan is used to circulate the air to 
reduce temperature gradients within the enclosure, which increases the efficiency of the 
thermoelectric device. The hot-side heat sink increases in temperature as the heat is 
absorbed from the enclosure as well as from the joule heat pumped into it. The ambient 
air absorbs the heat from the hot-side heat sink. As with the cold side, a fan on the hot 
side will greatly increase the performance and efficiency of the thermoelectric. The 
temperature of the enclosure can be controlled through simple on-off thermostats or more 
precise controllers that adjust the input power to the thermoelectric depending upon 
temperature. Condensation removal can be accomplished by using drainage ports or 
incorporating absorptive materials and wick structures.  Consistent temperature control 
and cooling below ambient can improve component reliability. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Technote provides the technical reference for the cooling of the T/R module.  
The recommendation is to use the thermoelectric system to cool the T/R module due to 
its small size and temperature control capability.  The advantage of the small size of 
thermoelectric cooler is the reduction in overall weight and size of the DARBC system, 
which increases overall system modularity and transportability. 
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I. PURPOSE 
The Digital Array Radar for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and Counter-stealth 
(DARBC) is being designed primarily to search for, detect, and track ballistic missiles 
and counter-stealth threats, but with minor modifications to the radar’s design this system 
could be used as a “Soft Kill” weapon to counter Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) and 
other threats.  The idea is that the DARBC will be able to direct radiation in order to 
disrupt communication and/or destroy electronics onboard enemy platforms and 
weapons.  This technote will discuss the potential capabilities that exist for the DARBC 
to be used as a weapon.  
II. BACKGROUND 
Electronic Attack (EA) is defined as the division of Electronic Warfare (EW) 
involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to attack personnel, facilities, or 
equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat 
capability132.  EA includes actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of 
the electromagnetic spectrum, such as Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) (jamming 
and deception) and employment of weapons that use electromagnetic, optical or directed 
energy as their primary destructive mechanism an in Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) 
(lasers, RF weapons, particle beams) 133 .  This paper will discuss both the jamming and 
destructive mechanisms that could be incorporated in the design of the DARBC. 
III. DISCUSSION 
The DARBC can be primarily classified as a AN/SPQ type radar as it is an at-sea based 
radar platform with missions of searching for and detecting enemy missiles, performing 
identification and recognition, and some level of surveillance and control.  However, with 
no additional modifications to the physical technology, this radar could also be capable of 
performing other EA functions as more of an AN/SLQ (countermeasure) system.  This 
multi-role, multi-purpose DARBC system could ultimately be classified as an AN/SSQ if 
all of these capabilities can be realized.  Table 1 shows the Joint Electronics Type 




Platform Installation  
Second Letter 
Equipment Type  
Third Letter 
Function or Purpose  
A - Piloted aircraft 
B - Underwater mobile, 
submarine 
D - Pilotless carrier 
F - Fixed ground 
G - General ground use 
K - Amphibious 
M - Mobile (ground) 
P - Portable 
S - Water 
T - Ground, transportable 
U - General utility 
V - Vehicular (ground) 
A - Invisible light, heat radiation 
C - Carrier  
D - Radiac 
F - Photographic 
G - Telegraph or teletype 
I - Interphone and public address 
J - Electromechanical or inertial wire 
covered 
K - Telemetering 
L - Countermeasures 
M - Meteorological 
N - Sound in air 
P - Radar 
B - Bombing 
C - Communications 
D - Direction finder, reconnaissance and/or 
surveillance 
E - Ejection and/or release 
G - Fire control or searchlight directing 
H - Recording and/or reproducing 
K - Computing 
M - Maintenance and/or test assemblies 
N - Navigation aids 
Q - Special or combination of purposes 
R - Receiving, passive detecting 
S - Detecting and/or range and bearing, search 
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W - Water surface and 
underwater 
combination 
Z - Piloted-pilotless airborne 
vehicle 
combination  
Q - Sonar and underwater sound 
R - Radio 
S - Special or combinations of types 
T - Telephone (wire) 
V - Visual and visible light 
W - Armament 
X - Facsimile or television 
Y - Data Processing  
T - Transmitting 
W - Automatic flight or remote control 
X - Identification and recognition 
Y - Surveillance and control 
Table 1 
 
The two types of EA which are used against enemy communications are jamming and 
deception, both of which are types of ECM.  Jamming is also be thought of as 
“Concealment or Masking”, which broadcasts lots of radiation within the frequencies 
used by the enemy for communication in an effort to overpower the communication 
signals and inhibiting the passage of the enemy messages. Deception or “Forgery” sends 
communication signals to the enemy radar, imitating the enemy’s communications in an 
effort to confuse the enemy’s communication systems.  To do this, the DARBC would 
have to be able to monitor (receive) enemy communications and imitate those signals and 
broadcast them out back to the enemy receivers135. 
 
The main threats against the DARBC platform would be ASCMs.  ASCMs can have 
various modes of guidance such as GPS, active homing, semi-active homing, heat 
seeking, TV or infra-red guided.  In all of these cases, there has to be either 
communication between the ASCM and the DARBC platform (homing or heat seeking) 
or communication between the ASCM and another guidance source (GPS).  If these 
communication methods can be interrupted, there is a greater potential of the ASCM 
missing the target.   
 
Since the DARBC is a VHF/UHF radar and does not have the capability to communicate 
on other frequencies, it is not likely that the DARBC would be a very good as a deception 
Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) platform.  ASCMs such as the Exocet use X-band 
active homing which is outside the range of the DARBC’s spectrum136.  Since the 
DARBC would not be a good candidate for conducting jamming and deception missions, 
we will now look at the possibility of using the DARBC as a destructive RF weapon. 
 
Based on the radar technical parameters research, the DARBC will be capable of 
producing in excess of 500 kW peak of output signal.  If all this power can be directed at 
an incoming ASCM at relatively close range (compared to the DARBC’s typical search 
ranges), the DARBC can generate a Non-Nuclear Electro-Magnetic Pulse (NNEMP) 
which is generated without use of nuclear weapons137. In order to achieve the frequency 
characteristics of the pulse needed for optimal coupling into the ASCM, the addition of 
wave-shaping circuits and/or microwave generators need to be added between the 
DARBC radiating element and the antenna.  
When NNEMPs are coupled with existing electronic systems such as ASCMs, damaging 
current and voltage surges can be induced on those systems causing failure138.  The 
signals power and the pulse of the signal are what drive the effectiveness of an EMP 
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signal.  Higher frequency signals such as microwave signals are more effective than 
lower frequencies139, such as VHF or UHF.  Due to the low operational frequencies, even 
with the high power output, the DARBC could not effectively deliver EMPs on close 
range targets.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
Even with the ability to direct high amounts of energy, the DARBC would 
probably not be capable of emitting EMPs effectively as part of a platform self-defense 
effort or short range offensive effort.  Further investigation could still be conducted into 
the vulnerabilities of electronic systems to high power VHF and UHF signals.  The 
DARBC would not be a good candidate for an ECM platform which could produce 
jamming or deception forms of EA due to the limited bandwidth of the radar.  However, 
if enemy communications were known to be operating in the VHF or UHF spectrums, the 
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This Technote will discuss the logistics and associated budget requirements 
affecting supportability that must be achieved to operationally sustain the DARBC radar 




An acquisition logistics process will have to be implemented for the DARBC 
radar system in order to achieve logistics program success based on the design, test, and 
production practices conducted during the various acquisition phases. The systems 
engineering process and the logistics planning must be accomplish at the same time in 
order to generate the logistics support requirements to maintain the DARBC radar system 
for its mission purposes. Operational and maintenance constraints must be identified 
early to ensure that the design development outcomes for the DARBC radar system can 
be implemented and supported at a practical cost.  DARBC design concepts differ 
significantly from traditional radars in service today.  These concepts must be assessed 




DARBC Radar System Maintenance Concepts and Supply Support Strategies 
 
 DARBC Radar System Equipment Support 
 
The supply support strategy will be to ensure that there is an adequate range and 
depth of On-Board Repair Parts (OBRP) available for the fleet to properly operate and 
maintain the DARBC radar system.  Due to the planned high design reliability for the 
DARBC radar system, OBRPs will not be calculated as allowance items in the ship.  All 
supply requisitions for parts will be processed by NAVICP-M using normal operating 
supply procedures.  
 
 Maintenance Concepts 
  
 The DARBC radar system maintenance concept will be based on Organizational 
Level (O-Level) and Depot Level (D-Level) maintenance. There is not Intermediate 
Level Maintenance planned for the system unless required for DARBC unique 
requirements for alignment calibration discussed below and in the Technote on ship 
flexure.   The use of prototype systems and modeling of spaces will be used to evaluate 
maintenance concepts and identify risk areas such as access to compartments and spaces 
where radar elements are placed.    
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 Organizational Level Maintenance 
 
 O-level maintenance will include Preventive Maintenance (PM) and Corrective 
Maintenance (CM). An Electronic Technician (ET) will accomplish O-Level 
maintenance. O-Level Corrective Maintenance will use failure diagnosis, Built-in-Tests 
(BIT) and reach-back distance support services that will provide the ET significant 
technical expertise resources.  Prognostics will be used by off-ship resources to monitor 
system status relieving O-Level support of system monitoring functions and performing 
scheduled maintenance that can be performed remotely. Maintenance will be limited to 
removal and replacement of failed parts at the Lowest Replaceable Units (LRUs). 
 
 Preventive Maintenance 
 
 Preventative Maintenance (PM) will be accomplished and conducted using the 
ship’s 3M Planned Maintenance System (PMS).  PM will be performed using procedures 
documented in Maintenance Index Pages (MIPs) and Maintenance Requirement Cards 
(MRCs).  Preventive and Planned maintenance will be performed by an ET and 
significantly augmented by remote distance support using prognostics to evaluate system 
performance and identify parts that require replacement reducing on-ship manpower 
required for maintenance.   
 
 Corrective Maintenance 
 
 Corrective Maintenance restores equipment to operational condition. It will be 
limited to identification and replacement of failed LRUs such as Circuit Card Assemblies 
(CCAs). Faults identified during planned maintenance actions or equipment operations 
will be isolated to a specific LRU through the use of BIT trouble shooting techniques.  
Corrective maintenance will be performed by an ET through a mix of repair piece parts 
repair and LRU replacement.  A design goal is to isolate faults to a single LRU 95% of 
the time.  This design goal will be assessed against the impact of adding additional parts 
and ETs to meet supportability goals.  The identification of failed items using remote 
diagnostics will require fault diagnosis to a higher level of certainty.   
 
 Depot Level Maintenance 
 
 Depot Level will consist of repairing failed assemblies, subassemblies and 
modules turned in by the using ship. The Allowance Parts List (APL) and the Master 
Repairable Items List (MRIL) will identify those items in the DARBC radar system 
designated as depot level repairable items. 
 
 During the ships scheduled overhaul periods (Regular Overhaul (ROH)) the 
DARBC radar system static/dynamic ship alignment of the entire array of elements will 
be performed by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), overhaul shipyard or 
Navy approved organic depot.  The dispersion of array elements across the entire ship 
superstructure and tolerances required for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) will make the 
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radar susceptible to performance degradation due to ship flexure.  Periodic alignment and 
calibration may be required beyond that normally conducted on today’s in service 
sensors.  Evaluations of different concepts for alignment are discussed in Technote on 
ship flexure.  These include pierside beacons, shore facility beacon and electronic target 
generators, and embedded self measurement and corrective systems.  This may require an 
additional level of maintenance beyond just O and D level. 
 
 Technical Assistance 
 
 Direct Fleet support will consist of resolution of maintenance/repair problems 
which are beyond the capability of ship personnel to correct. Request for Fleet support in 
the resolution or repair of the DARBC radar system casualty will be coordinated by the 
applicable Type Commanders (TYCOMs) with the local Regional Maintenance Centers 
(RMCs). 
 
Direct Fleet support can be reduced for the DARBC radar system by 
implementing BIT technology in the design of the DARBC radar system. BIT technology 
can be utilized on the DARBC radar system for two reasons:  (1) BIT lends itself to 
automated long distance support and (2) onboard trouble shooting assistance to the 
technician.  The long distance support can be comprised of many shore based facilities 
including the Depot, Intermediate or In Service Engineering Agent (ISEA).  This long 
distance support can be utilized via secure internet, teleconferencing or even telephone.  
Utilizing BIT technology and long distance support will reduce Mean Time to Repair 
(MTTR), manning requirements and increase Operational Availability (Ao).  Distance 
support can also employ prognostics to assess system trends in performance and 
determine where parts may be ready for failure and replacement.  The repair part can be 
shipped and installed before system failure and downtime result. 
 
Supply Support Strategies 
 
The supply support strategy is to ensure there is an adequate range and depth of 
ORBPs available for the Fleet to properly operate and maintain the DARBC radar 
system.  The DARBC radar system key performance parameters for reliability, 
maintainability, and availability are defined to be medium-to-high, and therefore ORBPs 
will not be calculated as allowance items in the ships load out Coordinated Shipboard 
Allowance List (COSAL).  All requisitions for parts will be processed by NAVICP-M 
using normal operating supply procedures.  The required parts for the DARBC radar 
system will be provision by the ISEA and management in the applicable APLs by 
NAVICP-M. Spare parts shall be requisitioned using procedures described in NAVSUP 




DARBC Radar System Manpower, Personnel and Training 
 
 The DARBC radar system training and manning requirements will be documented 
by developing a Navy Training System Plan (NTSP).  The NTSP will be promulgated 
and reviewed by a future sponsor, Fleet, training communities, Director of Navy Training 
and Navy Manpower Analysis Center.  The future sponsor approves the NTSP which will 
establish the baseline for training and manning requirements that the DARBC radar 
system must comply to meet the fleet readiness requirements.  The DARBC radar system 
key performance parameters for reliability, maintainability, and availability are critical 
during the design phase to identify drivers of support and manpower requirements.  The 
maintenance task times, maintenance skill levels and number of maintenance personnel 
required will be determined by the following metrics: 
 
Reliability (MTBF key performance parameters) 
Maintainability (MTTR, maintenance task times) 
Availability (Task time limits). 
Reliability and Maintainability tests. 
Performance monitoring/fault detection/fault isolation and diagnostics. 
Test conducted under representative operating conditions. 
 
Based on the key performance parameters to be achieved and meeting the Navy’s new 
concept for fewer personnel to operate an entire ship, the manning requirements for the 
radar system aboard ship should be one technician that will have collateral duties as a 
maintainer and operator.    
 
DARBC Radar System Packaging, Handling, Storage and Transpiration 
 
 The goal of Packaging, Handling, Storage and Transportation (PHS&T) is to 
ensure to the fleet user of the DARBC radar system when and where it is needed, with 
factory built-in reliability unimpaired.  MIL-E-17555 sets forth packaging requirements 
for electronic equipment, MIL-STD-794 sets forth general procedures for packaging and 
packing, and Naval Material Command Instruction (NAVMAINST) 4030.11A sets forth 
policy concerning requirements for packing hazardous material.  The OEM must adhere 
to the above standards in order to deliver a functional DARBC radar system to the fleet.  
 
DARBC Radar System Configuration Management 
 
 The Configuration Management (CM) process will be used to evaluate and 
approve/disapprove proposed design changes that will affect the DARBC system form, fit 
or function that is defined in the ICD and CDD.  These changes are referred to as Class I 
changes. This process will ensure that configuration control is maintained throughout the 
life cycle of the DARBC, and that all logistics documentation is current and available to 
the fleet for operational support. 
 
DARBC Radar System Technical Data 
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 Technical Data Packages 
 
 Technical data for the DARBC radar system will include commercial manuals, 
provision technical data, commercial drawings, MIPs, and MRCs. 
 
 Technical Manuals 
 
 NAVSEAINST 4160.3A establishes the policy, responsibilities, and requirements 
for the planning, budgeting, development, distribution, and life cycle management of 
NAVSEA Technical Manuals (TMs)/Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals (IETMs).  
The DARBC radar system must comply with all requirements set forth in the 
NAVSEAINST in order to provide useable and accurate technical manuals to the fleet. 
 
 
Planned Maintenance System Documentation 
 
 Planned Maintenance System (PMS) tasks are conducted using the ship’s 3-M 
PMS. The DARBC radar system PMS will be performed using procedures documented in 
the MIPs and MRCs. 
 
Provisioning Technical Documentation (PTD) 
 
 The ISEA for the DARBC radar system will be responsible for process 
Provisioning Technical Documentation (PTD).  All ISEA reviewed PTD changes will be 




 Commercial drawings from the OEM will be utilized in order to produce Navy 
standard Installation Control Drawings (ICDs) for applicable ship classes in which the 
DARBC radar system will be installed. 
 
Budget Requirements  
 
 As noted in the DARBC CDD program costs and projections of LCCs are outside 
the scope of this capstone project.  However specific systems attributes have been 
identified by capstone team members to be key cost driver risk areas that must be address 
at the earliest stages of the acquisition cycle in order to determine if trade offs in 
performance requirements may be necessary in order to meet the criticality of the mission 
that the DARBC radar system must perform.  The key anticipated cost driver risk areas 
that have been identified for the DARBC radar system are manning, reliability, 




 Identification of the lowest Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) levels must be 
acknowledged in order to distinguish risk events associated to the DARBC radar system.  
The WBS levels will be determined by using cost risk modeling software that includes a 
Monte Carlo Simulation to obtain a program level probability distribution.  The cost risk 
assessment modeling results will be utilized to determine actual risk cost overruns and to 
identify new risk drivers if applicable.  When possible the capstone team should 
compared in use radar systems cost risk data to the DARBC radar system to assist in the 
identification of what cost risk drivers and software modeling will be required to 
effectively identify/compute cost risk drivers.  It should be noted that specific, relevant 
cost risk information used to developed other radar programs is very difficult to obtain 
because, once a radar system is fielded, the records related to the project are either 
archived or dispersed among the project participants.  
 
Logistics Risk Metric Assessments  
 
 Logistics risk metrics were performed for the DARBC radar system based on the 
key cost driver risk areas that were identified in the DARBC CDD.  The logistics risk 
metrics will be utilized to determine risk handling priorities, execute risk handling plans, 
observed the status of risk handling actions, determine and acquire the resources 
necessary to execute risk management strategies. To analyze the cost driver risk areas 
logistics risk metric tables were created to measure and rate program activities associated 
with specific critical logistics elements noted as Manpower and Personnel, Design 
Interface and Support Equipment.  
 
 Table 1.0 represents logistics risk metric rating values that has been assigned 
based on practical knowledge and experience. The numerical rating value (1) represents 
little or no program fulfillment with the completed metric or progress to completing the 
metric, (3) for minimum fulfillment, (5) for significant fulfillment and Not Applicable 
(N/A) if that metric is not applicable at the time of the assessment.  
 
Rating vs. Risk Conversion Table 1.0 
Rating Values Risk Assessment 
2.0 to 2.2 
 
2.3 to 3.7 
 












 Table 2.0 represents the Manpower and Personnel metrics requirements that will 
aid in understanding how to handle a potential cost risk problem. This risk metric will aid 
in determining the needs for military manning with proper skills and grades required to 
operate, maintain and support the DARBC radar system over its lifetime at peacetime and 
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wartime rates.  The Manpower and Personnel program activity rating received an overall 
risk assessment of moderate. This program activity rating could change if another cohort 
continues to work on this capstone project where cohort #4 stops based on risk metrics 




Manpower and Personnel  Table 2.0 
Program Activity Metrics Ratin
g 
1.1 Identifies requirements for: 
Special skills. 
Maintenance and operator labor hours by rate 
by year. 
Number of personnel by rate by maintenance 
level by year. 
1.2 Identifies requirements for manpower 
factors that impact system design utilization 
rates, pilot-to-seat ratios and maintenance 
ratios. 
1.3 Maintenance task times, maintenance 
skill levels and number of maintenance 
personnel required have been derived from 
the following: 
Reliability (e.g., MTBF). 
Maintainability (e.g., MTTR, maintenance 
task 
times). 
Availability (e.g., task time limits). 
Reliability and maintainability tests. 
Performance monitoring/fault detection/fault 
isolation and diagnostics. 













1. Maintenance Concept/Plan – 
includes identification of the frequency of 
failures for maintenance, maintenance task 
times, 
maintenance skill levels and number of 
maintenance personnel required. These 
factors are critical during the design phase to 











 Table 3.0 represents the Design Interface for reliability, maintainability, quality 
and availability metrics requirements that will aid in understanding how to handle a 
potential cost risk problem.  This risk metric will aid in determining systems engineering 
activities in which the DARBC radar system most perform to that impacts supportability 
concerns.  Many of the metrics received a score of 1 based on little information is 
available at this stage and scope for this project.  This program activity rating received an 
overall risk assessment of high.  The program activity rating could change if another 
cohort continues to work on this capstone project where cohort #4 stops based on risk 





Design Interface (Reliability, Maintainability, Quality and Availability) Table 3.0 
Program Activity Metrics Rating 
2.1 The following measures of effectiveness 
or 
equivalent are identified in measurable 
quantifiable terms based on similar systems 
and available detail design information: 
Availability. 
Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF). 
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR). 
Frequency and duration of preventive or 
scheduled maintenance. 
Battle damage repair capability. 
Readiness thresholds for all system 
downtime, 
including scheduled maintenance. 
2.2 Reliability, maintainability and 
availability of the system are continually 
assessed through analyses and testing to 
ensure life cycle objectives will be met. 
2.3 Design and layout minimizes 
unnecessary removal of items to gain access 
for maintenance and minimizes design of 
special tools. 
2.4 Maintainability predictions and task time 
analyses are completed for organizational 
level or shipboard maintenance as a 
minimum. 
2.5 Mock-ups, prototypes and/or simulations 
to assess accessibility are completed as part 
of design. 
2.6 Accessibility and maintainability are 
validated through tests. 
2.7 A quality program is established to 
assure 
implementation of design requirements into 

























2.0 Reliability, Maintainability, Quality 
and Availability – are requirements imposed 
or analyses performed to insure that the 
system is 
operationally ready for use when needed, 
will successfully perform assigned functions, 
and can be operated and maintained within 
the 











Table 4.0 represents the Dynamic/Static Radar-Ship Alignment or Calibration metrics 
requirements that will aid in understanding how to handle a potential cost risk problem.  
This risk metric will aid in determining maintenance and repair planning requirements for 
the DARBC radar system antenna elements that impacts supportability concerns.  Many 
of the metrics received a score of 1 based on little information is available at this stage 
and scope for this project.  This program activity rating received an overall risk 
assessment of high.  The program activity rating could change if another cohort continues 
to work on this capstone project where cohort #4 stops based on risk metrics receiving 




Dynamic/Static Radar-Ship Alignment or Calibration Table 4.0 
Program Activity Metrics Rating 
3.1 Establishes the diagnostics concept to test 
the antenna elements. 
3.2 Identifies test and fault isolation 
capabilities desired of automatic, semi-
automatic and manual test equipment at all 
maintenance levels, expressed in terms of 
realistic and affordable probabilities and 
confidence levels to repair or calibrate 
antenna elements. 
3.3 Identifies the SE associated with the most 
economical level of repair (usually 
determined in the level of repair analysis) 
unless over-ridden because of non-economic 
factors. 
3.4 Identifies manpower, training and 
maintenance task requirements. 
3.5 Identifies required technical 
documentation to support the SE. 
3.6 Identifies the level of maintenance at 
which the various SE is required to repair or 
calibrate antenna elements (e.g., 
organizational, 
intermediate and depot level maintenance). 
3.7 Types and quantity of SE for each 
location has been established. 
3.8 Calibration requirements are specified. 
3.9 Support Equipment Requirements 
Document is submitted by the contractor to 
justify SE 























3.0 Maintenance Plan to repair or 
calibrate antenna elements – includes 
documentation of the Support Equipment 
(SE) concept as a result of the level of repair 
analysis, organic 














 DARBC radar system logistics support elements and cost risk drivers metrics 
were identified to ensure the operational and the support characteristics for the radar will 
be achieved to perform its assigned mission effectively and efficiently over a 
operationally life-cycle time period.  A supportability strategy was identified which 
explains the levels of support required to sustain the DARBC radar system in the fleet 
and meet mission requirements.  Cost risk based modeling  was discuss as a requirement 
to estimate and management the cost for the DARBC radar system plus the need for a 
methodology to better estimate the cost of other systems attributes drivers that have been 
identified as potential risks drivers.  The cost risk model must also provide risks and 
uncertainty methods to structure a project cost estimate to produce a “range of probable 
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cost” and include explicit identification of high-cost and schedule risk drivers, leading to 
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